{"id":1824,"date":"2025-07-22T10:37:00","date_gmt":"2025-07-22T09:37:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/?p=1824"},"modified":"2025-07-22T14:28:21","modified_gmt":"2025-07-22T13:28:21","slug":"tasmanias-hidden-tax-elite-cartel-corruption-and-its-real-costs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/2025\/07\/22\/tasmanias-hidden-tax-elite-cartel-corruption-and-its-real-costs\/","title":{"rendered":"Tasmania\u2019s Hidden Tax: Elite Cartel Corruption and Its Real Costs"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"
Image of Aurora Australis, southern Tasmania. \u00a9 Tas Orchid Hunter Geoff Curry 2023<\/a>. Used with permission.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Robyn A. Lewis[1]<\/a>
Michael Johnston[2]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Australia\u2019s island state Tasmania faces another cluster of economic, social and environmental crises. Despite intermittent growth, Tasmania remains Australia\u2019s poorest, least dynamic state<\/a>. In 2023-24, GSP[3]<\/a> per capita was A$70,679, 73% of Australia\u2019s per capita GDP (DTF, 2024). Tasmania\u2019s  projected debt position<\/a> is A$13billion (DTF, 2025a) largely accrued since 2020 (Eslake, 2025b).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other structural problems have re-emerged. In 2022-23, 15,222 people[4]<\/sup><\/a> left Tasmania \u2013 up 24% in a decade<\/a> \u2013 a net interstate loss of 3271<\/a> (ABS, 2025; Denny, 2024b). Tasmania\u2019s \u201cbrain drain<\/a>\u201d persists:  in 2021, 34% of emigrating 20-30-year-olds had degrees, versus 17% remaining (ABS, 2022), 61% of whom report being overqualified or unemployed<\/a>. Tasmania\u2019s population is ageing, with low literacy rates (Equity Economics, 2023). Innovation suffers; in 2022-23 \u2018innovation-active\u2019 Tasmanian businesses ranked last (38.7%),[5]<\/sup><\/a>  lagging Australia\u2019s average 45.7% (DISR, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These issues are not new. Fundamental causes identified in five major Inquiries<\/a> from Lockyer (1926) to Nixon (1997) \u2013 including \u201cpoor design of \u2026 Tasmanian institutions\u201d (Rae, 2002) \u2013 remain largely unaddressed. In our previous posts<\/a> we outlined Tasmania\u2019s Elite Cartels  (ECs) corruption syndrome (Johnston, 2005; 2014). EC corruption revolves around collusive networks of elites[6]<\/a> \u2013 e.g.<\/em> business, news media, political leaders \u2013 forming strong informal alliances<\/a> to maintain their own economic and political advantages, operating by sector, marginalising competitors and broader social interests. Despite little overt bribery, ECs are corrupt because they exclude citizens from democratic processes and decisions affecting their lives (Warren, 2004).<\/p>\n\n\n\n


However, corruption\u2019s impact on Tasmania\u2019s socio-economic situation[7]<\/a> has never been quantified. Corruption is costly, globally \u2013 including in Australia (Moore, 2023) \u2013 but estimates are imprecise; most is secretive, and corruption\u2019s boundaries remain undefined.  The UN Secretary-General stated in 2018 that the global cost of corruption<\/a> is at least 5% of global GDP annually[8]<\/a>, of which bribery alone is estimated at 2% (UNODC, 2023), although statistics are contested (Wathne and Stephenson, 2021).  The few attempts to quantify the cost of corruption in Australia have encountered similar methodological issues, but in 2018 estimated the cost at 4% of GDP<\/a>, since revised upwards (Laing, 2023; Smith, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many EC corruption processes are informal, opaque, legal \u2013 or not clearly illegal \u2013 and thus even harder to quantify and easy to overlook.  Direct measurement would require distinguishing between legal, grey-zone[9]<\/a> and normal private-sector activities, made more difficult by increasing delegation to consultancies (Mazzucato and Collington, 2023) and by ECs blurring public and private sector boundaries (Johnston, 2005, Ch.5; 2014, Ch.6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As shown previously<\/a>, many cases are things that do not happen<\/em>: public consultations avoided, competitors not entering economic or political arenas, broadly beneficial legislation never enacted<\/a>. But their costs are real, and substantial. Any monetary estimate would likely be low, because the costs are broader, deeper, long-term, and include lost opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever the amount, Tasmanians pay a \u2018corruption tax\u2019 via <\/em>reduced prosperity and poorer services and facilities. Indeed, in some countries chronically underfunded health and education are indicators of corruption (Gupta et.al., 2001). Average households and front-line service providers feel the pain daily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elite Cartels and Stagnation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

