The True Cost of the 2022 World Cup: How Qatar’s Migrant Workers Paid the Price

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Ellen Hughes is a third-year undergraduate student studying Anthropology and International Development at the University of Sussex.

The Kafala system, a sponsorship-based labour structure prevailing in multiple Middle Eastern countries, has long been criticized as a tool for exploitation, with Qatar exemplifying one of its most extreme forms. As preparations for the 2022 World Cup unfolded, migrant workers faced deteriorating conditions, while the international community only offered fleeting attention to rampant human rights abuses. Promised reforms were inadequate, leaving workers with little protection or recourse. 

Areal view, Qatar. Photo by Ben Koorengevel for UnSplash.

The History Behind the Exploitation 

Derived from the Arabic word “kafula,” meaning “to take care of” or “to guarantee,” the Kafala system binds workers (makfūl) to their sponsors (kafeel). In theory, employers provide accommodation, meals, and pay under temporary visas, but in practice, this relationship often fosters dependency and exploitation. 

On paper, the kafala system is a well thought out plan that allows several key issues to be addressed simultaneously. Its use of temporary work visas provides control surrounding over-migration and higher economic flexibility, as the onus moves away from the government and onto the sponsor. If there is no work available, there are no sponsorships or visas available. Privatizing visas not only decreases waiting times for approval but also prevents migrants from overstaying their board as employers will not want to pay them not to do work.   

Qatar was named the location of the 2022 World Cup in December of 2010, becoming the first country in the Middle East to be named a host. Qatar spared no cost, spending upwards of $220 billion on revitalising the city, building several stadiums, a new metro system, and renovating multiple hotels and the Airport. Due to the extreme lengths Qatar went to in preparation for the World Cup, the kafala system was more prevalent than ever, with 90% of the Qatari workforce comprising of migrant labourers. 

Immediately, human rights organisations began to shed light on the mistreatment that migrant workers were receiving to have the country ready to host in time. International objection could be seen from celebrities like Joe Lycett and Dua Lipa, who spoke out about their discouragement and lack of involvement towards the World Cup. Regardless of the global opinion, FIFA continued to wash their hands of the role it played in the exploitation of the workers. Theo Zwanziger, an executive of FIFA, said “What do you expect of a football organisation? FIFA is not the lawmaker in Qatar”. FIFA brought in a revenue of 7.5 billion USD and Qatar grossed 1.56 billion USD. This made the 2022 World Cup- as said by Minky Worden, “the highest grossing World Cup for FIFA and the deadliest event in the history of world sport.” By 2018, over 1200 deaths had been associated with the construction of the stadiums, although this number is likely far higher. 

The Cost of the World Cup: Worker Exploitation 

Workers were required to use private agencies to connect with sponsors in Qatar, with fees reaching as high as US$4,300. This forced many hopeful migrants to take out loans, with the belief that they would quickly repay the debt once they started their jobs. After leaving their families behind, workers were often placed in overcrowded accommodations, in which they would share a room with up to eight other individuals. Although regulations set welfare standards that limit occupancy to four individuals per room, these rules were rarely enforced.  

The most prevalent form of exploitation within the Kafala system stems from the deceitfulness surrounding workers’ pay. Potential labour migrants often invest in the kafala system with the promise to make significantly more than what they would make in their origin country. However, once workers arrive at their host country, they often receive less than half of what they were initially promised and may not receive their pay for several months. This leaves workers in a far worse scenario in which they cannot send any money to their families back home or pay back the initial loan taken out to pay the agency. 

Many labour migrants were unable to leave the stadium they were constructing as their employers refused to complete their resident ID; a form that only the sponsor can complete. If caught, these workers would have been fined or imprisoned, thus isolating them from a life outside the stadium. Moreover, workers must have an “exit permit” in order to go home or to another job site, which must also be approved by their sponsor. In many cases, workers were threatened to not be granted permission to go home and may not see their family until their contract is up. The kafeel will often take their passports on arrival to prevent them from fleeing, further immobilising them.  

Finally, the criminalisation of “absconding” legally reinforces forced labour as workers are threatened with jail time, deportation, or heavy fines if they try to flee their sponsor before their contract is over.   

The Human Toll of Construction – Surendra’s Story

Surendra Tamang was one of the many men who believed the World Cup being in Qatar was a dream come true. In 2015, Surendra took out a loan to pay an agency and signed a contract for six years at a construction site of one of the stadiums. He aimed to send money back home and have enough saved to buy himself a ticket to one of the matches in the stadium he built. However, Surendra never made it to the match and was instead sent home with gastritis in October of 2021. When he arrived home, the hospital deemed both of his kidneys to be failing due to the long hours in extreme heat. Likely to be on dialysis for the remainder of his life, Surendra was one of the many individuals whose lives were catastrophically ruined in the lead up to the World Cup. Surendra endured years of headaches, nose bleeds, fainting spells, vomiting and cramping as he worked every day in temperatures as high as 44.4°C. Despite the Qatari government requiring that the workers were on break around midday, it is cases like these that make you question whether the employers truly followed through with it or not and whether it did any good considering the humidity reached 70%, even in the early hours of the day. 

An intersectional lens help us better understand which groups are most vulnerable within the Kafala system, and the ways in which they are subject to exploitation. In the context of constructing for the world cup, male workers were predominately targeted; leaving female workers to occupy domestic roles where they faced the highest levels of sexual abuse. Reports indicate a staggering 600% increase in potential sex trafficking victims arriving from Africa to the Gulf states. Furthermore, there is a large racial bias rooted within the system in which the hierarchy sees workers coming from African and Asian countries as those disproportionality assigned to ‘4-D jobs’ (dirty, demanding, dangerous and difficult). This racialized hierarchy fosters a sense of “otherness, generating a certain level of detachment between the kafeel and makfūl, ultimately reinforcing the workers expendability and exacerbating their exploitation.  

Illusionary Reforms 

In light of the criticism Qatar had faced in the lead up to the World Cup, the Government implemented several reforms in order to protect the labour migrants and tackle the corruption surrounding the Kafala system. However, these amendments feature many flaws, and as the media exposure surrounding the World Cup dims, workers are left to face the exploitation of the kafala system alone. 

The kafala system, overseen by internal ministries rather than labour ministries, removed any workers’ rights to unionise or present litigations about their working environments.  Thenceforth, workers were essentially in the possession of the sponsor rather than the Government, leaving them largely unprotected and in a grey area in regard to legislation between the origin and host state. 

In 2018, as an attempt to give back marginal power to the workers, Qatar was the first country to abolish the aforementioned “exit permit”. Although this seems promising, many employers still confiscate passports upon the workers’ arrival. With little reinforcement on the government’s behalf, many migrants were continuously threatened with the punishment of absconding, undermining the reform. Furthermore, the workers were required to give their employer 72 hours of notice to leave Qatar, a process unlikely to reassure those who are being sexually or physically abused and fear backlash. 

In 2020, a minimum wage was introduced in Qatar for all workers, regardless of their nationality. The minimum wage was increased from 750 QAR (US$250) to 1,000 QAR (US$274). In addition, if employers were not providing accommodation or meals, the minimum wage must be 1800 QAR (US$494). Most workers sign up for the kafala system hoping to send remittances home and provide for their family from abroad. Migrant-Rights.org finds this amount too low to achieve this goal, including stating that workers cannot live a good quality standard of life, or make any savings for future retirement. It is not sustainable. Workers continued to get delayed payments and once again, due to a lack of reinforcement from the Qatari government, the minimum wage was not followed. 

