{"id":1834,"date":"2025-10-14T17:17:54","date_gmt":"2025-10-14T16:17:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/?p=1834"},"modified":"2025-10-15T21:09:29","modified_gmt":"2025-10-15T20:09:29","slug":"reforming-governance-and-the-quiet-capture-of-democracy-in-tasmania","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/2025\/10\/14\/reforming-governance-and-the-quiet-capture-of-democracy-in-tasmania\/","title":{"rendered":"Reforming Governance and the Quiet Capture of Democracy in Tasmania"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"
Struggling families are paying a \u2018corruption tax\u2019<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

In this final blog in a 4-part series on <\/em>Elite Cartels<\/em><\/a> in Tasmania,<\/em> <\/em><\/strong>Robyn A. Lewis<\/em>1<\/sup><\/em> and Michael Johnston<\/em>2<\/sup><\/em> draw on experiences elsewhere to suggest potential anti-corruption reforms.<\/em> 
<\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elite3<\/sup> Cartels (ECs) operate subtly \u2013 often legally and opaquely \u2013 contributing to Tasmania\u2019s long, slow decline in economic vitality, politics, civil society, and the environment.  
 
From a corruption standpoint, ECs\u2019 unaccountable networks exclude citizens from life-affecting decisions, via <\/em>behind-the-scenes collusion, bypassing or distorting public consultation, pursuing narrow governance agendas enabled by weak oversight \u2013 a quiet capture of democracy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result is effectively a corruption tax<\/a>,  lowering incomes, increasing debt<\/a>, inhibiting growth and innovation, constraining investment, and driving skilled youth outmigration<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasmania offers a cautionary tale regarding one-size-fits-all concepts, metrics and reforms for curbing corruption. ECs\u2019 business-as-usual may not appear corrupt but a stable alignment of politics and private enterprise. But ECs sustain dominance at great community cost, including public disaffection and distrust.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Addressing Corruption and Governance <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some Tasmanian corruption is illegal. One remedy is a powerful, well-resourced, completely independent anti-corruption agency (ACA) like Hong Kong\u2019s or NSW\u2019s ICAC. If cost or other challenges seem excessive, Tasmania might recruit NSW ICAC on a subcontracting or consulting basis4<\/sup>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That ACA should be empowered to initiate and investigate cases, prosecute wrongdoings, provide anti-corruption advice and education, including businesses \u2013 which is of increasing importance given the devolution of public-sector functions to private companies and consultants<\/a> \u2013 and allow safe public reporting<\/a> and feedback. We suggest it not have retrospective powers but be future-focussed, rebuilding good governance and avoiding pitfalls experienced elsewhere<\/a>. An Inquiry would form a good foundation. 
 
Proper resourcing of Tasmania\u2019s Auditor-General and Ombudsman are also necessary, as are legislated transparency reforms, utilised in Mexico where openness helps counter corruption (Verni, 2025). These must include lobbying oversight<\/a>. 
 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But because ECs operate sub-surface and often legally, detection, law enforcement and transparency are insufficient. Indeed, if those are the only reforms, ECs\u2019 infrequent bribery scandals may convince some that corruption is negligible, allowing persistent quiet capture. Deeper structural, cultural and institutional weaknesses need addressing, for example public service underfunding, skills erosion, career pathways and training (so corporate memory is built and retained).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasmania needs more inclusive and participatory governance to check ECs\u2019 dominance. Political and economic systems must become more fair, open, and competitive. Integrity and public interest must be at the forefront of all government decisions. Electoral and party-finance reforms should maximize transparency and limit donations. Champions of change and journalists should be supported and protected.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet even multi-party outcomes may not bring needed improvements, and risk perpetuating elite dealmaking. Therefore, meaningful, structured participation in party decision-making is as critical as transparent governance, a robust ACA and a clear, shared vision.  Tasmanians must see that their opinions and political choices matter \u2013 not that whoever they choose, the result is the same. Like other democracies grappling with institutional decay, Tasmania must rebuild fundamental social and political trust.  
 
Economic openness is also essential. Competitors to incumbent ECs \u2013 particularly experienced investors with the requisite resources, market channels and sustainability expertise, and who can challenge and encourage new dynamism in the Tasmanian economy \u2013 must be welcomed.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Transformation: Pathways and Benchmarks<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasmania\u2019s current situation is unsustainable, both locally and nationally<\/a>. Tasmania is at an economic<\/a>, social<\/a> and environmental<\/a> tipping point. The costs of inaction and continued divisiveness are enormous; some potentially irreversible. Recognising this problem is paramount; successful amelioration requires cross-party commitment (e.g.<\/em> Laing, 2024).  
 
