Author Anonymous*, Refugee Resettlement specialist
Over the course of its 45 year history, the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) has earned and enjoyed broadly bipartisan support as a vital, national private-public partnership. It has long been recognized as integral to US humanitarian commitments but also as a crucial tool of US diplomatic, security, and economic interests, as well.
Established under President Jimmy Carter as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, the USRAP is the formal mechanism by which refugees and special immigrant visa holders from around the world are referred and admitted to the United States for third country resettlement. Though the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that less than one percent of the world’s refugees (of which there are currently over 43 million) end up resettled to third countries, the USRAP has historically admitted around two thirds of those, making it a world leader in resettlement. Or at least, it was.

On day one of his inauguration, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order entitled Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, enacting an indefinite suspension of the program. The reason? It was not, according to the order, considered to be aligned with national interests. The fallout was swift: 10,000 refugees with scheduled flights found their bookings cancelled, and an estimated 22,000 approved and pending travel became stranded, including Afghan military allies and US family members. The US’ ten national resettlement agencies faced immediate stop-work orders and suspension of funding. After years spent rehabilitating critical USRAP programming from the injuries of the previous Trump administration, resettlement staff and volunteers watched as a global infrastructure ground to a screeching halt.
Six months on, countless families in the United States and abroad continue to find themselves living in limbo, unsure when or if they will ever be reunited with their loved ones: parents with children, brothers with sisters, spouses with spouses. And as the US administration continues to proclaim its supposed concern for promoting family growth and family life in the United States, it has become clear that these families do not seem to count.
Family Reunification: A Cornerstone of Refugee Resettlement
The universal human right to family unity is well established under international legal human rights, refugee, and resettlement frameworks, and assigns to individual States the primary responsibility of taking measures to avoid family separation, maintain family unity, and provide access to family reunification pathways for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection. In 2024, the UNHCR, in partnership with a large coalition global partners, produced the “Operational Guidelines on Facilitating Family Reunification for Persons in Need of International Protection”, reaffirming and building upon these global operating principles.
At the national level, family reunification has long been considered a cornerstone of immigration and resettlement policy in the United States. The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, laid the groundwork for the establishment of formal reunification specific access categories and pathways through the USRAP.
This included the establishment of the Visas 93 program, a petition-based follow-to-join pathway for immediate relatives of refugees admitted to and residing in the United States, and set the stage for the Priority 3 program, an access category designated for the specific purpose of reunifying spouses; unmarried, under 21 year old children; and parents of US based refugees and asylees. In 1989, the Lautenberg Amendment facilitated a reunification program under the USRAP for legal residents to apply for at-risk relatives in the former Soviet Union and later on, in Iran. No matter the exact program, USRAP family reunification applications submitted to the federal government undergo extensive and lengthy processing, including stringent vetting and documentation reviews, in-depth security checks by several federal agencies, expert interview rounds, and medical examinations.
Throughout the years, these reunification programs (to name a few) have represented important components of the US resettlement system and the government’s responsibility, as in all States, to provide pathways for family reunion procedures. After the previous Trump administration, significant efforts were made under the Biden government to resuscitate the USRAP and improve access and processing efficiencies built into the system. Family reunification programming proved an important piece of these efforts. For example, an Obama era program called Central American Minors (CAM) was restarted, which facilitated the reunification of separated children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with parents and guardians legally residing in the United States, and its eligibility categories and processing mechanisms were expanded in important ways. The Priority 3 reunification program expanded eligibility after years of nationality restrictions and was undergoing review to reduce inefficiencies in documentation vetting, improve delays related to required DNA processing, etc. Too, brand new pathways were launched by the State Department: The office for the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) was formed, which worked to relocate and reunite Afghan allies and their children, as was the Welcome Corps, a new model and access category within the USRAP allowing private sponsorship by US based petitioners for refugees, including family members.
