{"id":345,"date":"2026-03-10T10:45:59","date_gmt":"2026-03-10T10:45:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/sussex-centre-for-migration-research\/?p=345"},"modified":"2026-03-11T10:03:50","modified_gmt":"2026-03-11T10:03:50","slug":"when-return-does-not-last-internal-displacement-in-lebanon-from-2024-to-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sussex.ac.uk\/sussex-centre-for-migration-research\/2026\/03\/10\/when-return-does-not-last-internal-displacement-in-lebanon-from-2024-to-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"When \u201creturn\u201d does not last: internal displacement in Lebanon from 2024 to 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Cristina El Khoury, postgraduate researcher University of Geneva and former SCMR Visiting fellow, 2025<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

9 March 2026: 700,000 people<\/a> are displaced across Lebanon.   
 
Behind this number lies a familiar yet devastating pattern: families leaving southern towns in the middle of the night, carrying what they can, uncertain when (or whether) they will return. Since late 2023, hostilities along Lebanon\u2019s southern border have repeatedly emptied villages and towns. After a fragile ceasefire in November 2024 allowed thousands to go back home, renewed escalation in early March 2026 has once again triggered large-scale internal displacement across the country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A crisis that keeps returning<\/strong> <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In southern Lebanon, displacement has become cyclical. Families flee bombardment, find temporary refuge elsewhere in the country, return home after a ceasefire, and then leave again when violence resumes. The latest wave of displacement follows renewed military escalation affecting southern Lebanon as well as parts of Beirut\u2019s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley. Airstrikes, artillery exchanges and evacuation warnings have forced civilians to flee districts such as Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Nabatieh, often with little time to prepare. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Traffic in Beirut, one of the main destinations for families displaced from southern Lebanon.  
Internal displacement often takes place within urban spaces rather than in formal camps. Photo by the author (February 2025)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The scale of displacement increased dramatically in early March 2026. Within less than a week, humanitarian organisations reported hundreds of thousands of people leaving their homes. By 6 March, 300,000 people<\/a> had already been displaced within less than 100 hours as evacuation warnings and attacks intensified. A few days later, Lebanon\u2019s Minister of Social Affairs reported that around 517,000 displaced people had been registered on the government\u2019s emergency relief platform. Of these, more than 117,000 people<\/a> were hosted in approximately 538 collective shelters across the country. As of 9 March, 700,000 people were displaced.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet official shelter figures capture only part of the crisis. Many displaced families rely on informal arrangements, staying with relatives or friends or moving between temporary accommodation. This dispersed pattern reflects a defining characteristic of displacement in Lebanon: rather than large camps, displaced populations are spread across host communities. The current escalation builds on an already fragile situation created by previous waves of conflict. During the major escalation of late September 2024, internal displacement in Lebanon reached unprecedented levels, with around 1.2 million people<\/a> estimated to have fled their homes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the ceasefire reached on 27 November 2024 allowed many families to return during the following months, return did not necessarily mean recovery. Entire neighbourhoods had been damaged, infrastructure remained partially destroyed, and unexploded ordnance made some areas unsafe. By late February 2025, the International Organization for Migration reported<\/a> that 949,571 people had returned, yet nearly 100,000 remained displaced. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, the post-ceasefire period did not resolve displacement; it merely changed its form. The renewed escalation in 2026 therefore affects communities that had only recently begun reconstructing their lives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moving north: how displacement unfolds across the country <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Internal displacement in Lebanon rarely takes the form of large, centralized camps. Instead, it unfolds through a dispersed pattern of mobility that stretches across multiple regions of the country. As violence intensifies in the south, families typically move northwards, relocating to Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and in some cases further north to cities such as Tripoli or districts such as Akkar. 
 
Family and social networks play a crucial role in shaping these movements. Many displaced households initially seek refuge with relatives or friends living in safer areas. However, as displacement persists and the number of displaced families grows, the capacity of host households to provide accommodation quickly becomes strained.  
 
Public infrastructure therefore becomes an essential part of the emergency response. Schools, community centres and municipal buildings are frequently converted into collective shelters to host displaced families. During the escalation of 2024, hundreds of public schools across Lebanon were repurposed as emergency shelters, and similar arrangements are once again emerging in 2026 as municipalities attempt to cope with the increasing number of displaced households<\/a>.   
 
This dispersed pattern of displacement also creates uneven pressures across the country. While southern districts experience rapid depopulation as residents flee ongoing violence, central and northern regions must absorb sudden population inflows. Municipalities in Mount Lebanon, Akkar and cities such as Tripoli have therefore become key receiving areas for displaced populations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike camp-based displacement contexts, Lebanon\u2019s urban and socially mediated displacement makes it harder to monitor needs and coordinate humanitarian responses. Displaced families are scattered across apartments, temporary shelters and host households, creating a less visible but highly complex displacement landscape. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ripple effects of displacement <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the immediate humanitarian emergency, internal displacement produces far-reaching social, economic and environmental consequences. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the most immediate effects concerns education. During displacement crises in Lebanon, public schools are often repurposed as emergency shelters for displaced families, interrupting the academic year for thousands of students. In a country where the education system is already struggling<\/a> with the consequences of economic crisis and institutional instability, repeated school closures risk widening learning gaps and increasing the likelihood of long-term school dropout. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Displacement also severely affects livelihoods. Many families fleeing southern Lebanon depend on agriculture and small-scale rural economies tied to the land. As hostilities intensified, farmers were forced to abandon olive groves, tobacco fields and other crops during critical cultivation and harvesting periods. Agricultural production has therefore been disrupted not only by direct damage caused by shelling but also by the absence of farmers who are unable to safely access their land. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The environmental consequences of conflict further complicate prospects for recovery. Bombardments have damaged agricultural land, irrigation systems and water infrastructure in several southern districts, while unexploded ordnance poses serious risks for cultivation and reconstruction. These environmental impacts may significantly delay the possibility of safe return. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, host communities across Lebanon face increasing pressure as they attempt to accommodate large numbers of displaced people. Municipal services such as housing, water supply, waste management and healthcare are already under strain in a country experiencing one of the most severe economic crises in its modern history. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of displaced families therefore places additional burdens on local infrastructure and public resources. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The long shadow of displacement  <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Lebanese case illustrates how internal displacement can evolve from a temporary humanitarian emergency into a recurring condition shaped by cycles of violence and fragile recovery. Families flee, return after ceasefires, and then find themselves displaced again when hostilities resume. \u00a0Yet the significance of displacement in Lebanon goes beyond the number of people forced to move. As this crisis shows, displacement reshapes territories and societies in lasting ways\u00a0\u2013\u00a0interrupting education, destabilizing agricultural livelihoods, and placing new pressures on already fragile urban infrastructures.\u00a0In this sense, internal displacement in Lebanon is not only a consequence of conflict but also a process that gradually transforms the social and spatial landscape of the country.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For many of the 700,000 people currently displaced, the central question is therefore not only when they will return, but whether the next return will finally be able to last. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Cristina El Khoury, postgraduate researcher University of Geneva and former SCMR Visiting fellow, 2025 9 March 2026: 700,000 people are displaced across Lebanon.    Behind this number lies a familiar yet devastating pattern: families leaving southern towns in the middle of the night,…<\/span><\/p>\n

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