Conventional reforms are necessary but insufficient. Tasmania needs institutional and cultural transformation, dismantling patronage and secrecy, and promoting integrity, policy deliberation, strategy and future capacity over control, spin and short-termism.  
 
These are not new or unique problems. The Federal Inquiry into the Tasmanian economy (Nixon, 1997) stated Tasmania\u2019s challenges include \u201cextinguishing … wasteful parochialism and polarisation\u201d <\/em><\/strong>and overcoming \u201cinertia against taking \u2026 actions (by an) entrenched culture \u2026 more interested in protecting its patch\u201d. These symptoms of EC corruption persist today, worsened by increased secrecy<\/a> and reduced media competition. 
 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommendations of greater openness are helpful \u2013 but, considering the deeply-embedded nature of ECs, how do we know whether measures are implemented, and working? <\/em>National corruption indices reveal little about deeper processes or trends, nor state-level dynamics. To track progress toward openness and inclusion, Tasmania needs verifiable indicators reflecting the ways ECs operate and any trends toward improvement. There is no corruption index for Tasmania and the last corruption survey conducted by the Integrity Commission was in 2017 (Jamrozik). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sectoral analyses in areas like infrastructure, natural resources, health, and education can be particularly useful in revealing failures and offering structural reform opportunities (Pyman and Heywood, 2024). ECs dominate individual sectors in different ways; thus, reforms must be targeted, actionable, manageable and measurable. While EC deal-making is often obscure, there are precedents for promising reforms (Pyman, 2021). There is immediate \u2018fiscal space\u2019 in Tasmania\u2019s budget process which could be addressed using existing financial data.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Sectoral Example: Infrastructure<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Roadworks on the Tasman Highway, Tasmania.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The infrastructure sector is globally vulnerable to corruption due to its scale and large payoffs (Matthews, 2016). Tasmania allocates a significant percentage of spending to infrastructure<\/a>, with a ten-year \u2018pipeline\u2019<\/a>.  
 
Risks arise at every stage: project selection, design, contracting, procurement and delivery (IBAC, 2024; Pyman, 2021). Inadequate oversight and the influence of entrenched bidders perpetuate vulnerabilities.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Observable indicators can be designed to assess reforms\u2019 effectiveness. Red flags might, for example, include rubber stamp approvals, costs significantly exceeding national standards, or repeated benefits to favoured areas.  
 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similar proxy indicators could be developed for other sectors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is no \u2018silver bullet\u2019 nor <\/strong>cargo-cult \u2018silver bird\u2019<\/strong><\/a> 
 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reform is complex, requiring sustained effort, likely generating resistance and potentially triggering defensive consolidation<\/a>. Some challenges, especially environmental, are wicked, lacking simple solutions.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reforms must move beyond compliance checklists and revamped ethics guidelines. At both state and local levels, appointments \u2013 including Boards \u2013 must be merit-based. Fair-play rules \u2013 hearings, consultation, transparency \u2013 must be seen to be enforced. To resist EC capture, Parliamentary committees require strengthening, and regulatory autonomy assured. Citizens, NGOs, and the media must highlight the ECs behind business-as-usual, and their costs to Tasmania\u2019s public services, environment and brand<\/a>. Public interest must be paramount. 
 
There are also wider implications if rules are selectively applied or circumvented and citizens see connections overriding fairness and merit: trust in specific projects and broader governance is degraded. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strengthening Governance Strengthens Tasmania<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 
Checking EC power has more than budgetary and investment rewards, including political legitimacy for effective leaders, economic advantages for successful contractors, professional standing for capable managers, improved planning and greater public voice. In place of abstract calls for good government, our proposed reforms emphasize measurable public benefits. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Willpower, persistence and adaptation are required. Outcomes must be demonstrable and communicated. Building NSW\u2019s anti-corruption strength took decades \u2013 another reason Tasmania should leverage NSW\u2019s experience, combined with deep sectoral knowledge plus local understanding of how Tasmanians view their state and lives.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Acknowledging the Issue is Essential<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Above all, Tasmanians must understand what ECs are and do. The fundamental issue facing Tasmania is corruption<\/em> and associated failures in due process<\/a>, not NIMBYism<\/a>, over-regulation<\/a> or pathological dissent<\/a>. If Tasmania were a country, its score on the Corruption Perceptions Index would likely place it alongside Malta, Bulgaria or Jordan (Laing, 2020). UN anti-corruption assistance would be justifiable. 
 
