Phenomenology's Presence

Graduate Conference in Phenomenology,
University of Sussex, UK

13th & 14th June 2013

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Thursday, 13th June 2013, Room: MS3.07A (Medical School - BSMS)

09:00 – 10:00 Registration and Coffee

10:00 – 10:15 Welcome address

10:20 - 11:40 Session 1: Presence and Absence in Husserlian Phenomenology

Chair: Gabriel Martin

Speaker 1: James Jardine (Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copehnagen, Denmark)

Title of Paper: 'Presence and Absence in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Empathy'
Speaker 2: Marco Cavallaro (KU Leuven, Belgium)

Title of Paper: 'The Presence of the Past. The Past of the Presence. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the Possibilities of Forgetfulness'

11:40 - 11:50 BREAK

11:50 – 13:10 Session 2: Heidegger, Language and the Ready-to-hand

Chair: Carolina Christofidaki

Speaker 1: Joshua Bergamin (Durham University, UK)

Title of Paper: 'From Presence to Language: or, Towards a Heideggerian theory of consciousness'

Speaker 2: Katherine Kurtz (Villanova University, US)

Title of Paper: '"How to Include What is Seen with Hearing and Listening": The Problematic of Language in Being and Time'

13:10 - 14:00 LUNCH

14:00 - 15:20 Session 3: Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of
**Listening**

Chair: Patrick Levy

Speaker 1: Aaron Casley (University of Barcelona, Spain)
Title of Paper: 'Phenomenological Considerations in the Installation Work of Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller'

Speaker 2: Catherine Robb (University of Essex, UK)
Title of Paper: 'Silence at the Limits of Phenomenology: Listening to Merleau-Ponty and John Cage'

---

**15:20 - 15:30** BREAK

---

**15:30 - 16:50 ** Session 4: Heidegger's Appropriation of Christian Philosophy

Chair: Jana Elsen

Speaker 1: Victoria Davies (University of Oxford, UK)
Title of Paper: 'The Truth about Temporality: What is Heidegger's Understanding of Presence, and Where does it Come From?'

Speaker 2: Joshua Roe (University of Oxford, UK)
Title of Paper: 'The Appropriation of Scotist Philosophy in Martin Heidegger'
16:50 - 17:15 BREAK

17:15 - 18:45 Keynote Address
Professor Robert Bernasconi (Pennsylvania State University, US)
Title of Paper: 'The Play of Presence and Absence in Heidegger's Phenomenological Appropriation of Eckhart'
Chair: Dr. Paul Davies (University of Sussex, UK)

Conference Dinner
Friday 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Room: Jubilee 155 (Jubilee Building)

08:30 – 09:00 Registration and Coffee

09:10 – 10:30 Session 5: Presence and Absence in Heideggerian Phenomenology
Chair: e. Murat Celik

Speaker 1: Christos Hadjioannou (University of Sussex, UK)
Title of Paper: 'The Young Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Desire'

Speaker 2: Justin White (UC Riverside, US)
Title of Paper: 'Explaining Van Gogh's Shoes: A Heideggerian Response to Schapiro'

10:30 – 10:40 BREAK

10:40 - 12:00 Session 6: Beyond Presence and Beyond Givenness?
Chair: Dimitri Kladiskakis
Speaker 1: Seferin James (University College Dublin, Republic of Ireland)
Title of Paper: 'Absence and the Metaphysics of Presence'

Speaker 2: Mara Grinfelde (University of Latvia, Latvia)
Title of Paper: 'Is Non-intuitive Givenness Possible? An Evaluation of Jean-Luc Marion’s Response'

12.00 – 13.00 LUNCH

13.00 - 14.20 Session 7: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Politics
Chair: Will Rees

Speaker 1: David Martínez Rojas (University of Sussex, UK)
Title of Paper: 'Phenomenology and Critical Theory: Inequality and Equality in Ethics'

