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20 October 2023

Erika SzyszczakErika Szyszczak is a Professor Emerita and a Fellow of the UKTPO. She was the Special Adviser to the House of Lords Internal Market Sub-Committee in respect of its inquiry into Brexit: competition and state aid, and has previously acted as a consultant to the European Commission. She specialises in EU economic law. She is currently working with the European Judicial Training Network on developing training courses for national judges in EU competition law.

On 3 October 2023 the Council and the European Parliament reached provisional political agreement on an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI).[1] It is the latest legal trade measure contributing to the developing economic statecraft of the EU as part of the Open Strategic Autonomy. The tipping point for the EU to consider an extra method to address trade distortion occurred when China imposed trade restrictions on Lithuania after Lithuania improved trade relations with Taiwan. Lithuanian companies found that they could not renew or conclude contracts with Chinese firms, shipments were not being cleared and customs paperwork was held up. The ACI is portrayed as a deterrent device, discouraging third states from targeting the EU and its Member States with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. It is another example of how the EU is forging a leadership role in developing new economic trade rules in a fragmented global trading world, by stealing a lead in the narrative on what is, and what is not, acceptable trade policy.

Legislative Process

The European Commission proposed the ACI in the form of a Regulation on 8 December 2021 at the request of the Council and the European Parliament. The European Parliament Committee on International Trade adopted amendments to the proposal on 10 October 2022, and in the plenary session confirmed the Parliament’s negotiating mandate on 19 October 2022. The Council agreed its negotiating position on 16 November 2022.

The tipping point for the EU to consider an extra method to address trade distortion occurred when China imposed trade restrictions on Lithuania after Lithuania improved trade relations with Taiwan. Lithuanian companies found that they could not renew or conclude contracts with Chinese firms, shipments were not being cleared and customs paperwork was held up.

The Legal Base for the ACI is Article 207(2) TFEU:

“The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy.”

This is trade legal base for a measure designed to enhance EU economic and political resilience. The European Parliament Committee on International Trade adopted amendments to the proposal on 10 October 2022, and in the plenary session confirmed the Parliament’s negotiating mandate on 19 October 2022. The Council agreed its negotiating position on 16 November 2022.

Definition of economic coercion

The ACI defines economic coercion as when a non-EU country attempts to pressure the EU or a Member State into making a specific choice by applying, or threatening to apply, trade or investment measures. In the European Parliament Briefing ‘Proposed anti-coercion instrument different types of economic coercion are identified:

  • Explicit Coercion: based on the use of formal measures. The US Trade Act of 1974 (Sect. 301) has been used or threatened to launch trade-restrictive actions with the aim to influence a foreign country to cease applying a measure that the US perceived as unreasonable and unfairly harmful to its commercial interests.
  • Disguised coercion: when an instrument set up with a legitimate purpose is abused, for e.g. excessive or discriminatory use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
  • Silent coercion or boycott: informal restrictions applied by private players who are unofficially instructed to do so by a country’s government or are called upon to do so by state-controlled media.

Once notified of an alleged act of economic coercion the European Commission must investigate within 4 months. The European Commission report will be sent to the Council which then has between 8 to 10 weeks to decide, by a qualified majority vote, whether the complaint of economic coercion exists. The first response will be to engage in dialogue to persuade the authorities of the non-EU country to stop the acts of economic coercion. If diplomacy fails, the EU has a range of countermeasures it can apply with the consent of its Member States. These include restrictions in trade of goods and services, intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment, imposing constraints on access to the EU public procurement market, capital market, and authorisation of products under chemical and sanitary rules. The European Commission has 6 months to set out the appropriate responses, whilst keeping the European Parliament and the Council informed at all stages.

Comment

The ACI is a new legal development in international trade law. It has been developed in response to activities deployed by China and the US which threaten EU security. The ACI is another example of how the UK, post-Brexit, may be the target of EU trade defence instruments.

Why does the EU need the ACI? The European Commission justifies the measure by arguing that new forms of economic coercion are not addressed by the existing conventional trade defence measures of the EU (for e.g. anti-dumping).

The concept of economic coercion set out in the ACI is not caught by current WTO rules. Even if the threatening behaviour could be brought within the existing WTO agreement, the stymied appellate process makes enforcement difficult.

However, the ACI is not a rapid defence trade mechanism. In fact, an EU firm or sector could suffer irreparable damage in the time it takes to activate and use the ACI. It may also encourage third countries to develop their own trade defence tools which are more effective than the ACI in responding to escalating situations.