Fractured Families: The Impact of USRAP Suspension
Despite the progress made under the Biden administration, the current abrupt suspension of the USRAP (and with it, the family reunification programs that fall under its umbrella) has had and will continue to have lasting, devastating effects on family members around the world and across the United States, including legal permanent residents, citizens by birth, and long-time naturalized citizens.
News media, NGOs, and resettlement agencies are rife with examples of how the program suspension has fractured US families and exacerbated the traumas of family separation: A February letter by Refugee Council USA to Congress shares the experience of a woman who, after 15 years of being resettled in Ohio, received notice that her mother’s flight had been cancelled. While her siblings had arrived earlier on separate flights, her mother was left behind. The letter also recounts the plight of four separated Afghan children, the youngest just seven, set to reunite after three years with their parents in Massachusetts. Their bookings were also abruptly cancelled. Similarly, Church World Service (a national resettlement agency) shares the story of Wajid, their Director of Finance Business Partners, who had prepared to welcome his parents and whose sister had moved from California to help him with care arrangements. His parents had already given up their apartment and sold their furniture when they found their flight bookings suddenly cancelled. Across the country and indeed, the globe, there are countless more stories of families like these.
This month, the situation for US residents and their loved ones has grown even more grim. On June 4th, a presidential Proclamation banning travel to the US from twelve countries of the Global South was released, adding another layer of anguish to American families separated from relatives overseas. The ban contains some exceptions for Afghan SIV holders and certain minority members from Iran, but outlines none for relatives of refugees and asylees in the United States. This further signifies the administration’s rejection of family unity and reunion principles as integral to resettlement programming and to basic family life for so many around the world.
Since its inception, over three million people have been resettled through the USRAP. Today, they are the legal residents and naturalized citizens who make up the fabric of communities across the United States. They, like all people, have the right to pursue family unity. This World Refugee Day, let us remind each other of the centrality of family in global refugee frameworks and the critical role that domestic resettlement systems play in facilitating – or hindering — family reunion. And for those of us here in the United States, let us always remember that when the Administration touts the sanctity of family and family life, these Americanfamilies must count, too.
Given the current political climate, the author has asked to remain anonymous.






Outsourcing Through the Back Door. The UK France Deal Undermines the Legal Basis of CEAS
Ridam Gangwar – Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow (India) – Final Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student and Researcher in Migration and Law
The UK’s attempt to negotiate migrant returns deal with France – with apparent EU support –may seem like yet another step in Fortress Europe’s expansion. But unlike deals with Tunisia, Libya, or Albania, this arrangement brings the logic of legal outsourcing into Europe’s core, by using a former EU member state as a return destination without CEAS safeguards. This model sidesteps the obligations and oversight mechanisms outlined under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), particularly Article 78(1) TFEU and the Dublin III Regulation.
This is not just another externalisation agreement – it is a constitutional development that threatens to replace EU asylum law with a patchwork of bilateral deterrence regimes and may permanently fracture the idea of a common asylum system.
Bilateral Returns and the Undermining of CEAS
The UK, under the new Labour government led by Keir Starmer, is seeking a bilateral returns arrangement to send irregular Channel-crossing migrants back to France and a formal agreement has now been reached and according to reports EU–level support is anticipated, even if formal re–entry into the Dublin system remains off the table.
Yet this moves cuts directly against the core principles of the CEAS: solidarity, harmonised procedures, and equal protection. Article 78(1) TFEU mandates a “common policy on asylum”. The Dublin Regulation (Reg. No. 604/2013), though contested, institutionalises burden–sharing and prevents forum–shopping and ad hoc outsourcing it prevents the Undermining the CEAS’s institutional coherence.. If the UK – a third country with no access to CEAS enforcement tools such as Eurodac or the Charter is permitted to return migrants into EU jurisdiction, this weakens the mutual trust principle that underpins the CEAS legal framework. This opens the door for third countries to become active participants in internal asylum redistribution, a legally untested and constitutionally awkward mechanism. Permitting Member States to outsource protection obligations to third countries particularly ones no longer bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights –undermines the uniformity that Dublin III (Reg. No. 604/2013) was designed to enforce, replacing a coordinated regime with fragmented bilateralism. The EU has criticised such fragmentation elsewhere – it cannot now legitimise it internally without sacrificing both legal coherence and credibility.