Lastly, in 2022 Qatar allowed workers to change jobs at any point throughout their contract. The government moved the onus of the repayments from the workers onto the two employers. If a worker wishes to change jobs during the probationary period (which is legally not allowed to exceed six months), their new employer must reimburse the old employer the wage of the employee for the remaining probational months. However, this reform created new barriers, as employers often refuse to hire workers with pending fees, forcing workers to either remain with their original employer or go home. If in the case an employer did accept the worker, they may refuse salary until their “debt” is paid off, continuing the financial exploitation present between the kafeel and makfūl. 

Qatar has employed the kafala system since the 1950’s, but the 2022 World Cup severely exacerbated the exploitative nature to unprecedented levels. The desire for a spectacle allowed safety and labour procedures to be overlooked, and with tight deadlines taking priority over basic human rights. FIFA’s indifference and the fleeting attention of the global community allowed these abuses to persist. Now as the excitement of the World Cup fades, will the world honour the workers whose sacrifices made it a reality, or will their struggles be forgotten? The responsibility sadly rests on us to ensure their voices are heard and to demand meaningful accountability. 

This blog has been submitted as part of course work for the module Mobilities and Global Inequalities.

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The praxis of research about queer migrant lives: an Iranian case study

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Moira Dustin; Nuno Ferreira; Kamran Matin; Mehran Rezaei-Toroghi; and Isabel Soloaga – University of Sussex

Does an academic, theoretically framed, multidisciplinary research project have anything to contribute to migration policy and practice in the context of discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC)? LGBT+ History Month is a good time to ask this question, and we do so in this blog, based on a current University of Sussex research project. 

Negotiating Queer Identities Following Forced Migration (NQIfFM) is a comparative research project about queer Iranians living in exile in Turkey, the UK and Canada. Led by a multidisciplinary team at the University of Sussex, the project is currently drawing to a conclusion. Alongside our academic articles and the project monograph and other outputs, we are looking for opportunities to use the research findings to positively influence policy, practice and public discourse. The call for evidence on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in relation to forced displacement made by the UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 2024 was one such opportunity and the research team made a submission in January 2025 in which we identified some of the drivers of forced displacement, experiences of violence and discrimination, and flaws in refugee status determination and support for queer Iranians that our research has uncovered.  

The project explores identity within a reflexive postcolonial framework using innovative methodology, including poetry workshops to provide insights into how queer Iranians’ experiences of seeking international protection, migration, and resettlement are shaped by intersecting factors such as gender, sexuality, religion, class, age, ‘race’, ethnicity, and nationality, as well as the assumptions, perceptions, and priorities of the international organisations, agencies, and authorities with which they have to interact. Not all of this work mapped directly or easily onto policy agendas. However, in the extensive fieldwork at the heart of the research – 57 interviews with queer Iranian individuals and supporters on their experiences with asylum and migration – we heard of the difficulties experienced in Turkey as a transit country, and in Canada and the UK as resettlement or final destination countries. Participants also identified some of the changes necessary to improve the social, psychological, and legal experiences of SOGIESC asylum applicants and migrants. In the snapshot provided here, using pseudonyms and descriptors chosen by our participants, we highlight two themes from the project: the drivers of forced displacement, and the experiences of discrimination and violence, particularly in Turkey.   

Drivers of forced displacement  

The starting point for our research, and a catalyst in the lives of our participants in many cases, was the homophobic and transphobic legal norms and societal practices in Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) criminalises ‘sodomy’ as a capital offence and suppresses non-conforming sexual and gender practices. Beyond state repression, queer Iranians also grapple with family rejection, social stigmatisation, and everyday violence. The lack of legal protection in Iran from SOGIESC and gender related discrimination exposes queer people to abuse at the hands of state officials and community members, as we heard. Khalil, a gay man now living in Turkey, shared that his father reacted violently to his coming out:

You want to ruin my honour. I will find you wherever you are and kill you. 

Rima, a questioning (trans/gay) Iranian now living in Turkey, spent much of their life hiding their identity by ‘putting [on] makeup and feminine looks’. They explained: 

… I didn’t want my LGBT identity to become an obstacle for my progress. So, I kind of killed it in myself. This is what happens in Iran.

Saman, a gay man now in Canada, explained how, as a queer individual in Iran, one is a criminal without legal recourse.

When you have been subjected to injustice, you cannot defend yourself. You have no rights.

Queer people in Iran experience discrimination on a daily basis. This affects trans and gender non-conforming people as well: 

Arshia, a gay man now in Turkey, was detained by the moral police for inappropriate attire.  

Alireza, a nonbinary homosexual now in Turkey, was stopped by the police on multiple occasions and interrogated about their clothes, hair and nails. 

Transgender individuals, in particular, experience persistent discrimination. Arghavan, a trans woman now living in Canada, observed that even following state-subsidised gender reassignment surgery, many transgender individuals continued to be called out.

If you were not passable as a female and you were easily recognised as a transgender person, you would never have a safe life and you would always be in danger. And I was witnessing that, in the life of almost every trans woman that I visited. And even the trans men.

A number of our participants told us they had experienced rape or sexual assault, often as their first sexual experience. Themes of shame, humiliation and powerlessness were common among our participants. Shahab, a gay man / questioning Iranian now in Canada, was raped by the moral police in their van when they were detained. They found it difficult to talk about their experiences for two reasons: personal shame and concern about the impact it would have if their family found out. Shahab imagined their sisters crying together if they found out about it.  

Still from The Other Place – a documentary film by  Mehran Rezaei-Toroghi for NQIfFM

For a number of people, sexual abuse happened during their military conscription. In Iran, males over the age of 18 (with some exceptions) must carry out up to two years’ military service. This was a time of abuse for some. Amir, a gay man now in Turkey, was raped twice during conscription but could not report it because he risked the death penalty as receiving male in the act of sodomy.  

Prevailing medical and psychological practice in Iran fails to understand or meet the needs of SOGIESC minorities. Instead, state-subsidised gender reassignment, medical and psychiatric services act to impose binary gender roles, with care for the needs of the individual rarely a priority. Amira, a trans woman / nonbinary Iranian now in Canada, was threatened with electric shock therapy. Farhan, a nonbinary homosexual currently in Turkey, had behavioural therapy and was dosed with ‘anti-depressive, anti-psychosis meds, SSRIs, … strong medications.’  

These conditions force many from Iran’s sizable queer community to seek refuge in what they hoped would be safer countries.  

Discrimination and violence in Turkey 

Rather than finding safety however, many of our participants encountered discrimination and violence in their new locations, facing anti-refugee stigma and xenophobia as well as homophobia and transphobia. In Turkey, several of our participants suffered physical and verbal sexual harassment, abuse and rape, including in large, reputedly more progressive cities like Istanbul. Taha, a trans woman, complained that: 

[P]eople on the street spit at us when they see us! In Turkey, I can’t dress and live the way I want. (…) I am forced to act this way in order to avoid physical violence, conflicts, or negative consequences from the people in this society.

Queer Iranian asylum applicants often experience intensified discrimination and isolation in Turkey, as there is no housing support and applicants typically end up in inadequate housing and subjected to hate crimes and sexual violence. Applicants are also often forced to live in rural areas, far from other queer individuals and the support of SOGIESC organizations based in cities. Taha, a trans woman, told us that: 

When we try to rent a house, when they realize that we are transgender or LGBTQ+, they refuse to provide us with housing. They look at us with great disdain. They say, “You are selling your body! You do such and such things!” It is truly painful when they accuse us of selling our bodies, while they only see us through a sexual lens. (…) This has happened numerous times

Hannah, a trans woman, told us about being charged exploitative rents and being sexually harassed by landlords. 