Speaker 2: Alexandra Popescu (University of Sussex, UK)
Title of Paper: 'The Absent Friend: Minimal Community in Lévinas and Derrida'

14:20 - 14:30 BREAK
14:30 - 16:00  Keynote Address

Professor Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex, UK)

Title of Paper: 'Freedom, Autonomy and Medio-Passivity in Heidegger's Essence of Freedom'

Chair: Dr. Michael Lewis (University of the West of England, UK)

16:00 - 17:30  BREAK

16:30 - 18:00  Closing Discussion

Discussion of the themes and findings of the conference led by Dr. Paul Davies (University of Sussex, UK) in conversation with Professor Robert Bernasconi (Pennsylvania State University, US)

18:00  Closing Remarks
Name: Joshua Bergamin (Durham University, UK)

Email: j.a.bergamin@durham.ac.uk

Title of Paper: ‘From Presence to Language: or, Towards a Heideggerian theory of consciousness’

Abstract: Presence is tied indelibly in Martin Heidegger's thinking to the human experience of being. A central concept in Being and Time is the 'clearing' (Lichtung)– a space within Dasein wherein entities come to presence. Presence here, like much of Heidegger's vocabulary, takes on a very particular meaning. It implies more than the mere occurring or coming-across of an entity– it is coming-to-be-with an entity in an entirely new way.

It is this change in Dasein's relationship to an entity that enters its clearing that I wish to explore here. For this change, I will hold, is at the very centre of our humanity, and the presencing of an entity as something in Dasein's clearing (for Heidegger buffs, its unconcealment) is the central moment of conscious experience.

To fully convey the significance of this moment, I will begin by teasing out Graham Harman's (2002) exciting redefinition of zuhandenheit, or readiness-to-hand. This way of being, he argues, extends far beyond the human use of equipment towards ends, but describes the state of process/flux that underpins all entities. While I will generally agree with his ontology, I argue that his extension of zuhanden relations to the inanimate realm glosses over the finer distinction of entities that are presenced in human consciousness. In human consciousness, I will argue, entities are not only experienced as frozen out of their ready-to-hand being, but are held so in an atemporal state. Re-reading
Being and Time through the lens of several of Heidegger's lecture courses, I will argue that this state—and therefore, a specifically human consciousness—is made possible only by language.

I will conclude by suggesting that understanding language's relation with presence, time and consciousness in this way will open some fertile paths for exploring the nature of the Self and its relation to the world.

Name: Aaron Casley (University of Barcelona, Spain)
Email: aaron.casley@gmail.com

Title of Paper: 'Phenomenological Considerations in the Installation Work of Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller'

Abstract: What is the role of phenomenology in contemporary art? When the English translation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception was first published in 1962, New York was the capital of the art world and radical changes were taking place. Robert Morris's Boxes (1961) and Donald Judd's Relief Paintings (1961-1962) are examples of what was a new art practice, now referred to as minimalism. The primary focus of the work was upon the interaction between the art object and the viewer's body, and greatly complimented Merleau-Ponty's ideas. The transition away from the gallery wall and into the gallery space, in Judd's own words using "real materials in real space", represented not only a new way of viewing the art work (from the body), but a new conception of what art should be. Meaning is derived solely from the presence of the viewer, rather than existing intrinsically within the work itself. Half a century later, and the assimilation between these early works and phenomenology has already been widely discussed, but the central concept of art as something that needs to be physically encountered by the viewer has not gone away. In the installation work, or sound walks of contemporary artists Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller, sound is the primary medium through which to explore the physical environments either set up or selected by the artists. Complex themes ranging from environmentalism, identity, place or the unconscious are encountered, and embodied perception is posited as the primary means of exploring the work. The viewer interprets these scenes through the act of imagining, which Edward Casey insists is an intrinsic feature
of all aesthetic experience. What is absent from the work is often as important as that which is present, and phenomenology plays an essential role in understanding the significance of such work.