Italy Albania and Externalisation Precedent
This is not an isolated development. Italy’s 2023 deal with Albania – allowing asylum seekers rescued at sea to be processed in Albanian territory – mirrors the UK–France logic of offshoring processing and legal responsibility, albeit with the UK no longer legally embedded within the CEAS regime, the difference here is that the UK, unlike Albania, is a former Member State, raising questions about constitutional forum-shopping from within the EU’s own legal past. This is intended to prevent disembarkation, deter future arrivals, and bypass EU procedural safeguards.
A bilateral externalisation agreement such as the UK – France deal risks operating entirely outside these judicially required safeguards, sidestepping both Charter standards and judicial review. At the time, legal scholars raised alarm over potential violations of procedural guarantees, limited access to remedies, and risks of refoulement – issues relevant under both Article 18 (right to asylum) and Article 19(2) (non–refoulement) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The CJEU further elaborated in Jawo v. Germany (C–163/17) that asylum seekers must not be transferred under Dublin where there is a real risk of inhuman treatment due to deficiencies in the reception system. Instead of resisting this drift, the UK – France case shows the EU acquiescing in the Balkanisation of asylum governance even with a third country no longer bound by the Charter or the CEAS. This sets a dangerous precedent for legal inconsistency, constitutional forum – shopping, and the hollowing out of a rights–based asylum regime.
Legal Grey Zone of UK France Arrangement
From a legal standpoint, the proposed UK – France arrangement occupies a troubling grey zone. For the UK to send asylum seekers to France, two legal routes could be pursued, first, classifying France as a safe country of return under UK domestic law, or striking a bespoke bilateral deal with France, potentially invoking Articles 78(3) and 216 TFEU.
Under Article 78(3) TFEU, the EU can take provisional measures in cases of sudden inflow –but it is the Union, not individual Member States, that acts. This mirrors the concerns raised in the CJEU’s judgment in N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (C–411/10), where the Court held that Member States must not transfer asylum seekers if systemic deficiencies in the receiving state’s asylum system risk violating Article 4 of the Charter (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment). Moreover, the Dublin Regulation (currently being replaced by the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation) was designed to prevent precisely this kind of ad hoc, opportunistic returns diplomacy.
Procedural and Rights Risks: The Subtle Yet Profound Shift and Political Temptations at Constitutional Cost
Beyond institutional risks, this model threatens the individual rights that CEAS was meant to guarantee. The European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09) held that the transfer of an asylum seeker’s application under the Dublin system violates Articles 3 and 13 ECHR due to inhuman detention conditions and the lack of effective remedies in Greece. As past jurisprudence shows returns without safeguards risk violating non-refoulement and due process. The UK–France joint declaration promises “expeditious” returns “in accordance with national law” but offers little clarity on rights protections.
Politically, such deals offer quick wins. For the UK, it signals “control” post – Brexit. For France, it shifts the burden. For Brussels, it reduces irregular inflows. But the constitutional cost is immense. This trend also Jeopardises “common” asylum policy and solidarity mechanisms as such deals undermine burden-sharing and erode trust.
The EU is constructing a Neo – Dublin architecture which risk’s establishing a stratified asylum system driven not by legal harmonisation or rights protection, but by deterrence and geopolitical expediency.
Europe Must Choose Legal or Logistical Unity
The UK–France deal would mark the first attempt to integrate a non-EU third country into the operational returns structure of CEAS –without access to its legal instruments or safeguards. The UK–France deal is more than a migration control measure. It is a constitutional test – not of Europe’s borders, but of its legal identity. If such practices continue, CEAS risks becoming an empty façade of shared governance without legal substance.