{"id":1751,"date":"2023-09-07T11:35:42","date_gmt":"2023-09-07T10:35:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/?p=1751"},"modified":"2023-09-07T14:20:54","modified_gmt":"2023-09-07T13:20:54","slug":"is-money-laundering-a-form-of-strategic-corruption","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/2023\/09\/07\/is-money-laundering-a-form-of-strategic-corruption\/","title":{"rendered":"Is money laundering a form of strategic corruption?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Professor Robert Barrington<\/strong> looks at the intent behind flows of dark money into the UK – and concludes that the UK is ill-equipped to deal with the threat of strategic corruption.<\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Brompton Road Tube Station. Source: Kotomi_\/Flickr<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

When lots of Russian money flows into London and the UK financial system, is there any malevolent intent behind it? Setting aside the unproven theories about Russian funding for the pro-Brexit<\/a> campaign, there are plenty of examples that throw up red flags – such as the Lebedev peerage<\/a>, the involvement of Russians as political party donors<\/a>, oligarchs investing<\/a> in strategic (though legitimate) businesses, and philanthropic donations to universities<\/a>.  But these are red flags only because of the nationalities of those involved, not because of proven corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question of the intent behind such activities has arisen because the dealings of Russia in Ukraine – for some years before the invasion – have brought to the world’s attention an issue that has come to be known as ‘strategic corruption’. This is essentially the promotion of corruption in another country by a sponsoring government to further its national interest or foreign policy objectives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concept of strategic corruption started to appear in the lexicon of corruption terms towards the end of the 2010s.\u202f Alternative framings include ‘corruption as statecraft<\/a>‘, used by Transparency International in a 2019 report; and the ‘weaponisation of corruption’. The term strategic corruption has gained wider exposure through being included in the US Government\u2019s Countering-Corruption Strategy<\/a> (2022), where it is defined as: \u201cwhen a government weaponizes corrupt practices as a tenet of its foreign policy.”\u202fThis echoes the description offered by a comprehensive article in Foreign Affairs<\/a> (2020): \u201ca country\u2019s weaponization of corruption against other states in pursuit of national goals.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s involvement in various activities within Ukraine prior to 2022 \u2013 for example, in providing covert financial and other support for corrupt politicians known to support Russian influence over Ukraine \u2013 is often cited as an example of strategic corruption. However, many of its characteristics do not differ from those used by both sides in the Cold War to advance their national interests and foreign policy objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are several beneficiaries of strategic corruption, not all of whom may themselves be corrupt:  <\/p>\n\n\n\n