---

**Name:** Marco Cavallaro (KU Leuven, Belgium)

**Email:** marco.cavallaro@student.kuleuven.be

**Title of Paper:** ‘The Presence of the Past. The Past of the Presence. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the Possibilities of Forgetfulness’

**Abstract:** In this paper I will take on the issue of time in Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In particular, I will compare Husserl's early theory of time-consciousness and Merleau-Ponty’s later conception of an immemorial past. The central issue that bounds these, in some respects, very different pictures of time, I will argue, is the attempt to account for the presence of the past: How is consciousness conscious of the past? How does the presence of the past condition and shape the consciousness of the present?

The title of my paper suggests two directions to grasp phenomenologically the presence of the past, which correspond to the two different views respectively embraced by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. On the one hand, the past is interpreted only as a temporal modification of the present which, in turn, represents the fundamental dimension of time. By means of remembering I experience the past solely as having been present. Therefore, Husserl's early theory of time seems to reflect the limits of a metaphysics of presence, as Heidegger pointed out. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty's different perspective underlines the autonomous character of the past and its fundamental priority with respect to the present. Merleau-Ponty's account of an immemorial past, developed in the Working Notes of *The Visible and the Invisible* as well as his early reference to the dimension of “a past that has never been present” in the *Phenomenology of Perception* offer a picture of time which overcomes the limits of a metaphysics of presence. The original past is not only unattainable for the activity of remembering, but also is considered by Merleau-Ponty as a condition of possibility for perception and, hence, for the presence itself.

I will conclude my talk by depicting the notion of “transcendental forgetfulness” which is at stake in Merleau-Ponty's picture of time.
Name: Victoria Davies (University of Oxford, UK)

Email: victoria.davies@theology.ox.ac.uk

Title of Paper: ‘The Truth about Temporality: What is Heidegger’s Understanding of Presence, and Where does it Come From?’

Abstract: What is presence in Heidegger’s thought? How do things presence, and what is it that they presence over against? I offer a paper that addresses the nature of presence in Heidegger’s thought, beginning in Being and Time’s Augenblick, and delving into the nature of the event (Ereignis) with special focus on Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event. This will refer to the fissure, the leap into which is the realisation of whatever it is that Heidegger terms presence, coming about and happening, co-responsively, in the primal strife between beyng and beings. Moreover, I will look to how presence relates to the unconcealing (aletheia) of truth: that truth is not, but rather, it happens.

With the question, ‘Where does it Come From?’ I intend the double meaning: the question as to how presence comes about and from what primordial structures can we understand it (the nature of its ‘upon-which’), and the question of the inherited ideas of presence and the present. I will touch briefly on Husserl, but ultimately look to Kierkegaard. I will address the nature of the inheritance of ‘the moment’ from Kierkegaard, and touch on whether Kierkegaard is best understood as a proto-phenomenologist. (This perhaps addresses, to some extent, the status of phenomenology in theology.)

If Heidegger does inherit Kierkegaard’s moment (and I argue he does), and if Kierkegaard is ‘everywhere metaphysically entangled’, what does this mean about Heidegger’s understanding of presence? Is Caputo essentially right to critique Heidegger’s understanding of presence in terms of a monument to metaphysics? I seek to argue that with the appropriate articulation, phenomenology can and should offer an alternative to the scientific-
metaphysical Weltbild, with which (a certain kind of ‘post-metaphysical’) theology is a potential - unlikely - bedfellow.

Name: Mara Grinfelde (University of Latvia, Latvia)

Email: mara.grinfelde@gmail.com

Title of Paper: Is Non-intuitive Givenness Possible? An Evaluation of Jean-Luc Marion's Response