We cannot attribute all Tasmania\u2019s problems to EC corruption. Geographically, Tasmania is small and isolated; employment options are limited, and external opportunities \u2013 including training, careers, higher incomes \u2013 are enticing. Many current industries are resource-exploitative, posing threats to the state\u2019s natural environment. Some sectors lag in technology and expertise, including management (Skills Tasmania, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such reduced innovation, socio-economic stagnation and the activities of Tasmania\u2019s ECs are tightly interrelated. Dominant interests protect existing advantages, skew policy, and attempt to minimise scrutiny and adverse regulation (Nixon, 1997), while portraying their schemes as Tasmania\u2019s only short-term opportunities[10]<\/a>. Such inverse correlations between economic growth and levels of corruption have also been demonstrated in the USA (Dincer and Johnston, 2025). In Tasmania, the lure of \u201ccargo-cult\u201d developments \u2013 single, large, exogenous \u2018silver bird\u2019 industries hoped to transform the economy[11]<\/a> (McCall, 2011) \u2013 is historically close to the EC agenda (Gale, 2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The political logic of protecting existing hegemonies is similar. In both the economic and political arenas new competitors and innovators are resisted. Youth emigration harms families and businesses but having potential advocates of change \u2018take the exit option\u2019 (Hirschman, 1970) may politically advantage ECs. And just as a stagnating economic and political situation can be conducive to EC dominance, their influence, inertia, and closed-off style of decision-making can preserve the status quo.

The result is a situation that may seem sustainable but produces a long, gradual, self-perpetuating decline in which corruption is not just a cause of economic stagnation, but a symptom of complacency \u2013 difficult to change because it serves and protects those whose interests and relationships prevail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indirect Impacts and Inequality
<\/strong>
The full picture is worse: less-affluent citizens and communities have fewer economic opportunities and alternatives and are likely more dependent upon impacted public services. Moreover, corruption distorts government priorities towards big-ticket projects (e.g.<\/em> infrastructure) \u2013 where corruption is easily concealed and enormously lucrative (up to 30-50% of project costs internationally; OECD, 2024) \u2013 at the expense of public health and education, where illicit profits are smaller and accrue more slowly (Mauro et.al., 2019). Unlike taxes, the benefits flow to the connected \u2013 not chosen democratically or on merit \u2013 while costs, including environmental, are socialised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Less obvious costs include diminished capacity to recognise and respond to statewide problems, declining accountability and transparency<\/a>, and prevailing frustration and demoralisation stemming from public resignation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The big unknown regarding any claim about corruption\u2019s effects is: what would have happened without it? That is particularly difficult in examining ECs, whose deals in old-boys\u2019 clubs, corporate boxes and 19th<\/sup>-holes are generally legal<\/a> \u2013 if inaccessible \u2013 and self-perpetuating. They appear as \u2018business as usual\u2019 because they are, since the 1960s at least (Eldridge, 1972). Like illiteracy, Tasmania\u2019s EC corruption is inter-generational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasmania without the \u2018<\/strong>MONA effect<\/strong><\/a>\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Moorilla Museum of Antiquities, precursor to MONA, Hobart, Tasmania. \u00a9 Architects Designhaus, Tasmania 1999<\/a>. Used with permission.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