Amir, a gay man, experienced homelessness and physical assaults when sleeping on park benches. 

Refugees do not have formal access to the labour market in Turkey, which severely curtails their livelihoods in Turkey. Working in the informal economy – often in combination with violating the limitations on free movement in order to work in a neighbouring town – may lead to deportation from the country, but refugees still do it for the sake of making a living. This puts all refugees, including queer Iranian refugees, in very precarious situations. Farhan, a nonbinary homosexual, explained this:

I have worked informally, also not being paid, and I have seen such behaviours, merely because they are Turks and I am not, and they know I cannot do anything about it. The guy comes every day to touch my crotch […]. And if you went to do something [complain] about them, they would respond in a way and would turn your life into such hell that you would wish you hadn’t done anything about it and that you should have even let them do whatever they wanted with you.

Taha, a trans woman, told us that 

[I]n many places where I had a job and a position, when they found out that I am LGBTQ+, they fired and humiliated me, and, in some cases, I even faced physical violence.

Access to adequate medical and psychological care in Turkey for queer asylum applicants and migrants is often hindered by their invisibility within the system, social isolation, and discrimination. This increases the likelihood of mental health problems, which can negatively impact their asylum and resettlement claims. Ali, a gay man, had been waiting for 6.5 years for resettlement while suffering from a debilitating joint-and-bone disease and serious dental problems.  

Several of our participants suffered from serious health issues, such as insomnia, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder. Some of our participants were HIV-positive – like Amir and Taha – needing regular medication, only affordable through health insurance, which refugees are unlikely to have. 

This is only a snapshot from our submission to the UN Independent Expert. While his thematic report is not expected imminently, we are hopeful that it will recognize and address some of the factors we have identified, leading to improvements that will be of benefit to all queer Iranians in exile and all SOGIESC refugees as well. 

Acknowledgment: The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged (Grant Ref: ES/V017497/1). 

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Posted in Migration Research

A European language detection software to determine asylum seekers’ country of origin: Questioning the assumptions and implications of the EUAA’s project

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Cecilia Manzotti, Doctoral Researcher, School of Law & SCMR, University of Sussex (UK)

In 2022, the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA) reported that seven European Union (EU) member states (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and Switzerland, have used Language Analysis for the Determination of Origin (LADO) as a tool for establishing asylum seekers’ country of origin for several years, and six other member states (Croatia, Greece, Malta, Polonia, Portugal and Slovakia) are considering introducing LADO in the near future. Based on the assumption that the way a person speaks reflects their origin – a notion which is often conflated with nationality – LADO consists in the analysis of speech samples to ascertain whether the speaker really originates from the country they claim to be from. More rarely, LADO is used to verify whether asylum applicants genuinely originate from a specific region within a country or belong to a certain ethnic group. LADO and its use in asylum procedures have fuelled lively debates, especially among linguistics. While LADO is generally conducted by humans, since 2017 Germany – until now the only country in Europe – has implemented an Artificial Intelligence (AI)[i] tool to detect the languages or dialects spoken by asylum applicants.

Inspired by the German experience, the EUAA has recently launched a project to establish a «common European platform to identify the country of origin of applicants through language assessment», including a first-line AI language detection tool and a second-line pool of language analysts. The project was announced in the 2023 EUAA’s Strategy on Digital Innovation in Asylum Procedures and Reception Systems, which to date is the only publicly available official document providing information on the initiative. Under the project, whose implementation timeline spans over a period of 10 years, the EUAA will initially foster coordination between stakeholders and develop common standards and procedures. At a later stage, once the EUAA’s mandate is adjusted as needed, the agency will establish an AI language detection tool, create a pool of analysts, and build the capacity of a team in charge of the system. In the EUAA’s view, the effort will reduce costs related to LADO, level differences among national administrations in terms of digitalisation, «facilitate more efficient and smarter identification» of asylum seekers, «ultimately leading to better and faster decisions» (EUAA’s Strategy on Digital Innovation, pp. 28-30).

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Although the EUAA’s project may have a significant impact on the substance of asylum decisions and procedural guarantees for asylum applicants, so far it has gone virtually unnoticed both among experts and in the media. Therefore, this contribution draws attention on the EUAA’s project and investigates its potential impact on the credibility assessment of asylum seekers’ claims regarding their country of origin under the Pact on Migration and Asylum (the Pact). Since there are several reasons to believe that a European AI language detection tool will be largely based on the software used by Germany – which Germany has actively promoted across Europe and the EUAA described as «providing fast and reliable assessment» of asylum applicants’ origin (EUAA’s Strategy on Digital Innovation, p. 28) – this blog post will start by critically examining the German automatic language detection system. Based on the German experience, the blog post will then attempt to foresee how the EUAA’s project will be operationalised in the context of the new or amended procedures introduced by the Pact. This contribution questions the assumptions on which automatic language analysis is based as well as its implications on the overall credibility assessment of asylum seekers’ nationality claims and, ultimately, on the applicants’ right to seek asylum.

The German automatic language and dialect detection system

Following the 2015-2016 influx of asylum seekers and under the pressure of the scandal of Franco A., a German far-right extremist who was granted subsidiary protection pretending to be Syrian, in 2017 the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) introduced three AI-based identification systems. These include an automatic language and dialect recognition system (DIAS, Dialektidentifizierungsassistent), a software for the transliteration of Arabic names that also indicates how often a name’s spelling is used in the applicant’s claimed country of origin and in other countries, and a software that analyses data stored in asylum seekers’ electronic data carriers for the purpose of establishing their identity and/or nationality. Since 2018, the three identification systems have been used as a standard procedure during the registration of asylum applicants in all BAMF branch offices and reception centres, if the person cannot provide a valid passport or passport substitute[ii] or if the document’s authenticity cannot be immediately confirmed.

Concerning DIAS, in particular, following the registration of personal data, the BAMF’s officer dials an internal phone number and the applicant is asked to describe a picture or discuss freely a topic in their native language on the phone for around two minutes. Their speech is recorded and analysed by DIAS, which automatically produces a report indicating the language(s) or dialect(s) spoken by the applicant and with which probability. The report is then used by the BAMF officer to prepare specific questions about the applicant’s origin for the asylum interview. If the report’s conclusions contradict the applicant’s claim regarding their country of origin, the applicant must be informed and given the opportunity to respond. As of November 2023, DIAS is used for the five major Arabic dialects (Egyptian, Gulf, Iraqi, Levantine and Maghrebi), Dari and Farsi. A Pashto language model was introduced in 2022, although it is unclear whether it is still in use, and a language model for Kurdish has been in the pipeline for a couple of years.

The BAMF justifies the use of DIAS based on Section 15 of the German Asylum Act that sets out the applicant’s general obligations to cooperate, and Section 16(1), which specifically provides that oral statements can be used to determine a person’s country or region of origin provided that the person was informed beforehand. The Federal Government pointed out that «[t]he results of the dialect recognition can neither confirm nor refute the information on origin» but only «provide an indication of the applicant’s origin, which is taken into account in the context of the interview, which also serves to clarify identity and nationality».[iii] In very exceptional cases, if doubts concerning the applicant’s country of origin persist after the asylum interview, a «Speech and Text Analysis», carried out by external linguists based on a new and longer speech sample, may be recommended.[iv]

According to the Federal Government, the use of DIAS has several benefits, including the verification of asylum seekers’ origin early on in the procedure, the fact that additional data are made available to decision-makers to support asylum decisions, an overall acceleration of the procedure, a reduction of fraud and increased security. On the other hand, linguists, civil society actors and members of the Parliament have expressed serious concerns regarding DIAS’ accuracy and reliability. Indeed, the Federal Government reported a language recognition rate of 80% for Arabic dialects in 2017, which increased to 87% in 2023, and 75% for the other languages in 2022. This means that the software provides a wrong result for around 20% of the applicants who undergo the procedure. Other criticisms concern the BAMF’s lack of transparency regarding the software’s algorithms and the language samples distribution, the risk of self-perpetrating bias, and the government’s failed promise to commission an independent evaluation of the system. Leaving in the background these issues, which have already been explored in some of the literature on the use of AI in asylum procedures, the use of a language detection software to ascertain asylum seekers’ country of origin poses fundamental questions regarding the evidence and standard of proof for assessing the credibility of asylum applicants’ nationality claims.