Abstract: While French thinker Jean-Luc Marion is probably best known for his hypothesis of “saturated phenomenon” – a hypothesis of a phenomenon that is characterized through the excess of intuition over intention –, a close reading of his works “Being Given” and “In Excess” allows to introduce a distinction between saturated phenomenon (intuitive givenness) and phenomenon of revelation (non-intuitive givenness). Marion claims that both of them can be characterized as givenness that shows itself in and from itself, namely, as phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the meaning giving activity of subjectivity. In other words, both of them are unconditioned or pure givenness. The difference is that while saturated phenomenon as the excess of intuition shows itself directly, phenomenon of revelation, being non-intuitive, shows itself indirectly. The aim of this paper is to question the meaning and phenomenological possibility of non-intuitive givenness. The question of the phenomenological possibility of non-intuitive givenness presupposes questioning the meaning of “indirect phenomenalization.” What does it mean that unconditioned givenness shows itself indirectly? According to Marion, unconditioned givenness shows itself only through other phenomena – therefore indirectly – as a necessary condition of phenomenality. It is argued however that based on both Marion's description of intuition and examples of non-intuitive givenness (birth, death and time), it must be equated either 1) with unfulfilled meaning-intention (something that is merely thought) or 2) with speculative ideal. In both cases Marion is not able to maintain the characterization of non-intuitive givenness as givenness that shows itself in and from itself. In other words, indirect phenomenalization can be equated with either phenomenon that
shows itself as intentional object within the reduced sphere of transcendental subjectivity or the speculative ideal that exceeds experience.

Name: Christos Hadjioannou (University of Sussex, UK)
Email: C.Hadjioannou@sussex.ac.uk

Title of Paper: 'The Young Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Desire'

Abstract: Phenomenology has always paid careful attention to the interplay between presence and absence. But this interplay has also been a popular topic of other approaches, notably the ones stemming from Hegelian dialectics, which relied on a paradigm of subjectivity developed in terms of the operation of desire as lack/absence.

Heideggerian (and Husserlian) phenomenology developed out of the paradigm of givenness, seemingly leaving no space for a notion of absence as desire. Whenever we look for the disclosure of absence in Heidegger, we normally look at the mood of Angst in Being and Time (1927) (§53), or -say- at his lecture What is Metaphysics (1929) where his ontological account of the “Nothing” as the ground of all determinate (dialectical) negation renders his account incompatible with dialectical absence and desire. Ultimately, Angst is a “mood” and its operation differs ontologically from the operation of desire.

Last year Professor Miguel de Beistegui presented a paper on the contemporary French phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras (Sorbonne), who tries to articulate a phenomenology of desire. Most of Barbaras’ works are as yet untranslated but from the few that they have been translated into English, we can already get a glimpse of what a phenomenology of desire would amount to. In this paper, I will present the main arguments he offers in the essay Life, Movement, and Desire (2008), and by virtue of juxtaposition show how the young Heidegger had already offered such a phenomenological path of a phenomenology of desire.
This is a path that we find in Heidegger before his ontological turn, most notably in the Kriegsnötsemester lecture titled Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1919). We can rethink Heidegger’s phenomenology in light of a juxtaposition with Barbaras’ text, and explore an alternative Heideggerian path, one that includes the notion of desire.

In the paper we will explore how Barbaras rethinks the unity and accomplishment of life as desire, thus putting “incompleteness” and absence at the heart of life; absence as that towards which life strives rather than as a lack out of which life comes (i.e. contra Jonas’ definition of life as a metabolic tendency to preservation). In our analysis of Heidegger’s KNS lecture, we will explore the notions of motivation and tendency, and see how they satisfy the criteria set by Barbaras while also seeing how they amount to a radicalization of Husserl’s (and Brentano’s) notion of intentionality as derived from the medieval notion of desire (ὀρέξις).