ECs can wield their influence, and do their damage, in surprising ways. One impactful case is Tasmania\u2019s Museum of Old and New Art[12]<\/sup><\/a>, which re-energised Tasmania (Franklin, 2017). MONA\u2019s initial estimated economic benefits in 2011\/12 were $54 million (Ryan, 2015) plus multiplier effects<\/a>, rising to $134.5 million by 2017\/18; despite COVID<\/a> they are back on track<\/a>.  Yet it was nearly sabotaged. In 1998, entrepreneur David Walsh planned MONA\u2019s pilot trial Museum of Antiquities<\/a>. But minutes before the permit deadline, an objection was lodged on the claim the heritage waterfront house contained Tasmania\u2019s first ensuite bathroom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the objector had not seen the bathroom. Challenged at an official meeting, the objection was withdrawn.[13]<\/a> Whistleblowers later revealed associates\u2019 plans to privately acquire the site for retirement units. Had EC cronyism prevailed, Tasmania\u2019s loss would have been enormous: MONA transformed Tasmania\u2019s tourism and arts industries<\/a>, brand reputation and cultural identity<\/a>. Tasmania without MONA and the employment, businesses, confidence and other benefits<\/a> generated is almost unimaginable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MONA provides a global example<\/a> of the benefits of opposing corruption. How many other Tasmanian ideas, opportunities and transformative projects have been stymied by ECs and their vested- or conflicts of interest, including local government<\/a> connections? We will never know. But we can imagine Tasmania without these corrosive influences: where innovation and opportunity thrives for all, not just the few, young people can settle and build careers, and public services are robust and accountable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Understanding to Reform 
<\/strong>
The Elite Cartels syndrome offers a subtler \u2013 but in Tasmania, more realistic \u2013 understanding of corruption than the dramatic, bribery-intensive, black-bag scenarios historically associated with the term corruption.  It is about who never \u2018gets in the room\u2019. Addressing EC corruption is not just a matter of new laws and administrative arrangements. Rather, fundamental justice, transparency, accountability, economic openness, and democratic reinvigoration are needed to create a better, sustainable future for all. Our next instalment explores some effective responses.

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABS (2024a) Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, 2023-24 financial year.<\/em> Australian Bureau of Statistics. Available at: https:\/\/www.abs.gov.au\/statistics\/economy\/national-accounts\/australian-national-accounts-state-accounts\/latest-release<\/a> (Accessed: 13 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABS (2024b) Personal Income in Australia, 2021-22 financial year. <\/em>Australian Bureau of Statistics. Available at: https:\/\/www.abs.gov.au\/statistics\/labour\/earnings-and-working-conditions\/personal-income-australia\/latest-release<\/a> (Accessed: 13 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABS (2025) National, state and territory population, September 2024 | Australian Bureau of Statistics<\/em>, Australian Bureau of Statistics<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.abs.gov.au\/statistics\/people\/population\/national-state-and-territory-population\/latest-release<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Denny, L. (2024a) Leaving Tasmania Report – Tasmanian Times<\/em>, Tasmania Times<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/tasmaniantimes.com\/2024\/03\/leaving-tasmania\/<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Denny, L. (2024b) \u2018Population Change in Tasmania: back to the future?\u2019, InSummary<\/em>, 14 June. Available at: https:\/\/lisadenny.substack.com\/p\/population-change-in-tasmania-back<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dincer, O. and Johnston, M. (2025) Corruption in America A Fifty-Ring Circus. 1st edn. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https:\/\/www-cambridge-org.sussex.idm.oclc.org\/core\/books\/corruption-in-america\/7838277A0FC1DF353696F1CCAC57600D (Accessed: 2 May 2025).

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DISR (2024) Innovation outcomes | Australian Innovation Statistics | Department of Industry Science and Resources<\/em>, https:\/\/www.industry.gov.au\/node\/93968<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.industry.gov.au\/publications\/australian-innovation-statistics\/innovation-outcomes<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DTF (2024) AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: STATE ACCOUNTS, ABS CAT NO 5220.0: TABLE 15<\/em>, Department of Treasury and Finance, Tasmania<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.treasury.tas.gov.au\/Documents\/State-Accounts.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DTF (2025a) 2024-25 Revised Estimates Reports (including December Quarterly Reports) | Treasury and Finance Tasmania<\/em>, Department of Treasury and Finance, Tasmania<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.treasury.tas.gov.au\/budget-and-financial-management\/financial-reports\/revised-estimates-reports-(including-december-quarterly-reports)<\/a> (Accessed: 16 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DTF (2025b) Treasury and Finance Tasmania<\/em>, Department of Treasury and Finance, Tasmania<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.treasury.tas.gov.au\/<\/a> (Accessed: 13 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eldridge, S. (1972) \u2018Damania. The Hydro-Electric Commission, The Environment & Government in Tasmania. by JONES, RICHARD; Editor.\u2019, in Damania<\/em>. Hobart, Tasmania: Fullers Publishing, pp. 1\u20134. Available at: https:\/\/www.abebooks.com\/Damania-Hydro-Electric-Commission-Environment-Government-Tasmania\/30453635078\/bd<\/a> (Accessed: 16 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equity Economics (2023) Saving Money by Spending: Solving Illiteracy in Australia<\/em>. Sydney NSW: Equity Economics, p. 63. Available at: https:\/\/www.equityeconomics.com.au\/report-archive\/saving-money-by-spending-solving-illiteracy-in-australia<\/a> (Accessed: 18 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eslake, S. (2025b) Tasmania\u2019s Financial Woes – Presentation to U3A Hobart<\/em>, U3A<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.u3ahobart.org.au\/course-resources\/<\/a> (Accessed: 16 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Franklin, A. (2017) \u2018Creative exchanges between public and private: the case of MONA (The Museum of Old and New Art) and the city of Hobart\u2019, in. V Congresso Internacional Cidades Criativas<\/em>, Janeiro, Portugal: University of Tasmania, p. 11. Available at: https:\/\/hdl.handle.net\/102.100.100\/523776<\/a>.