First, the BAMF’s guidance problematically describes DIAS as a tool to establish an applicant’s nationality or country of origin, which is defined in EU refugee law as a person’s country of nationality or, in the case of stateless persons, country of former habitual residence (recast Qualification Directive, article 2(n); Qualification Regulation, article 3(13)). Although the guidance available in other countries using LADO or developed by the EUAA (p. 36) specifies that «[l]anguage analysis does not reveal the country of nationality of the applicant as such, but the place (or one of the places) where the applicant has socialised by residing there for a longer time and interacting with the community», in asylum decisions LADO conclusions are generally used – either openly or implicitly – to determine a person’s nationality. Indeed, what is relevant when it comes to the assessment of asylum seekers’ risk of persecution or serious harm under refugee law is the concept of country of nationality, and not the notion of country of socialisation. But what does constitute evidence of a person’s nationality in the absence of any identity or travel document? While asylum authorities generally resort to LADO and questions to test the applicant’s knowledge of their alleged country of origin, neither language nor knowledge of a country’s geography and traditions constitute evidence of nationality. Nationality is a legal status, which may or may not correspond to a person’s main country of socialization. Accordingly, more pertinent questions would concern, for example, identity and travel documents issued by the applicant’s alleged state of nationality, the applicant’s attempts to obtain these documents, the applicant’s place of birth and their parents’ nationality, and the applicant’s access to the rights and entitlements reserved to nationals of the state in question.

Second, and related to the previous point, the fact that DIAS is used when a person’s asylum application is registered, that is before the asylum interview, means that language indication is given priority over the applicant’s testimony as evidence of nationality. Indeed, the results produced by DIAS orient the asylum interview, and not the other way around, and it is hard to believe that they do not create a prejudice in the interviewer. The use of DIAS before giving the applicant the opportunity to explain in detail their personal situation and reasons for seeking asylum, even in the absence of any negative credibility indicators, appears even more questionable considering the software’s poor reliability. Additionally, although the BAMF has repeatedly specified that DIAS only provides an indication of the applicant’s nationality, it remains unclear what evidentiary weight language indication should be given in the overall credibility assessment of the applicant’s nationality claim. In the absence of any clear guidance, the question risks being left to the discretion of individual decision-makers.

Third, a closer look at the conditions that trigger the use of DIAS shows that asylum applicants are expected to substantiate their nationality to a standard of proof higher than the balance of probabilities generally required in refugee status determination. Indeed, the BAMF’s instructions provide that DIAS must be used if the applicant’s identity and nationality cannot be proved, determined with certainty or established beyond doubts. On the other hand, the BAMF seems to adopt a much more generous standard of proof when it comes to its own determination of asylum seekers’ nationality through language indication, considering DIAS’ low accuracy level. The fact that DIAS is used whenever an applicant does not produce any valid passport or passport substitute or the BAMF doubts the documents’ authenticity also constitutes a weakening of the principle – included in German law (Residence Act, Section 5(3)) and well-established in EU refugee law (Qualification Directive, article 4(5); Qualification Regulation, article 4(5); ECtHR, F.N. and others v. Sweden, paragraph 72) – that asylum seekers do not need to produce a passport to substantiate their identity and nationality.

In sum, the German automatic language recognition system relies on problematic assumptions regarding the relationship between language and nationality. Furthermore, its systematic use before the asylum interview whenever an applicant fails to provide a valid identity or travel document or the BAMF doubts the authenticity of the applicant’s document reflects the adoption of an unduly high standard of proof for the applicant. Moreover, it results in automatic language detection being given priority over the applicant’s testimony in the credibility assessment of nationality claims, despite DIAS’ inaccuracy and controversial nature.

Where does the EUAA’s project fit within the Pact?

As I argued elsewhere, under the Pact, the determination of asylum seekers’ country of origin is not only critical to the assessment of their fear of persecution or serious harm but may also substantially affect the level of procedural guarantees to which applicants are entitled. Indeed, following a pre-entry screening, applicants who originate from countries with a low recognition rate and those who do not cooperate in the identification procedures, notably concealing their nationality, will be channelled into the asylum border procedure. The latter implies fewer procedural safeguards compared to the regular examination procedure and practical restrictions that may substantially affect the applicants’ ability to assert their claim. Under the new rules, the nationality of applicants for international protection is determined and recorded for the first time during the pre-entry screening, which includes preliminary health and vulnerability checks, identification, registration of biometric data and security checks (Screening Regulation, article 8(5)). The screening authorities must include an «indication of nationalities or statelessness» (article 17(1) (b)) in the screening form, specifying if the information recorded has been «declared by the person» or «confirmed by the authorities» (article17(3)).

Considering that the purpose of the pre-entry screening is to ensure that asylum applicants «are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible and that those procedures are continued without interruption or delay» (recital 7), it is reasonable to foresee that the automatic language detection tool that the EUAA is going to develop will be made available to the screening authorities. Although the Screening Regulation does not mention language indication or analysis anywhere, Article 14 includes «data or information provided by or obtained from the applicant» among the types of evidence that should be used to establish or verify asylum seekers’ nationality, together with identity, travel or other documents and biometric data. The phrasing «data or information provided by or obtained from the applicant» is sufficiently broad to include the recording and analysis of a speech sample through a language recognition software. On the contrary, the EUAA’s pool of language analysts is likely to come into play during the asylum procedure, since the pre-entry screening must be finalised within seven days at the border and three days within the territory of member states (article 8). As in the case of Germany, it is foreseeable that asylum authorities will be able to request an in-depth language analysis if doubts regarding the applicant’s country of origin persist.

Since the goal of the pre-entry screening is to identify applications that are likely to be inadmissible or unfounded and channel them into the accelerated and border procedures as soon as possible, the results produced by the language detection software can be anticipated to be decisive in establishing applicants’ country of origin in the absence of any valid identity or travel document. Importantly, the Screening Regulation does not foresee any possibility for the applicant to challenge the authorities’ recording of their personal data during the screening. Although Article 17 provides that the applicant shall have the possibility to indicate that the information included in the screening form is incorrect and the authorities must record this, under the Regulation the applicant’s view does not have any impact on the screening process and, given the short time of the procedure, is unlikely to lead to a more in-depth assessment at this stage. This means that the decision to examine an asylum application through a sub-standard procedure, severely limiting the applicant’s rights, would largely be based on the results produced by an AI language recognition software that is grounded on wrong assumptions regarding the relationship between language and nationality and has proved to be inaccurate. The results of the automatic language recognition may also potentially affect the assessment of the asylum application, since evidence shows that amending a nationality record during the asylum procedure can prove extremely complex. This would be even more complicated for asylum seekers who have been identified as originating from countries with a low recognition rate or safe countries of origin and whose application has been rejected as unfounded or manifestly unfounded, because their appeal against the first instance decision would not have automatic suspensive effect (Asylum Procedure Regulation, article 68(3)).