Name: Seferin James (University College Dublin, Republic of Ireland)
Email: seferin@gmail.com

Title of Paper: ‘Absence and the Metaphysics of Presence’

Abstract: Descartes, Hume, Kant and Husserl all appealed to the presence of intuition – whether performative, sensible, intelligible or phenomenological – as grounds for the reform of philosophy through a resistance to metaphysical dogmatism. This resistance to dogmatic speculation was felt to give philosophy its dignity. Derrida appears to invert this convention and throw philosophy’s sense of its own dignity into disarray when he asserts that presence is not the resistance to metaphysics but metaphysics itself. This would seem to make it difficult, if not impossible, to demarcate metaphysics from that which is not metaphysics. Derrida sometimes acknowledges this difficulty and at other times writes, notably while denouncing Husserl, as if a resistance to metaphysics is still possible. This paper will argue that there are traces of both the traditional sense
of metaphysics and the conventional resistance to it in Derrida’s writings in that (a) some of what Derrida denounces under the heading of the metaphysics of presence is clearly metaphysical but not obviously presence; (b) there is still a trace of what was formerly termed presence being deployed by Derrida against metaphysics. If both the metaphysics of presence and the resistance to it in Derrida’s consideration of Husserl involves the presencing of absence and absent presence, then how would it be possible to distinguish between the horizon of the Husserlian and Levinasian trace?

Name: James Jardine (Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

Email: jamesjardine0@gmail.com

Title of Paper: 'Presence and Absence in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Empathy'

Abstract: Edmund Husserl’s work on empathy implies two lines of thought, which taken together appear in tension. On the one hand, empathy is described as an irreducible, intuitive and original experience of another person, in which the other is given as herself there before me in bodily presence. This other person of empathy is a “thoroughly intuitive” expressive whole, bearing two intertwined dimensions, a lived body as essentially personally significant and a personal subject as essentially manifesting herself in a lived body. On the other hand, Husserl maintains that, as experience of subjectivity, empathy is a non-original presentification, and indeed that empathized content, as the content of a foreign consciousness, can only be what it is for me in its absence. Thus the only subject genuinely given in empathy is the empathizing Ego, which serves as analogon for the interpretive apprehension of the empathized Alter Ego. Put briefly, Husserl’s analyses seem to lead him to the conclusion that empathy intends the other, at once and in the unity of a single act, in a peculiarly divided manner, both as a ‘present’ intentional object, and an ‘absent’ intentional subject.
**Name:** Katherine Kurtz (Villanova University, US)

**Email:** kkurtz1@villanova.edu

**Title of Paper:** "How to Include What is Seen with Hearing and Listening": The Problematic of Language in Being and Time

**Abstract:** This paper works primarily with Heidegger’s Being and Time to situate the presence of language within Dasein’s encounters with being-in-the-world, in order to clarify the nature of the relationship between language and being already at play within his early work. Here, Heidegger situates language within the primordial existential structure of the being of Dasein in a way that grants ontological significance to the ontic phenomenon of speech as Dasein’s factual possibility for authentic shared worldly disclosure. However, Heidegger struggles to secure the relation of language to being, reflected in his unanswered question, “Is [language] an innerworldly useful thing at hand or does it have the mode of being of Dasein, or neither of the two?” This paper will navigate this question by distinguishing the ways in which language presents itself in three particular modes of speech identified by Heidegger: the everyday of discursive speech, the apparent absence of speech in the silence that accompanies anxiety, and the more elusive, mysteriously dubbed “poetic” [dichtende]. Both discursive and poetic speech are so constituted for authentic worldly disclosure, but whereas discourse has the tendency to fall prey to idle talk, Heidegger singles out the poetic as that mode of speech that has the disclosing of existence as its true aim. This paper will argue that it is precisely this tendency of discourse that necessitates something like the poetic to keep open the possibility for authentic shared disclosure via language that is not entirely severed from the everyday. With the help of Robert Bernasconi’s explication of the nothingness (or nothingness) that belongs to language in the absence of speech, the case will be made for the poetic as crucial for preserving the connection to being in everyday language, insofar as it provokes an experience which inverts Dasein’s mistaken dominance with respect to language, foreboding of Heidegger’s later work.
Abstract: Over the last few years, there has been an increase in the interest in Emmanuel Lévinas’s work, and particularly in the relation between ethics and politics. This has been influenced, to a great extent, by Jacques Derrida’s influential writings on Lévinas. There has also been a debate, extending over a considerable number of years, over the function of deconstruction, and whether one could speak of it as having any ethical import on the one hand, and political import on the other. Commentators have been split between those who see Derrida’s work as continuing the Lévinasian legacy, and thus having little to offer to the political, and those who would like to divorce the trajectory of deconstruction from the Lévinasian heritage, and thus reveal it as being inherently political. The above split in interpretation is largely based on the divergence of interpretation of Lévinas’s own writings as essentially about ethics, and therefore as either having little to offer to the political, or as undergoing something like a ‘split’ in later writings, such as Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, with the focus coming to rest more clearly on politics through the figure of the third.