Gale, F. (2013) \u2018When interests trump institutions: Tasmania\u2019s forest policy network and the Bell Bay pulp mill\u2019, Environmental Politics,<\/em> 22(2), pp. 274\u2013292. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/09644016.2012.683150<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Tiongson, E. (2001) \u2018Corruption and the provision of health care and education services\u2019, in The Political Economy of Corruption<\/em>. 1st ed. London, UK.: Routledge, p. 240. Available at: https:\/\/www.taylorfrancis.com\/chapters\/edit\/10.4324\/9780203468388-13\/corruption-provision-health-care-education-services-sanjeev-gupta-hamid-davoodi-erwin-tiongson<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hirschmann, A.O. (1972) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty<\/em>. 1st ed. Boston, USA.: Harvard University Press. Available at: https:\/\/www.hup.harvard.edu\/books\/9780674276604<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

JANAR (2024) 35th Virtual Roundtable on Measuring Corruption, ft. Andrew Laing<\/em>. Osaka, Japan Roundtable on Measuring Corruption. Available at: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=0qh0sxn56cc<\/a> (Accessed: 18 May 2025).

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Johnston, M. (2005) \u2018Elite Cartels: how to buy friends and govern people\u2019, in Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy<\/em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89\u2013119. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/CBO9780511490965.006<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Johnston, M. (2014) \u2018Elite Cartels: Hanging on with a little help from my friends\u2019, in Corruption, Contention and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization. <\/em>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151-185. Available at:  https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/CBO9781139540957.007<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Laing, A. and Anon. (2023) \u2018Costing Corruption and Other Efficiency Losses\u2019, Artificial Fiscal Intelligence, 31 March. Available at: https:\/\/artificialfiscalintelligence.com\/afi_home\/costing-corruption\/<\/a> (Accessed: 5 December 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lessig, L. (2013) \u2018\u201cInstitutional Corruption\u201d Defined\u2019, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics<\/em>, 41(3), pp. 553\u2013555. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/jlme.12063<\/a>.

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lockyer, N. (1926) Inquiry into the Financial Position of Tasmania<\/em>. 1st edn. Hobart, Tasmania. Available at: http:\/\/berkelouw.com.au\/rare-book\/lockyer-s-report-on-tasmania-s-claim-reprinted-from-the\/158643\/buy-online<\/a> (Accessed: 10 July 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mauro, P., Medas, P. and Fournier, J.M. (2019) The True Cost of Global Corruption \u2013 IMF F&D<\/em>, IMF<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/Publications\/fandd\/issues\/2019\/09\/the-true-cost-of-global-corruption-mauro<\/a> (Accessed: 8 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mazzucato, M. and Collington, R. (2023) The Big Con – How the Consulting Industry Weakens our Businesses, Infantilizes our Governments and Warps our Economies. 1ed edn. UK: Penguin Books. Available at: https:\/\/marianamazzucato.com\/books\/the-big-con\/UK\/<\/a> (Accessed: 25 April 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n


McCall, T. (2011) \u2018Tasmania\u2019s Development as Cargo Cultism: A Political Historical Perspective\u2019, in Pulp Friction in Tasmania. 1st edn. Launceston, Tasmania: Pencil Pine Press, pp. 18\u201336.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moore, C. (2023) The invisible hand of \u2018legal\u2019 corruption costs every Australian, Michael West Media. Available at: https:\/\/michaelwest.com.au\/the-invisible-hand-of-legal-corruption-costs-every-australian<\/a>  (Accessed: 8 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nixon, P. (1997) The Nixon Report: Tasmania into the 21st century. Report to the Prime Minister of Australia and the Premier of Tasmania. Government. Hobart, Tasmania: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 346. Available at: https:\/\/catalogue.nla.gov.au\/catalog\/1597669<\/a> (Accessed: 9 July 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

