{"id":1842,"date":"2026-02-03T13:28:46","date_gmt":"2026-02-03T13:28:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/?p=1842"},"modified":"2026-02-03T13:28:48","modified_gmt":"2026-02-03T13:28:48","slug":"evaluating-the-evidence-base-for-the-uks-2025-anti-corruption-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/centre-for-the-study-of-corruption\/2026\/02\/03\/evaluating-the-evidence-base-for-the-uks-2025-anti-corruption-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"Evaluating the evidence base for the UK\u2019s 2025 Anti-Corruption Strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Source: Pexels\/Public Domain Pictures<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Professor Robert Barrington from the Centre for the Study of Corruption looks at the use of research and evidence in the UK\u2019s new Anti-Corruption Strategy.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anti-corruption plans and strategies have a well-known challenge: what is the evidence base on which they can build a response? Copious academic research has concluded that a) corruption is hard to measure and b) existing measures mostly have flaws. Some countries (Nigeria<\/a> and Bangladesh<\/a>, for example) have been more fully researched than others, but some, including the UK, have historically not been well served by surveys or researchers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UK government\u2019s Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025<\/a>, a 120-page document released in December 2025, represents an ambitious attempt to address corruption in three \u2018pillars\u2019: corrupt actors, tackling UK vulnerabilities and global resilience. But does this Strategy rest on a solid foundation of research and evidence, or does it reveal gaps in our understanding of corruption\u2019s true scale and nature in Britain?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thorough preparation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Home Office (lead department for the Strategy in government) clearly realised there was potentially an evidence gap, and that this might need to be filled if such a strategy document were to get political buy-in and have external credibility. The three-year delay in publishing the Strategy (yes, that\u2019s right: three years) has probably been helpful in this regard. It has allowed for the commissioning of new research \u2013 from the University of Sussex<\/a> and Ipsos<\/a> \u2013 as well as the encouragement and assimilation of academic and think-tank research, and results from the early phases of the FCDO\u2019s Anti-Corruption Evidence<\/a> (ACE) programme to be published in a range of academic journals, books and other forums. Ground-breaking ACE research on procurement red flags<\/a>, kleptocratic networks<\/a>, the role of peer-to-peer accountability checks<\/a> and mapping illicit financial flows are all referenced<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Good deployment of existing evidence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Strategy deserves credit for acknowledging evidence gaps from the outset. The government admits that \u2018it is difficult to quantify the overall scale of the corruption threat to the UK\u2019 and that \u2018reliable data is challenging to obtain and analyse.\u2019 This honest assessment sets realistic expectations and demonstrates awareness of the measurement challenges. But this is also by some distance the most evidence-based plan or strategy that a UK government has produced on corruption to date. And the Home Office should be credited for publishing some of the underlying the research<\/a> alongside the Strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where data exist, the Strategy deploys the information effectively to help make the case about why there is a problem and where it exists. For example, the document cites Home Office research showing that 68% of the public are concerned about corrupt foreign actors\u2019 impact on national security, and 59% about their impact on housing markets. These figures help justify policy priorities around kleptocracy and sanctions. Similarly, the 2024 Economic Crime Survey<\/a>\u2019s finding that businesses were offered an estimated 117,000 bribes worth over \u00a3300 million provides new evidence of domestic corruption\u2019s economic footprint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Strategy also references international benchmarks, noting that the UK was placed at its lowest ever ranking of 20th in Transparency International\u2019s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Although the use of the CPI as a measurement tool for national progress has had its fair share of academic criticism<\/a>, it remains the most widely used and reported measure of corruption, and this comparative evidence creates urgency around reputational damage, positioning anti-corruption work as essential to Britain\u2019s global standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the Strategy has a substantively different feel to previous documents, as though research and the evidence base have been key considerations in drafting the priorities and commitments. That gives it a welcome sense of coherence and authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where evidence needs tightening<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite these strengths, some important evidence gaps remain. The note that \u2018evidence of corruption in public procurement is largely anecdotal\u2019 must be a cause for concern given that \u00a3400 billion flows through government contracts annually. When the Strategy states that \u2018law enforcement partners assess local government as a key sector exposed to corruption risk,\u2019 this appears to reflect professional judgment rather than being based on systematic research.  It is more or less as much as we know at present about corruption ion local government, and in being so clear about the evidence base the government is both being honest about what is currently known and setting an implicit research agenda for what we need to know.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like in many such documents from governmental and international organisations, the Strategy at times relies on assumptions where, ideally, data should shape policy. Although few experts would quibble with the claim, there is limited empirical support for the statement that corruption \u2018makes British people poorer and less safe\u2019. The NCA\u2019s cautiously worded view that \u2018it is a realistic possibility that over \u00a3100 billion is laundered every year through the UK\u2019 carries a degree of uncertainty, yet has for a number of years underpinned major policy statements and commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another question mark is over the quality and deployment of evaluation evidence. The Strategy builds on two decades of anti-corruption initiatives, including the Bribery Act 2010 and the establishment of specialised enforcement units. Yet the document does not point to research that systematically assesses what worked well, less well, and why. Did Unexplained Wealth Orders achieve their intended impact? Have Deferred Prosecution Agreements deterred corporate corruption?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking forward<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

However, these are observations rather than criticisms. Other countries have also found such gaps hard to fill, and some have given up at that point. This document has \u2013 very commendably \u2013 an entire section on Evidence, acknowledges these issues and commits to \u2018seek to improve the corruption evidence base, including through the new UK policy definition of corruption.\u2019 Two areas that are rightly picked out for this are the use of beneficial ownership data and the activities of professional enablers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There cannot be many government strategies in this field across the world that have similar commitments. If delivered, such research could transform our understanding of how corruption operates in modern Britain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is also reflected in the promises for future monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL): a commitment to \u2018an initial measurement framework agreed with partners within six months of this strategy being published.\u2019 Although in a perfect world it would have been preferable to have such a framework in place at the outset, this is an opportunity to take a best-practice approach, building on the research<\/a> the Home Office commissioned on the approaches other countries have taken to MEL.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 represents a significant step forward for the UK government on evidence use, understanding of data gaps, and commitments to fill the gaps. Where data exist, the document deploys the information skilfully. The collaboration with academic researchers to develop conceptual frameworks, notably on the new definition of corruption and MEL, shows commendable rigour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, some gaps inevitably remain: anecdotal evidence substitutes for systematic research in some important areas like procurement and local government corruption; and there is no evaluation of past interventions, which \u2013 though unusual \u2013 would be a best of class approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The test will be whether the government follows through on the Strategy\u2019s commitments to improve data collection and research. Without good evidence, even well-intentioned anti-corruption measures risk missing their mark. Perhaps the UK should be reflecting back into the Strategy the approach that it introduced a decade ago to gathering anti-corruption evidence (ACE) oversees through its ACE Programme. Britain\u2019s fight against corruption deserves to be evidence-led, not just evidence-informed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disclaimers: the University of Sussex a) has received funding from both the Home Office and FCDO for some of the research mentioned in this blog; and b) is home to one of the three strands of the ACE Programme.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Professor Robert Barrington from the Centre for the Study of Corruption looks at the use of research and evidence in the UK\u2019s new Anti-Corruption Strategy. Anti-corruption plans and strategies have a well-known challenge: what is the evidence base on which…<\/span><\/p>\n

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