            Ultimately, the use of an AI language recognition tool to establish asylum seekers’ country of origin during the pre-entry screening would not be without consequences on the credibility assessment of asylum seekers’ nationality claims, as the case of Germany has shown. Moreover, combined with the systematic channelling of applicants from certain countries of origin into the border procedure, the use of automatic language indication would compromise the applicants’ right to seek asylum. With their asylum applications being examined at the border and under limited procedural guarantees, applicants identified as originating from certain countries would face significant obstacles asserting their claim and challenging the first instance authorities’ decision.

Further readings

EMN-OECD, The Use of Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence in Migration Management, February 2022.

D. Eades, Nationality Claims. Language Analysis and Asylum Cases in M. Coulthard and A. Johnson (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Forensic Linguistics, 2010.

H. Hahn, Digital Identification Systems and the Right to Privacy in the Asylum Context: An Analysis of Implementations in Germany, 2021.

K. Wilson and P. Foulkes, Borders, Variation, and Identity: Language Analysis for the Determination of Origin (LADO) in D. Watt and C. Llamas (eds), Language, borders and identity, Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

This blog was originally posted on the ADiM Blog, Analyses & Opinions, November 2024, and has been re-posted with permission of the author and ADiM.

[i] For the purpose of this blog post, I adopt the definition of ‘AI system’ contained in Article 3(1) of the EU AI Act. Under certain circumstances, the use of AI for identifying asylum seekers who are unable to prove their identity is permitted under the AI Act (recital 33).

[ii] The BAMF’s Instructions on Identity Verification in Asylum Procedures (Dienstanweisung Asylverfahren, Identitätsfestellung, 2023) define a ‘passport substitute’ as «a document that, alone or with a visa or residence permit, authorizes cross-border travel and fulfils some, but not all, of the functions of a passport. In particular, the identity card (ID card) is relevant in this context». (Translation from German into English revised by the Editorial Team).

[iii] Translation from German into English revised by the Editorial Team.

[iv] On the difference between ‘language indication’ and ‘language analysis’, see EUAA, Executive Summary, Study on Language Assessment for Determination of Origin, September 2022, p. 13.

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Posted in Migration Comments, Migration Research

The ‘Muslimification’ of Muslims: why political conflict over Islam makes us blind to transformation towards diversity

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Paul Statham, Professor of Migration, SCMR Director

Muslim man walking past a mural in East Harlem, New York City. Photo, author’s own

Do you think that Islam is a threat to the British way of life? UK Population 30% yes; Conservative Party members 58% yes

Do you think parts of many European cities are under the control of Sharia Law and are ‘no-go’ zones for non-Muslims? UK population 30% yes; Conservative Party members 52% yes 

Source: Opinion poll of 521 Conservative party members from 7-16 February 2024, Hope Not Hate

When you had your breakfast this morning did you feel the British way of life under threat? When you stroll through London, Manchester, or Leeds, do feel pressurised by Sharia law?  Or do you see cities blooming with diversity? People of all types thrown together in the glorious mish-mash of everyday life. Personally, I find it disturbing that 3 out of 10 people say “yes” to questions above, because it does not fit the reality I see around me. It’s less surprising those who gave us Liz Truss as PM say “yes”, but that’s another story.

How can it be ‘normal’ for so many people to see the world in a way depicted by these questions?

There are two stories at play here: The first is the only story in town for dominant politics and mainstream media – the “clash of civilizations”. This is the idea that European societies are basically cleaved in two conflicting camps, with “White Christian” majorities on one side pitched against the alien culture and values of Islam imported by immigration on the other. Even those who morally challenge this view as discriminatory, are dragged onto the same battleground, as the endless multicultural conflicts show.

But there is an alternative story that you won’t read about in the news that finds almost no space in the heat of politics. This is a story of incremental social and demographic change across boundaries and generations – a world transitioning to diversity, in part through ethnic mixing. This is where kids of different colours hang out together in the school yard, their parents work together, and where we increasingly choose partners from different backgrounds than ourselves. This is also a world where girls wearing the niqab in Bradford speak in broad Yorkshire accents. It where the Muslim son of a bus driver can be elected Lord Mayor of London, and another from across the political divide can rise from humble origins to become Home Secretary and Chancellor. This is a story of aspiration, opportunity, and society transforming through diversity. It’s about British Muslims becoming so much a part of British society, that for most social intents and purposes it is of no consequence that they are Muslim at all.

I’m a sociologist, not a politician. I’ve been working on the integration of Islam and Muslims in Europe for more than 25 years. This is from when we were just a few oddballs studying the political accommodation of minority religions, to when these issues move the centre of European consciousness – after 9/11, the so-called ‘War on Terror’, a global renaissance of Islamic beliefs, and seemingly endless multicultural conflicts over headscarves, minarets, and niqabs etc.. Looking back, I’ve been increasingly concerned by the impact of this politicisation in distorting the way we do academic research. I think we have fallen short in the social sciences, often simply mimicking and reinforcing tropes from politics and media. I’ve called this the “Muslimification of Muslims” – not without a slight hint of sarcasm.

At Sussex, we were part of a massive original survey on Muslim minorities of 1st and 2nd generations across six European countries. This was a decade ago, but I’ve recently gone back to re-examine the data. We asked all the hot questions about culture, values, and identities. But the value of this study was that we not only asked about culture as a cleavage, but we also asked the questions about culture as a way of connecting people across boundaries. We asked about shared identities with non-Muslims, such as feeling “British”, “Dutch” or “French”, about having people who are non-Muslims as your friends, neighbours, or within your family network. In short, we wanted to give culture a chance to empirically tell us about social interaction across ethno-religious boundaries, by including the questions that seem to be increasingly omitted for studies on Muslims.

So, what is problematic about the “Muslimification” of Muslims?

First, there is the problem with the category “Muslim”. To state what should be very obvious, people who self-identify as Muslim living in Europe are a highly heterogeneous category: by ethnicity, family country of origin, Islamic faith, immigration history etc… and that’s before we even mention gender, age, or class/status differences. But most research simply mimics political debates and lumps this diverse set of people into a single category “Muslim”, often unquestioningly, and often because the quality of the data is not good enough to do anything else. Unsurprisingly, scholars seldom acknowledge this last point.

Against this, our findings shows very distinctive trajectories of acculturation, opinions, and behaviour by people within this umbrella label of “Muslim”. Family country of origin was especially salient in account for divergence. One size does not fit all.

Second, when academic lump all Muslims together as “Muslims” this automatically emphasises religion and religiosity over other all other identities and social explanations. Religiosity now has a sort of über-explanatory status.

Against this, our research shows that non-religious factors that connect people across boundaries matter much more than religiosity. These push in the opposite direction and demonstrate being part of a shared culture. Especially significant are feeling “British”, “French”, or “Dutch”, consuming “British”, “French”, or “Dutch” media, and having family experiences of intermarriage. Only four out of ten people even practiced their Islamic faith and could be considered religious in a meaningful sense. It really isn’t all about religion because they are Muslims.

The third point is about ideas of democracy. Social scientists often tend to repeat the dogmas from politics and media about supposed conflicts over so-called “liberal democratic values”. Twenty-five years ago, “liberal democratic values” were seen as the civic stuff that would hold national societies together facing the new challenges of globalisation, of which immigration and superdiversity are part. Today, however “liberal democratic values” usually only introduced as a stick to beat Muslims – as a sort of test of ethnocultural “Britishness”, “Frenchness” or “Dutchness” that they can never pass.