OECD (2024) Infrastructure anti-corruption toolbox<\/em>, OECD<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/en\/about\/projects\/infrastructure-anti-corruption.html<\/a> (Accessed: 9 May 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rae, J. (2002a) \u2018Tasmania\u2019s No Tiger, But Why?\u2019, Institute of Public Affairs, (IPA Review), pp. 11\u201313. Available at: https:\/\/ipa.org.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/archive\/Review54-3%20Tasmanias%20no%20tiger.pdf<\/a> (Accessed: 10 July 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ryan, L. (2015) \u2018Re-branding Tasmania: MONA and the altering of local reputation and identity\u2019, Tourist Studies<\/em>, 16(4), pp. 422\u2013445. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/1468797615618097<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Skills Tasmania (2024) Tasmanian Skills Plan | Tasmanian Government, Skills Tasmania. Available at: https:\/\/www.skills.tas.gov.au\/strategic-documents-and-policies\/skills_tasmania_skills_plan<\/a>  (Accessed: 8 July 2025).

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Smith, R. (2024) Estimating the costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, 2022\u201323. Australian Institute of Criminology. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.52922\/sr77796<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thompson, D.F. (2018) \u2018Theories of Institutional Corruption\u2019, Annual Review of Political Science<\/em>, 21, pp. 495\u2013513. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1146\/annurev-polisci-120117-110316<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Warren, Mark. (2004) \u2018What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?\u2019 American Journal of Political Science, <\/em>48, pp. 328-343. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/1519886<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

UNODC (2023) UNODC publications<\/em>, United Nations<\/em>\u202f<\/em>: Office on Drugs and Crime<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.unodc.org\/corruption\/uploads\/documents\/Corruption_sustainable_development_C.pdf<\/a>  (Accessed: 23 April 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Warren, M.E. (2004) \u2018What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?\u2019, American Journal of Political Science<\/em>, 48(2), pp. 328\u2013343. Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/j.0092-5853.2004.00073.x<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wathne, C. and Stephenson, M.C. (2021) The credibility of corruption statistics – A critical review of ten global estimates<\/em>. Academic U4 Issue 2021:4. Norway: CMI (Chr. Michelson Institute), p. 48. Available at: https:\/\/www.corruptionwatch.org.za\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/the-credibility-of-corruption-statistics.pdf<\/a> (Accessed: 1 April 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Robyn Lewis is an MA student in Corruption and Governance, Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of Sussex, UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Michael Johnston<\/a> is the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Colgate University, in Hamilton, New York, USA.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Gross State Product, which in 2024 was A$41.6 billion p.a. 5% equates to approximately $2.1 billion p.a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Of a population of approximately 540,000 (ABS, 2024b)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> \u201cAn innovation-active firm develops or implements new or improved products or processes\u201d (DISR, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Which we define in this context as \u201cgroups of individuals who hold disproportionate amount of wealth and\/or power, who participate in, or have influence or access to, decision processes affecting the public\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Described for decades as \u201cthe Tasmanian problem\u201d (Rae, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Not including environmental or other secondary impacts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Corrupt but legal, in Tasmania\u2019s case often because legislation is severely outdated, due in some<\/p>\n\n\n\n

sectors to state capture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Sometimes correctly, given the related lack of vision and\/or lack of commitment to targeted, long-term intergenerational productive infrastructure (e.g.<\/em> Forrest, 2017)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> e.g.<\/em> pulpmills, stadia, AI centres, windfarms <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> MONA, located at Berriedale, a suburb of Hobart, the capital of Tasmania. See https:\/\/mona.net.au\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> One of the authors (R.A.Lewis) was the Project Manager and successfully challenged the objector.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Robyn A. Lewis[1]Michael Johnston[2] Australia\u2019s island state Tasmania faces another cluster of economic, social and environmental crises. Despite intermittent growth, Tasmania remains Australia\u2019s poorest, least dynamic state. In 2023-24, GSP[3] per capita was A$70,679, 73% of Australia\u2019s per capita GDP…<\/span><\/p>\n

Read more ›<\/a><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":427,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"spay_email":""},"categories":[123513],"tags":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1824"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/427"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1824"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1824\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1830,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1824\/revisions\/1830"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1824"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1824"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1824"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}