The question is: do Tasmanians want to restore public integrity and trust, reduce their \u2018corruption tax<\/a>\u2019, reinvest wasted billions into public services and facilities, and return to surplus \u2013 or not? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It can be done. Like Estonia (OECD, 2024), Tasmania could become an unexpected reform leader by choosing to dismantle Elite Cartel corruption and restore democratic integrity now. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

References: <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

IBAC Victoria (2024) Corruption and misconduct risks in the construction and manufacturing sector<\/em>, IBAC<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.ibac.vic.gov.au\/corruption-and-misconduct-risks-in-construction-and-manufacturing<\/a> (Accessed: 21 June 2025). 
 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jamrozik, P. (2017) \u2018Integrity Commission – Community Perceptions Survey 2017 – Research Report\u2019, Research Report<\/em>, p. 29. Available at: https:\/\/integrity.tas.gov.au\/__data\/assets\/pdf_file\/0010\/728596\/integrity-Commission-community-perceptions-survey-2017-report.PDF<\/a>  
 
Laing, A. (2020) How Corruption Works in the Public Sector\u2014One Easy Lesson<\/em>, PFM<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/blog-pfm.imf.org\/en\/pfmblog\/2020\/03\/how-corruption-works-in-the-public-sectorone-easy-lesson<\/a> (Accessed: 13 July 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Laing, A. (2024) Curbing Corruption Through the Budget Process<\/em>. Academic. Dublin, Ireland: Dublin City University, p. 61. Available at: http:\/\/rgdoi.net\/10.13140\/RG.2.2.25577.31844<\/a> (Accessed: 21 June 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Matthews, P. (2016) Why is the construction industry so corrupt and what can we do about it?<\/em>, World Economic Forum<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/2016\/02\/why-is-the-construction-industry-so-corrupt-and-what-can-we-do-about-it\/<\/a> (Accessed: June 21, 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

OECD (2024) Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024 \u2013 Country Notes: Estonia<\/em>, OECD<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/en\/publications\/anti-corruption-and-integrity-outlook-2024-country-notes_684a5510-en\/estonia_a1df0c2f-en.html<\/a> (Accessed: 14 July 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pyman, M. (2021) \u201cCurbing corruption in Construction, Public Works, and Infrastructure.\u201d CurbingCorruption.com. Available at: https:\/\/curbingcorruption.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/210618-Curbing-Corruption-in-Construction.pdf<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pyman, M. and Heywood, P.M. (2024) Sector-Based Action Against Corruption: A Guide for Organisations and Professionals<\/em>. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland (Political Corruption and Governance). Available at: https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-031-59336-9<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 
Nixon, P. (1997) The Nixon Report: Tasmania into the 21st century. Report to the Prime Minister of Australia and the Premier of Tasmania<\/em>. Government. Hobart, Tasmania: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 346. Available at: https:\/\/catalogue.nla.gov.au\/catalog\/1597669<\/a> (Accessed: 9 July 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Verni, Z. (2025) Lessons from Mexico\u2019s Public Information Reforms | The Regulatory Review<\/em>, The Regulatory Review<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.theregreview.org\/2025\/06\/19\/verni-lessons-from-mexicos-public-information-reforms\/<\/a> (Accessed: 21 June 2025).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1<\/sup>\u00a0Robyn Lewis is an MA student in Corruption and Governance, Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of Sussex, UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2 <\/sup>Michael Johnston<\/a> is the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Colgate University, in Hamilton, New York, USA. They are currently co-authoring a chapter for the Edward Elgar Research Handbook on Corruption and the Environment<\/em> (2026), on environmental corruption in Tasmania.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3 <\/sup>We define elite in this context as \u201cgroups of individuals who hold disproportionate amount of wealth and\/or power, who participate in, or have influence or access to, decision processes affecting the public\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4 <\/sup>As provided by NSW ICAC in the Pacific region and their regional outreach within Australia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In this final blog in a 4-part series on Elite Cartels in Tasmania, Robyn A. Lewis1 and Michael Johnston2 draw on experiences elsewhere to suggest potential anti-corruption reforms.   Elite3 Cartels (ECs) operate subtly \u2013 often legally and opaquely \u2013 contributing…<\/span><\/p>\n

Read more ›<\/a><\/div>\n

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