Interestingly, our research shows that from the side of Muslims there is little to suggest that acculturation over democratic values is unlikely. However, when we look on the other side of the boundary, it is the non-Muslim majority who see larger and significant gaps between themselves and Muslims. It seems that a sizeable part of the majority population have taken on board the dominant message of politics and media and see Muslims as a threat to the democratic way of life – as we saw in the opening opinion poll. 

An important point here is that often integration and acculturation processes are talked about in a way that assumes that the more integration or acculturation advances the less conflict there will be over diversity. Clearly, this is not the case – it is not a zero-sum game. Instead, what we are witnessing today is that the more Muslims adapt and become part of European societies, the more their presence is opposed and made conflictual, by a significant proportion of those who are not Muslim. In other words, we live in a time of factual increasing demographic diversity and hybridity (among Muslims and non-Muslims) on the ground, but the only dominant political story in town is one of conflict between two opposed ethno-religious camps. Populists stoke these divisions that are counterfactual to the social reality around us.

But what about the academy? Surely, we can do better?

Today, the social sciences are polemical, driven by normative critiques and counter-critiques, that at worst ape the “culture wars” outside. But for me, Sociology is not just about being a social justice warrior. It’s not just about being negative and criticising the world. It’s about making the mechanisms visible through which societies transform and change. This is based on the belief that if we understand them, then we may be in a position to consider doing something about it for good. In this sense, we need humility and to take inspiration from something George Orwell said seventy-five years ago: “To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle.” The social sciences need to take up this struggle. A better world needs better research.

The research supporting this article is published in:

Statham, Paul. 2024. Challenging the Muslimification of Muslims in research on ‘liberal democratic values’: why culture matters beyond religion. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 50(1), 203–232. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2023.2268894 Open Access.

For a commentary article, see:

Statham, Paul. 2024. ‘Re-thinking how we study Muslim minorities in Europe—A call for de-Muslimification.’ International Migration, (62): 277–280. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13333

This was presented as a TED-style talk at the “Impossible until it’s Done: a celebration of Sussex research”, 12th, June 2024, 1 Birdcage Walk, Westminster, London. You can see a video of the talk here.

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Posted in Migration Research

What can regret in migration decision-making reveal about policy failures?

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Dr Caterina Mazzilli | ODI Global

When Aida (not her real name) joined her husband in South Africa, she could not believe that that was what she “had come here for”. She said, “the first business we were doing was door-to-door [vending]. We used to sell blankets and curtains door to door and that brought [up] some reasons that made [me] consider returning home.”

Aida was born in Ethiopia and, like many Ethiopians over the past 20 years, migrated to South Africa. In her case it was to reunite with her husband, which is common amongst women and girls, while men and increasingly younger boys tend to set off in pursuit of economic opportunities. Photos and videos of luxury wedding parties in Cape Town, talks of established business ventures, sizeable remittances, and substantial donations to churches in towns of origin convey the message that in South Africa it is possible to “become someone”.

26 December 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia- a strapped luggage stands without its owner at the migrant rehabilitation center. ©UNICEF Ethiopia/2013/Ayene

To a certain extent, these aspirations are possible to meet. As of 2022, South Africa was the third largest economy in Africa after Egypt and Nigeria. The local currency (the Rand) is relatively solid and there are many opportunities for entrepreneurship, with fewer and lower taxes on businesses than in Ethiopia. But the journey to South Africa is 10,000 kilometres long, laden with physical threats and danger of economic extortion. And even when they arrive, Ethiopians are “pushed to the margins” of the South African society, as most of them work as door-to-door vendors or in informal convenience stores (spaza shops).

The interviews our project partners conducted with Ethiopian men and women uncovered the presence of regret among some participants, expressed through the wish of having taken some different decisions. Regret is an incredibly sensitive topic, which risks being misinterpreted and misused, but looking at it can have implications for both research and policy-making.

As a caveat, this is not psychology research, nor was it possible to conduct it under clinical settings. Nonetheless, we hope it is the starting point for a more rigorous examination of the topic.

What the research showed

Everybody feels regret in their daily life both for trivial matters and big decisions, and migrants are no exception. However, in the context of migration, this topic is still underexplored at best, and a taboo at worst. This happens for a few reasons:

  1. Pressure to ‘succeed’. Migration requires considerable material and emotional investment not only for the individual migrant, but often for their own network too. There is extensive research on the fact that the ‘poorest of the poor’ just do not have the means to migrate and very often families rely on the one member who migrates for remittances – but also to increase their social capital. This puts pressure on migrants to tick the boxes of a ‘successful migration’, for instance by owning a house, starting a business, or sending money to cover family healthcare expenses and school fees. These expectations are a weight on their shoulders and constrain them in their conversations with loved ones who have not migrated. The Ethiopian participants narrated of their frustration when communicating with their family, who found it difficult to believe accounts of hardship in South Africa. Those accounts contradict the well-established narrative of easy-access to economic success and personal development that has been reproduced over time. In reality, this narrative only paints a partial picture, as it erases the solitude, violence, and discrimination most of them have experienced in South Africa. The impossibility to communicate lived challenges went together with a longing for loved ones, and the regret for missing important family events. This made regret unspeakable of.
  2. Lack of control over certain decisions. The data collection at the core of this study revealed that regret was mostly associated with those decisions that are a direct result of restrictive migration policies, such as strict border control or ever more stringent requirements to be granted a residence permit. Residence documents are extremely difficult to obtain and renew in South Africa because of both rigid regulations and pervasive corruption. But without them, it is impossible to register a business, use national healthcare, send children to a state school, or send remittances through regular bank transfers. One participant explained the tough impact this had on his life: “Back at home, you are not worried about any possible police raid or forced repatriation. For instance, my wife is living here but without paper; I have a child and [is] still undocumented; this is a huge psychological burden for me.”

While some people might regret the entire decision to migrate, others might regret just part of the process. In addition, some participants who seemed to express regret quite vocally remained in the destination country, while others decided to return even if there was apparently no major problem in their life. And this happens because, even when participants feel and express regret, they might just not have the means and/or the opportunity to act upon it. For instance, some participants in our study mentioned their desire to go back to Ethiopia. Yet some of them were holding back while waiting for a family member to reach South Africa, while others wanted to achieve a specific goal before returning (i.e., saving a certain sum). Mostly, however, they were hesitant to leave South Africa as they knew they would not be permitted to re-enter, unless they crossed the border irregularly once again.

  • Risk of weaponisation. In a world where migration is treated like a top political issue and migrants are described as a threat to citizens and national resources, a delicate topic such as regret is at high risk of being weaponised by those sections of society that are hostile to migration. Politicians and members of the public who openly oppose migration could co-opt notions of regret as a means to accuse migrants of being ungrateful for the opportunities they found in the country of destination. But also, politicians and policy-makers might champion agendas that look caring on the surface while hiding a wider anti-immigration sentiment, such as development funds to countries of origin and transit that are conditional on migration prevention. This ‘liberal’ approach might appeal to many as it does not look openly hostile, but rather adopts the narrative of protecting migrants from the risk of regret.

So, what are the implications of these findings?

Exploring regret can help demystifying mainstream narratives about migration and success. Specifically, it can shed light on the fact that migration alone does not bring success, but rather success stems from structural conditions such as the job market, migration policies, and social cohesion between migrants and natives, to name a few. Shifting the focus from the individual to the structure could first and foremost make regret less of a taboo, thus hopefully alleviating the constraints that migrants feel in their conversations with family and friends.