In this paper, I argue that Derrida’s development of the concept of ‘minimal friendship’ as ‘absence within presence’ in Politics of Friendship can be traced to the Levinasian development of the ‘other-within-the-self’ in Otherwise than Being. Derrida suggests ‘minimal friendship’ as the political form of being-with demanded by the ‘infinite heterogeneity’ and ‘dissymmetrical curving’ that the Levinasian concept of the other-within-the-self demands. Friendship thus emerges as a spacing within which ‘minimal community’ arises. My proposal resolves the impasse mentioned above: I argue that Derrida’s thought on the political need not be divorced from the Levinasian trajectory, since the Levinasian concept of the ‘other-within-the-self’ in already a concept which establishes politics as the necessary, interruptive force within the ethical.
Title of Paper: 'Silence at the Limits of Phenomenology: Listening to Merleau-Ponty and John Cage'

Abstract: How is it possible to envisage a phenomenology of silence, if silence is distinctively the absence of sound? Is silence better thought of as an absent presence, or a present absence? Merleau-Ponty considers silence as the dialectical opposite of language and gesture, as the temporal beginning of expression, as mute experience awaiting expression through sound. Silence is a pregnant potentiality that allows expression to be brought forth to presence. From this reading, silence is an absence, not necessarily negative, but one which allows for sound to emerge as present. However, this phenomenology of silence has to be questioned when we consider John Cage's seminal composition, entitled 4'33, consisting of four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence. By composing silence, Cage reverses the role of silence; silence is not prior to expression but is the expression itself. This is apt both for the performer, who is performing silence, and for the audience, who are intentionally listening to and hearing musical silence as the outcome of a performative gesture. Significantly, Cage's silence is no longer an absence but a present object open to musical and phenomenological analysis. Should we now automatically reject Merleau-Ponty's theory of silence? I suggest that by looking at Merleau-Ponty's later work, 'The Visible and the Invisible', a phenomenology of silence can be reconstructed that figures silence not through the dialectical opposition of absence and presence, but as an in-visible or hidden-presence. Silence is thus an intermediary, the transition between the dialectic, which both explains the potentiality of silence as prior to expression, and the intentionality of Cage's silence. Thus, silence is neither an absent presence nor a present absence, but the pivot between the two.
Email: joshua.roe@stx.ox.ac.uk

Title of Paper: 'The Appropriation of Scotist Philosophy in Martin Heidegger'

Abstract: This paper will argue that Heidegger's appropriation of Duns Scotus employs an understanding of transcendence distinct from the prevalence of immanence in Deleuze's interpretation of Scotus. In his habilitation, Heidegger attempted to find traces of phenomenology in scholastic thinking, with particular focus on a work by Duns Scotus (although now believed to have been authored by Thomas of Erfurt, a disciple of Scotus). He argued that Scotus recognised the distinction between things that are real and things that are abstract. This provides the basis for an indication of the priority of givenness in phenomenology. Whereby, the real is equivalent to the given and the abstract is derived from the given. Thus the abstract is secondary to the real. Heidegger then applied the division between real and abstract to a discussion of the medieval debate on three types of language: univocal, denoting things which have a common definition and name; equivocal, denoting things which have a common name but distinct meaning; and analogy, which describes how something that is distinct can also have something common within it. Heidegger argued that, in analogy, dissimilarity is not necessarily dependent on similarity in the same way that the abstract is dependent on the real. Therefore analogy, for Heidegger, is no less basic than the real as given. Scotus has also risen to prominence in the work of Giles Deleuze, who proposed the priority of the Scotist idea of univocity as emphasising immanence. Deleuze argues that being is primarily defined by univocity, which then has diversity within itself. Philip Tonner, in his recent book on univocity in Heidegger, reads the Habilitation through the lens of Deleuzian univocity. However I will argue that Heidegger did not regard analogy as reducible to univocity, but appreciates how analogy could be distinct from univocal terms.