Footnotes

[1] The European Commission proposed the ACI in the form of a Regulation on 8 December 2021 at the request of the Council and the European Parliament. EUR-Lex – 52021PC0775 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu). The European Parliament Committee on International Trade adopted amendments to the proposal on 10 October 2022, and in the plenary session confirmed the Parliament’s negotiating mandate on 19 October 2022. Procedure File: 2021/0406(COD) | Legislative Observatory | European Parliament (europa.eu). The Council agreed its negotiating position on 16 November 2022. pdf (europa.eu). The Legal Base for the ACI is Article 207(2) TFEU: The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy.

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October 20th, 2023

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Briefing Paper 76 – September 2023

Erika Szyszczak

Key points

Introduction

The threat from China and the US: A stymied global trade order

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Preserving EU values and the OSA

Translating policy into a legal concept

Significant legal developments

Defending against economic coercion

Conclusion

Key points

  • In response to the increasing breakdown of the global trading system, the EU is developing economic statecraft through a policy of Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA).
  • The OSA combines EU trade defence policies with EU commitments to sustainability goals.
  • OSA utilises a mosaic of EU legal bases drawn from trade and foreign policy to create a new set of trade defence instruments for the EU.
  • However, the OSA is limited by EU constitutional law and international law.
  • Whilst the OSA has developed in response to threats from the US and China, the UK is potentially a target for OSA action.
  • The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) does not cover foreign policy issues. The EU has more defence weapons and experience when handling trade disputes than the UK. In the next phase of enforcement of the post-Brexit deal, the UK could find itself at a disadvantage.

(more…)

September 22nd, 2023

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Share this article: FacebooktwitterredditpinterestlinkedinmailErika Szyszczak24 February 2023

Erika Szyszczak is a Fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory and Professor Emerita of Law at the University of Sussex.

24 February 2022: a date that shook the world as Russian aggression in Ukraine escalated.

The fragility of a strategic democratic state was challenged, alongside exposing the vulnerability of interdependent global supply chains. Thus, it was not surprising that the early response to Russian aggression was in the form of economic sanctions led by the US, the UK and the EU. [1] (more…)

February 24th, 2023

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Briefing Paper 70 – October 2022

Erika Szyszczak

Key Points

Introduction

Subsidies granted by third states

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)

The definition of a concentration

Ex ante mandatory notification: qualifying thresholds

Financial contribution

An actual or potential distortive effect on the EU internal market

Implications for the UK

The Anti-Coercion Instrument

The definition of economic coercion

When diplomacy fails

Compatibility with international law

Conclusion

Key Points

  • The EU is developing new legal instruments to respond to, and provide remedies against, trade policies of third states which harm the EU internal market.
  • While China is the main threat to EU trade security the measures will be applicable to all third states, especially Russia, the US and the UK.
  • The proposals give the European Commission a central role in the investigation and enforcement of trade remedies but will have significant consequences for business
  • The proposals have less than transparent criteria for their application. This gives the European Commission wide discretion but may also entail further guidance, using soft law, if the European Commission wants to avoid legal challenges to the exercise of its new powers.
  • The Anti-Coercion Instrument attempts to bypass the slow procedures of the WTO and this raises questions as to whether the measure is compatible with WTO and international law.
  • The use of unilateral measures for trade security is a new form of statecraft for the EU, but it may undermine the EU’s pledge to maintain a rules-based global trading order.

Introduction

(more…)

October 12th, 2022

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Share this article: FacebooktwitterredditpinterestlinkedinmailErika Szyszczak16 September 2022

Erika Szyszczak is a Fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory and Professor Emerita of Law at the University of Sussex.

On 23 February 2022, in a Communication on decent work worldwide, the EU announced a new legislative initiative tackling issues of sustainability and working conditions in global trade. [1] On the same day, the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence. (more…)

September 16th, 2022

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Share this article: FacebooktwitterredditpinterestlinkedinmailErika Szyszczak31 March 2021

Erika Szyszczak is Professor Emerita and a Fellow of the UKTPO.

Trade has become a new tool of political and economic warfare.  Recent years have seen a rise in threats and the disruptive use of use tariffs, export and import bans to further political aims by the two economic superpowers, the US and China. Other countries wishing to assert greater political influence, such as Russia or Turkey, have joined the fray. Although the disputes are characterized as being between States, the real impact of trade wars is felt by businesses, workers, consumers and ordinary citizens. The impact is felt in the COVID-19 pandemic, where critical supplies of medical products or Personal Protective Equipment are essential in a health emergency. (more…)

March 31st, 2021

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Briefing Paper 55 – March 2021

Erika Szyszczak

Key Points

Introduction

Current Trade Disputes

Review and Enhancement of International Trade Dispute Mechanisms

Conclusion

Key Points

  • The EU has adopted a new trade policy based upon a model of Open Strategic Autonomy.
  • One aspect of the policy is to enhance enforcement powers where there is a breach of a Trade Agreement and also a proposal to enact a general anti-coercion instrument.
  • The EU is committed to including sustainable development, environmental and labour protection goals in EU trade agreements.
  • These new approaches to trade are found in the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK
  • To enhance the enforcement of international trade agreements the EU has introduced the role of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer.
  • The Enforcement Regulation 654/2014 has been amended by Regulation 2021/167.
  • A new Directorate in DG Trade for enforcement has been created to enhance market access and SME, with the establishment under the Access2Markets Programme of a single-entry point for complaints from EU stakeholders and businesses on trade barriers on foreign markets and violations of sustainable trade commitments in EU trade agreements.
  • Until the WTO Appellate Structure is operational the EU is setting the pace for international trade dispute resolution.

(more…)

March 25th, 2021

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Share this article: FacebooktwitterredditpinterestlinkedinmailErika Szyszczak18 February 2021

Erika Szyszczak is Professor Emerita and a Fellow of the UKTPO.

Traditionally, the legal enforcement of obligations was the Achilles heel of bilateral and multilateral international agreements. The EU has signalled that it wants to conduct international trade based upon the rule of law.  The demise of the WTO Appellate body since 11 December 2019 has focused the EU into using and bolstering its own Dispute Resolution mechanisms in international trade agreements. The significance of this approach is seen in the Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and the UK 2020, containing innovative procedures for rebalancing the trade elements of the TCA (and ultimately cancelling them) if one side changes its standards in ways that materially affect trade. Such rebalancing can be triggered in several circumstances, including via periodic reviews of the whole trade relationship. (more…)

February 18th, 2021

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Briefing Paper 54 – January 2021

Emily Lydgate, Erika Szyszczak, L. Alan Winters, Chloe Anthony

Key Points

Introduction

The Constitutional Structure of the TCA

Dispute Settlement

The Level Playing Field

Subsidies

Labour and Environmental Standards

Precaution

Climate

Remedial Measures

Rebalancing: Dynamic Alignment in Disguise?

Significant Uncertainty

What does this imply for the long run?

Conclusion

Annex

Key Points

  • The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has a complex bureaucratic structure, at the apex of which is a Partnership Council.
  • The Partnership Council has powers to amend most of the TCA by mutual agreement, and there will be five-yearly reviews of the operation of the TCA.
  • The UK regime for managing subsidies will be very similar to the EU system; the TCA will allow the UK and EU to challenge each other’s subsidies, ultimately referring disputes to arbitration.
  • On labour standards and the environment, the EU and UK have committed not to weaken standards in ways that affect trade or investment and there is a fairly rigorous procedure for addressing violations.
  • In addition, there are highly innovative procedures for rebalancing the trade elements of the TCA (and ultimately cancelling them) if one side changes its standards in ways that materially affect trade.
    • Such rebalancing can be triggered in several circumstances, including via periodic reviews of the whole trade relationship.
    • While these last provisions create scope for the relationship to develop, they also create considerable uncertainty and could cause almost constant negotiation and tension between the EU and the UK.

(more…)

January 15th, 2021

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Share this article: FacebooktwitterredditpinterestlinkedinmailErika Szyszczak4 December 2020

Professor Erika Szyszczak is Fellow of the UKTPO.

The preoccupation in the final stages of the Brexit talks with an industry that contributes 0.12% to GDP and employs less than 0.1% of the UK workforce baffles commentators. Control over “our” fishing waters owes more to maintaining the British psyche rather than economic arguments.  Amidst fears that the traditional UK fish and chip supper could be at risk without a fisheries deal with the EU, the UK has put in place a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with four Northern fishing nations; Greenland, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. (more…)

December 4th, 2020

Posted In: UK - Non EU, UK- EU

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