There is an urgent need for a different narrative on migration, showing migrants under a nuanced light, highlighting their contributions to host societies, but also reckoning with the structural obstacles they face in their search for a better life. Ethiopian spaza shops in South African cities provide a valuable commercial service to the local population: they are located where there are no other minimarkets, such as in townships, stay open beyond usual shop working hours, and sell products at affordable prices. Yet these shops overwhelmingly operate in the informal sector, exposing shopkeepers to precarity and risks to their own safety, but also depriving the government of South Africa of potential revenues from registered businesses. As was the case for Aida, the most common regret amongst our participants stemmed from the clash between pre-departure expectations and reality at destination.

In this research regret did not emerge only as an emotional response to lived experiences, but also as the by-product of structural political and economic dynamics that place migrants in extremely hazardous positions. Direct control measures on migration have become more and more stringent over the last decades, and while this has not stopped migration, it has pushed migrants towards more dangerous and deadly routes. This context may lead to feelings of regret amongst migrants, although not necessarily about the decision to migrate itself as much as about the conditions under which they were forced to migrate. Relaxing the criteria to obtain regular residency status, while ensuring the prompt renewal of expiring permits, would ensure safer journeys, lower reliance on criminal networks, increased material and mental wellbeing of migrants, and better socio-economic integration.

Finally, policies fostering effective integration can weaken misguided hostile rhetoric against migrants and reduce concerns on the side of the local population. And while doing this, it is essential to keep in mind that integration goes both ways, and that its success depends far more on the opportunities generated by policies, structures, and institutions than on individuals’ keenness.

It would be naïve to think that simply avoiding a conversation on regret can protect migrants. As such, we call on scholars and practitioners to analyse regret within migration decision-making ethically, preventing its hijacking for political gains, to improve policies and migrants and host communities’ lives.

* This work is one of the outputs of the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub, which is funded by the UKRI Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) [Grant Reference: ES/S007415/1]. Additional funding has been provided by Irish Aid. More information at www.mideq.org

* The author wishes to thank the members of the MIDEQ South Africa team for conducting the interviews on which this piece is based.

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Posted in Migration Research

Feminist Migration Futures? Reflections on a Feminist Migration Policy

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Toni Cela (Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED) and University of Miami); Anita Ghimire (Nepal Institute for Social and Environmental Research (NISER);  Meena Poudel (Independent researcher); Sarah Scuzzarello (SCMR, University of Sussex); Mary Setrana (University of Ghana); Marcia Vera Espinoza (Institute for Global Health and Development at Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh); Franzisca Zanker (Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute at the University of Freiburg) 

Migratory movements occur in the context of hegemonic postcolonial power relations. These situated relations in turn, adversely affect the overall treatment of migrants on the move. The intersectional migrant experience based on racial, class, gender, sexual, and religious oppressions further compounds the hegemonic power structures. Feminist migration scholars, among others, have long discussed how to best understand and mitigate the effects of these intersections on the lives of migrants. With the newly emerging debates and practices out of the field of feminist foreign policy, we decided to hold a roundtable discussion at the 21st IMISCOE Annual Conference in Lisbon – in a hybrid manner – to consider what a feminist migration policy might look like and whether it is even feasible. This blog summarises our conversations and presents some of the key contributions of global feminist migration research. Drawing on our discussion as well as our own research and political practices, we make a case in favour of transforming migration research and policy through better listening, advocating, and research design. 

A strong foundation for gender in migration research 

In recent decades, gender-specific migration research has gained momentum. Through this research, feminist academic practice has made the many women who migrate in contexts like South Asia, West Africa, and Latin America more visible. This scholarship has developed our understanding of migrants’ situated intersectionality across locations and social contexts. It has also made clear the influences of migration governance and migration categorisations on the lives and mobility of female migrants.  

The feminisation of migration is based on family strategies of economic survival, suggesting complex and collective decision-making processes that take place across time. Power and marginalisation shift depending on the geographical, social, and temporal location in which migrating populations live. This can range more generally from a lack of access to sexual and reproductive health for displaced women, to the effects of gender blind policy implementation for long-term integration. Feminist research has pushed the boundaries of our understanding in debates on smuggling and trafficking, conversations on indentured sex work and  migration and dialogues on the gendered nature of migration governance. Research has uncovered how gendered caretaking responsibilities exacerbate female immobility, as well how states can impose normative practices of motherhood onto migrant mothers. Others have considered what transnational mothering from abroad can look like. To some extent, migration has empowered women and enabled them to renegotiate gendered power structures back home. Yet, these structures have not gone extinct; on the contrary, they persist. The structural realities both at home and in migrant’s host countries reinforce certain types of gender dependency and subject individuals to gender-based forms of prey/oppression.  

A major contribution to the migration literature from feminist research has been the analysis of practices of resistance. We want to emphasise the work by Amarela Varela for example, who has explored what she calls the “sociology of migrant struggles”, or luchas migrantes. Varela analyses migrants’ collective actions that challenge both the State and society at large. While such struggles take different forms and enact diverse aims, they tend to develop a critique of racism and xenophobia while contesting border regimes and redefining the normative frameworks of social recognition. Resistance work is often collective and strongly informed by feminist approaches. 

Gaps of course exist. Global South based and focused research is still not clearly visible in the literature. Similarly, research on masculinities has a long way to go. An equally important gap in research concerns LGBTQ+ migrants and refugees and the analysis of how border regimes and social boundaries reproduce hetero- and cisnormative power structures is burgeoning. Beyond the research field, heteronormative, cisnormative, racialised, class-based, and post-colonial power structures continue to shape migration governance and the experience of migration. In research and policymaking, gender (if included at all) is a variable instead of an analytical tool. More research needs to be undertaken to change this, but what can we change beyond that? 

Feminist Futures – possibilities and tensions 

Migration policy is at best about regulation and at worst about control. Embedded into the neoliberal capitalist world order that dictates who can move and when, migration and its regulating policies are founded on racialised and postcolonial ideals. An intersectional feminist migration policy has the potential to challenge this. It would shed light on the complex intersecting systems and structures of power that shape mobility opportunities. As such, an intersectional feminist migration policy would be not only transformative, but we believe, it would also encourage a new framing of migration. Its focus would be on human security which would not be pitched against receiving states’ national security, and a key focus would be on the root causes of why people emigrate in the first place. Through a feminist-informed migration policy, mobility would become possible outside of a spectre of violence. Borders would no longer be violently enforced rather they would be enablers of movement and safe passage. Migration would become a choice instead of being imposed as one’s only chance for survival or a better life. Importantly, women who would like to migrate would be able to do so without the fear of stigmatisation and high protection risks. People on the move would be looked after, cared for, and ensured a safe passage rather than an ‘orderly’ one. The needs and desires of migrants would be the focus of a feminist migration praxis, and they would be seen as individuals rather than being defined by a particular legal status. 

Street Art in Santiago, Chile. Photo Cred. Marcia Vera Espinoza

There is, however, a tension between the ‘what it is’ and the ‘what could be’.  We are currently stuck at a crossroads between contemporary policies and feminist transformative principles. How can we transform migration, not just in terms of research, but also practice and policies? We argue we need to better listen, advocate and research. 

1.     We need to listen 

First, we need to make space for, listen actively to, and learn from the voices of refugees and migrants. They need to inform – and be part of – research, policy, and governance infrastructure. Their experiences should be the central force guiding our understanding of migration. Second, we need to become better at listening to those who fear migration and refugees. Listening to see what their fears are actually about (e.g. access to healthcare, school, food, and livelihoods) so that we can foster constructive conversations where possible.