Name: David Martínez Rojas (University of Sussex, UK)

Email: dm295@sussex.ac.uk
Abstract: In Levinas’s and Derrida’s thought there is a point of view that represents a real challenge for theories of morality in the Kantian tradition. This point is grounded in the phenomenology of the encounter with the other and it conveys concepts such as asymmetry and infinite responsibility. In Levinas’ this encounter implies infinity because ontological relations that form totalities reduce the otherness into the same of the subject. This relation properly understood means that the other cannot be reduced to the same, she escapes the power of the subject, she impacts me like any other object or force. Due to this, in phenomenology, from intersubjectivity emerges inequality as a principle of ethics. This is different in deontology, because in this case, from intersubjectivity emerges equality and symmetry as core concepts of ethics. This is clear in Habermas’s Discourse principle, where it is implied that persons are free and equal (just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses). According to Derrida, from equality we cannot come to terms with the other in her difference, therefore, only in opposition to this principle can the other be recognized. In phenomenology, ethics should be grounded on the idea of the infinity of the other, and it implies a dimension of asymmetry. However, is it really the case that asymmetry is absent in Habermas’s? In his concept of memory Habermas states that participants have a responsibility regarding the otherness of past and future generations. Furthermore, in his concept of solidarity, the vulnerability of the other should be recognized and protected with empathy. In this context I want to develop both approaches (I&II); finally I will contrast them, discussing whether Habermas, through memory and solidarity, properly includes the dimension of asymmetry (III).

Name: Justin White (UC Riverside, US)

Email: justin.fred@gmail.com
**Title of Paper:** 'Explaining Van Gogh's Shoes: A Heideggerian Response to Schapiro'

**Abstract:** Meyer Schapiro famously criticized Heidegger's interpretation of Van Gogh's A Pair of Shoes, largely because Heidegger was wrong about whose shoes they were. In *Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger suggests that the painting discloses the world of the peasant woman, but the shoes depicted in the painting were likely a city man's shoes. Yet how can Van Gogh's Shoes disclose a peasant woman's world, the criticism goes, if it depicts neither a peasant's nor a woman's shoes? Some have found this criticism effective, while others think it misses Heidegger's point of how art discloses a world. Although not framing it in this way, Beátrice Han-Pile's discussion in “Describing Reality or Disclosing Worldhood” goes a long way toward suggesting how one might explain Heidegger's (mis)interpretation of Van Gogh's Shoes. She claims that any interpretation of an artwork involves a fusion of sorts. The artwork discloses structures of its world, but the interpreter will need to fill in the gaps, as it were. In addition to aesthetic sensitivity, attention to detail, and such, our knowledge of the original world of the artwork will determine the degree of proximity between the original world of the artwork and the hybrid world resulting from the interpreter's filling in the structures disclosed by the work of art. This framework provides the resources to rescue Heidegger's seemingly failed interpretation of Van Gogh, thereby responding to Schapiro's influential criticism. Van Gogh's Shoes discloses a world, but Heidegger fleshes out the world of the shoes in an inevitably idiosyncratic but in this case historically inaccurate way. That shortcoming, however, does not make Heidegger's phenomenological account of art irrelevant. Heidegger's discussion of the way artworks can be world disclosive need not lose its potency, even if Heidegger as interpreter of Van Gogh leaves something to be desired.