Nepali women who are wives of migrants reflecting the migration of their spouse through paintings. Photo Cred. Anita Ghimire

2.     We need to advocate 

According to Amina Mama, feminist theory is “most relevant when it is rooted in activism.” We need to advocate from a space of “inclusive resistance”, from a collective feminist approach. We advocate for migration policies that aim for transformation rather than a slight improvement to our heteropatriarchal status quo. A starting point for this is calling for a different narrative, one that does not see migration as a problem. To achieve this, we need to advocate for changes to our news outlets to become complicit in creating an atmosphere of solidarity. We additionally advocate for an acceptance that mobility is a fact in human history and part of global change. We need to acknowledge that contemporary migration governance and policies are developed with the socioeconomic interest of the Global North in mind. We need to identify and network our feminist allies in government bureaucracies, agencies and amongst policy-makers. Whilst there is no consensus on whether we seek a borderless world, we are in consensus on the topic of human rights-based pathways for regular migration. We imagine a world where there are consistent and equitable processes for regularization for undocumented migrants (e.g. permanent residence, affordable citizenship pathways, and meaningful participation in civic and political life). We need to advocate for a future where productive and reproductive labour are recognised as equally important. With this, we ultimately envision a feminist-informed version of labour rights that are fundamental to international labour standards, protection, and development. 

3.     And yes, we need to research (better) 

Methodologically speaking, in particular, quantitative survey data still suffers from an androcentric bias – both in terms of variables chosen and how we interpret quantitative findings (i.e. recognizing the gendered structures shaping male and female migrants’ lives rather than attributing outcomes to individual choice).  

A larger question is, however, how we research and produce knowledge: we need to carry out slow research, beyond funders’ restrictions. That is to say, we need to conduct research based on collective action with a careful consideration of the varying privileges that cut across research collectives. There are examples of research collectives based on feminist research principles, including the Narrativas de Fronteras (Border Narratives) a Latin American collective that aims to exercise epistemological self-care while, at the same time, practising ‘sentipensante’ (sensing/thinking) activism, or the group CAMINAR – comparative analysis on migration and displacement in the Americas, who came together during the pandemic. The latter has been trying to work outside, although still rooted within, the boundaries of neoliberal academia conducting research with no funding and publishing in multiple languages. Another small international pilot research project brought together researchers to discuss and draw out how migrant communities in the Global South, namely in Mexico, Nepal, Qatar, and Zimbabwe, were affected by, and reacted to the pandemic.  

Such multi stakeholder collaborations within the Global South have to be strengthened, and their work promoted, in order to create contextual knowledge on the various dimensions of migration such as transformative gender approaches, feminist research methodology relevant to migration research and inform transformative policymaking.   

Posted in Migration Research

Solidarity in Europe two years on from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

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Dr Rob Sharp, Lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies in the School of Media, Arts and Humanities, University of Sussex

It has now been well over two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As of February 2024, nearly 6.4 million Ukrainian refugees had been recorded globally. As the war has progressed, the European Union’s support for displaced Ukrainians has generated significant public debate, not least due to the conflict’s heightened and prolonged demands on member states’ public infrastructure and associated economic cost, necessarily of concern and interest to the public. This concern comes after a widespread outpouring of support from private individuals, companies and non-governmental organisations.

If we take solidarity to comprise a negotiation between two individuals around shared values, with clear emotional, legal and sociocultural dimensions, then the question of solidarity fatigue in relation to those responding to the war – those in institutions and private individuals offering help with accommodation, integration, language, or financial help – has generated significant press and academic interest. The European Commission’s Ukraine adviser Lodewijk Asscher has suggested its major cause is economic slowdown relating to cost-of-living crisis. One might expect solidarity fatigue to particularly hit Germany and Poland most prominently, given that these two countries have hosted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees since the invasion, around a million in each country respectively, according to some reports.

As a Media and Cultural Studies researcher, I am particularly interested in the discursive and communicative justificatory strategies used when expressions of fatigue are articulated by those at the heart of offering solidarity – small NGOs, self-organised community organisers and employees of cultural institutions. I completed 45 interviews in January through April 2024 with such individuals in Berlin and Warsaw, many of whom were displaced Ukrainians, as part of an ongoing project funded by the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust in order to understand such questions of solidarity further, not least in an effort to critically interrogate successful attempts at maintaining solidarity long-term in respect to such crises.

In May 2024 I organised workshops in Ukrainian run by the Ukrainian artists Dasha Podoltseva and Elena Orap at the centre for urbanism ZK/U in Mitte, Berlin and in Collegium Civitas in central Warsaw. Up to 15 displaced Ukrainian women based in each city attended in each workshop, where a series of object, photographic and map-elicitation activities were used – with strong ethical consideration – to explore specifically the question of recognition or its opposite – not just solidarity, but also legal-rights-based and affective alternatives. Participants explored where, for instance, in each city they felt recognised or otherwise – showing much more of an affinity to Warsaw’s identity as a reconstructed city, as opposed to the post-Soviet architecture of East Berlin. Clearly memories of the city’s railway stations are still raw and being rearticulated in different ways.

Workshop activity, Photo by Dasha Podoltseva/Elena Orap

Via these different methodologies, and as I proceed with writing up my analysis, there have been numerous complex articulations around solidarity fatigue – as the cultural and political climate has shifted, as rights have evolved in both jurisdictions, and as complex affective and emotional responses between people have needed to be renegotiated over time as the full-scale invasion wears on.

In Berlin, multiple interviewees referred in general terms to the changing media and political climate as attitudes towards the crisis have evolved. As you might expect, many NGO employees highlighted a shift from a short-term emergency response targeting health and accommodation to longer-term questions of integration and socioeconomic inclusion, alongside rearticulating a changed understanding of the duration of the war, which was originally widely believed to be temporary but is now perceived by many interviewees to be indefinite. The original positive reception of Ukrainians by institutional media has changed to something more ambivalent. Such media discourses are often used as a justificatory articulation of solidarity fatigue.

In Berlin, it was clear that caveats have been introduced among some independent citizens over time in order to justify their withdrawal in some cases from providing solidarity. This is manifested through what might be called a kind of associative solidarity with particular caveats – whereby solidarity is extended to members of a particular groups but not to others – that reproduce the boundaries around the German liberal nation-state (Straehle, 2020). It is also indicative of selective solidarity(Ortiz, 2022), whereby pre-existing values within a population may be used to justify providing support to some groups but refusing others (Steinhilper et al, in press; Lawlor and Tolley, 2017) – with some racial dimensions, including towards those arriving via the ongoing migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border.

In Poland, these discursive changes were more overtly politicised. These partly reflect the populist mediated discourses of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) government which lost power in Poland in October 2023, shortly before data gathering for this paper took place. It also reflected changing media narratives over time in Poland resulting from the war’s domestic effects; most notably, the Polish farmers’ protests in 2024 against the European Green Deal and the import of grain from Ukraine.

The NGO Migration Consortium, in a 2023 report on the aftermath of the full-scale invasion produced with colleagues from the University of Warsaw, spoke of burnout being especially pronounced among Ukrainians now embedded within NGOs in Poland. “Refugees from Refugees from Ukraine proved to be extremely committed workers,” reads the report. “They claimed that work was a way for them to participate in the war – a field where they could make themselves useful. This very personal, strong motivation was admirable, but at the same time it fostered overworking and job burnout.”

As well as being written up for its own ends, my research is also feeding partly into a series of AHRC-funded workshops with cultural institutions across the UK, hosted at a national institution in Manchester and London in June 2024, with representatives, in an attempt to produce guidance or at least share best practices in sustaining ethical participatory best practices with refugees long-term, from an initial perspective of minimizing misrecognition. While this and the aforementioned data is complex, given its quantity and its skeins of competing dimensions, I am looking forward to sharing and discussing this work in greater detail with colleagues in the coming months. If anyone is interested in discussing individually please do get in touch.

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The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the individual authors and do not represent the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR).