Marquee climate events like COP 26 have been notably sidelined by this year’s dramatic public health emergency. However, research projects across the globe have persisted through the pandemic, continuing to conduct their necessary work tackling decarbonisation targets across the globe.
In the next two months, three more European Union Horizon 2020 projects will commence with the involvement of several Sussex Energy Group academics. Our researchers will contribute their expertise to help inform vital decisions on balancing emission reduction with social and economic goals, both within and beyond the EU.
CINTRAN (Carbon Intensive Regions in Transition –
Unravelling the Challenges of Structural Change)
CINTRAN will investigate the effects of EU decarbonization
efforts on coal-dependent regions. These regions are particularly vulnerable to
the economic and social upheaval (and resultant inequality) that can be caused
by the deep structural changes resulting from EU climate mitigation activities.
The project focuses on four of these fossil-fuel dependent
regions: Western Macedonia (Greece), Silesia (Poland), Ida-Virumaa (Estonia)
and the Rhenish mining area (Germany). To minimise harmful consequences to
these areas and others like them, it is necessary to understand:
Patterns and dynamics of structural change in response
to decarbonization at the regional level
Parameters determining the pace of
transformation
The capacity of regional actors to cope, adapt
and pro-actively create alternative structures.
Better understanding of these areas will produce insights
about the patterns and dynamics of decarbonisation and corresponding structural
adjustments. These insights have relevance for all carbon-intensive regions in
the EU and neighbouring countries.
JUSTNORTH (Toward Just, Ethical and Sustainable Arctic
Economies, Environments and Societies)
The development of the Artic has been historically
characterised by inequitable practices, further complicated today by the
adverse effects of climate change. JUSTNORTH combines justice theories with the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals in order to evaluate the true
viability of economic activities in the Artic regions.
JUSTNORTH will provide policy makers with insights from indigenous communities, local businesses, state government and NGOs of the social, economic and environmental complexities of the Arctic. The project will carry out 16 case studies, covering topics as diverse as Icelandic fisheries, polar tourism, wind farming, reindeer herding and employment. These activities will inform the creation of a “JUSTscore framework”, aiming to create transparency, documentation and standardisation for sustainable development across the Arctic, and even further into the EU.
LANDMARC (LAND-use based MitigAtion for Resilient Climate pathways)
The Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector is responsible for about a quarter of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in a wide variety of ways, for example through deforestation, drained peatland, the application of manure or burning biomass. Land use based mitigation technologies (LMTs) can contribute significantly to the global efforts in climate change mitigation and meet the challenges of sustainable ecosystems management. Despite the presence of LMTs in most of the submitted Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, doubt remains on the effectiveness of mitigation measures in reducing emissions. This project will assess the potential effectiveness of Land-use based Mitigation Technologies (LMTs) as net sinks for greenhouse gases.
LANDMARC is an interdisciplinary
global consortium bringing together 18 partners from agriculture, ecology,
engineering, climate sciences, satellite earth observation sciences, economics,
social sciences and more. The partners are based in the EU, Africa, Asia and
the Americas, providing a global perspective on this far-reaching concern. The consortium
will carry out 8 work packages and 16 case studies in five continents, covering LMTs in different land use systems
including agriculture, forestry, reforestation, agro-forestry and peat soils. The
project will achieve this through the creation of a suite of modelling tools
and a model system to inform decisions by private sector stakeholders and
policymakers.
The targets set by firms in the corporate Hall of Fame
Many of the biggest and the best-known firms across the
world have set ambitious targets to tackle climate change – and this means
tackling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from electricity use which is a
significant contributor to most organisations’ carbon footprint. Many big name
brands have joined RE100, an organisation that encourages organisations to pledge
to using 100% renewable electricity as part of the fight against climate change.
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Marks & Spencer, Virgin Media, Zurich: the
200-plus companies that have joined RE100 reads like a Who’s Who of the
corporate world. The Crown Estate is listed among them too: renewable
electricity targets are not limited to the business world.[i]
The electricity through your socket: you don’t get what you pay for
Buying renewable electricity (RE) is not as simple as it may
seem. If an organisation has its own on-site wind turbines or solar panels, it
is directly consuming RE. If it is taking electricity from the grid, then the origin
of the electricity coming through its sockets is determined by whichever
methods of electricity generation are sending electricity to the grid.[ii]
An organisation’s GHG emissions from electricity use can be
calculated in two ways[iii]:
It can be calculated by finding out which grids it is
connected to and the average emissions per unit of electricity on those grids.
This is known as the location method because it is the location of the
organisation which counts.
There is a second method of estimating emissions. The
market-based method bases emissions on the contractual arrangements (known
as instruments) an organisation enters for the provision of electricity. The instrument
could be a green tariff with an electricity supplier, or a contract directly
between the RE generator putting electricity onto the grid and the consumer organisation,
or energy attribute certificates.
Energy attribute certificates document that 1 MWh of
electricity has been produced by a particular electricity generation method
(usually a renewable method). A common European certificate is the Guarantee
of Origin. This was created by a European directive in 2001.[iv]
The GO – or GoO depending on your sense of humour – had a troubled upbringing. There was a wrangle
at European level over the best means of public support for RE: a European-wide
quota system or feed-in tariffs. The quota camp lost but the GO remained in the
directive with a vague, residual role as a label of RE[v].
Organisations that want to claim they were using RE buy GOs. Sometimes they are
packaged with electricity or they can be stand-alone purchases. Typically, organisations
use them to cover part, or even all of their electricity consumption, and then say
they have reduced their emissions from electricity use.
So, what’s the problem?
Prima facie, buying GOs is positive course of action.
From conversations with firms, I am convinced that some staff apply neoliberal
axioms related to supply and demand and genuinely believe that the purchase of
energy attribute certificates or green tariffs will incentivise more investment
in solar, wind farms and other RE generating capacity. Unfortunately, research on
the impact of the GO (and European green tariffs which are usually backed by
GOs) does not support this. Supply has consistently exceeded demand, in a large
part due to the huge amount of decades-old hydropower. Figure 1 shows how
hydropower GOs dominate the market. Norwegian
hydropower pumps out certificates that are exported all over Europe. Evidence
suggests that new RE capacity has been driven by financial incentives from public
policy that have significantly outweighed the tiny extra income that RE generators
make from certificate sales. [vi]
Figure 1: GOs issued over the period 2010-2015 by generation method.
Note: The figure is taken from Dagoumas and Koltsaklis
(2017) and is based on data from the Association of Issuing Bodies.
There is considerably less research on the US certificate –
the Renewable Energy Certificate. However, what there is shows that the price of RECs has been too low
to make a difference to investment decisions for new wind power.[vii]
These situations create a zero-sum game. Organisations that
use RE contractual instruments typically go on to report reduced GHG emissions
as a result of their use. The emission rate of the electricity used by everyone
else increases commensurately as organisations buying GOs and RECs lay claim to
low-carbon electricity on the grid for a small fee. While these organisations typically
report their RE use and GHG emissions on their websites and in their Corporate Social
Responsibility reports, the emissions of organisations that do not use RE
contractual instruments may go unreported or are reported using the
location-based method, which means organisations use the same emission rate
irrespective of their RE contractual arrangements. The result is no net change
in emissions, but the public and politicians are potentially left with the
impression that organisations are driving new RE capacity more than they
actually are.
Is there a solution?
Some organisations try to address the issue of supply
outstripping demand through only buying certificates from RE generation
facilities less that a certain number of years old, thereby trying to create
scarcity in the market and encourage new supply. Other organisations enter into
power purchase agreements (PPAs) directly with RE generators, undertaking to
buy a certain quantity of electricity at a certain price for a certain number
of years. I expect it may be easier for RE project developers to find finance for
new wind and solar farms and other types of RE if they have a guaranteed income
from a PPA. However, neither tactic has been investigated by academics.
Would it be better for firms not to use RE contractual instruments?
Dr Matthew Brander, Dr Michael Gillenwater and Dr Francisco Ascui have been among the leading voices calling attention to the problems of the market-based approach as outlined above[viii]. They have also raised the further question of whether use of RE contractual instruments may actually divert organisations from measures that reduce GHG emissions i.e. electricity efficiency. They argue there could be a reduced incentive to cut electricity consumption if there were no reported emissions from electricity. This question was one of two addressed by my PhD thesis.
My thesis looked at the factors influencing the GHG
mitigation strategies of 11 large German and UK firms as they evolved typically
over more than a decade. I focussed on the interactions between RE contractual instrument
use and efficiency improvements in all types of energy use, although the effect
on other mitigation measures is assessed. I found that RE contractual
instrument use did not always entail any cost for these firms. Even if
it did, the cost was small compared to other operating costs. Where there was a
cost, a re-allocation of funds to internal mitigating activities e.g. energy
efficiency might have only led to small, on-going emission reductions, although
if the money had been spent on offsets instead, there would have been substantial, but one-off reductions.
I also found that
the use of emission rates based on RE contractual instruments[ix] use had led to a change
in focus or a potential change in focus on other GHG mitigation activities in
very limited instances. I characterised the circumstances in which I
found a change or a reduction in focus on energy efficiency/saving or the
potential for this. This outcome depended on the intersection of circumstances
(all three were necessary conditions):
1. where a
reputation/moral motivation was driving RE contractual instrument use[x];
2. where energy
efficiency/saving were not being driven solely or strongly by cost-saving;
3. where staff
did not prevent a reduction or change in focus on energy efficiency/saving
activities.
I have suggested some
simple reporting requirements that could be introduced to prevent this
change/reduction in focus from occurring (see this briefing).[xi]
Conclusion
In summary, the use of RE certificates and green tariffs has
not been shown to have a positive effect on RE investment. However, if the firms
I studied are typical of other organisations, any negative impact on other GHG
mitigating activities is very limited. I would prefer that organisations spent
any premium that they pay for RE certificates and green tariffs on good quality
offsets instead, as they offer more certain benefits. However, offsetting’s
poor reputation may make organisations wary, and carbon footprinting rules
discourage this course of action.[xii]
A more promising course of action is to steer organisations
towards ensuring that their use of RE contractual instruments draws on new
investment. PPAs look like the contractual instruments most likely to achieve
this as they offer RE generators a guaranteed income usually over several
years. This may be especially useful in the era of Covid-19 where public
financial support for RE may be diverted to other purposes. However, this needs
to be checked by research on the efficacy of PPAs in incentivising extra
investment[xiii].
Organisations need to know what characterises an effective PPA or any other RE
contractual instrument. We do not have time in the battle against climate
change to go down any dead-ends.
[i] Alarcon, C., and M. Reynolds. 2019. ‘Going 100%
Renewable: How Committed Companies Are Demanding a Faster Market Response’.
RE100 Annual Report Progress and Insights.
http://media.virbcdn.com/files/5c/aa8193f038934840-Dec2019RE100ProgressandInsightsAnnualReport.pdf.
[ii] Monyei, C.G., and K.E.H. Jenkins. 2018. ‘Electrons
Have No Identity: Setting Right Misrepresentations in Google and Apple’s Clean
Energy Purchasing’. Energy Research & Social Science 46 (December): 48–51.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.06.015.
[iii] Sotos, M. 2015. ‘GHG Protocol Scope 2 Guidance – An
Amendment to the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard’. World Resources Institute,
Washington D.C., USA.
https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Scope_2_Guidance_Final.pdf.
[iv] European Parliament and European Council. 2001.
Directive 2001/77/EC. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/renewable_energy/l27035_en.htm.
[v] Lauber, V., and E. Schenner. 2011. ‘The Struggle over
Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the European Union: A Discursive
Institutionalist Analysis’. Environmental Politics 20 (4): 508–27., Nilsson,
M., L. J. Nilsson, and K. Ericsson. 2009. ‘The Rise and Fall of GO Trading in
European Renewable Energy Policy: The Role of Advocacy and Policy Framing’.
Energy Policy 37 (11): 4454–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.05.065.
[vi] Wüstenhagen, R., and M. Bilharz. 2006. ‘Green Energy
Market Development in Germany: Effective Public Policy and Emerging Customer
Demand’. Energy Policy 34 (13): 1681–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.07.013.
Markard, J., and B. Truffer. 2006. ‘The Promotional
Impacts of Green Power Products on Renewable
Energy Sources: Direct and Indirect Eco-Effects’.
Renewable Energy Policies in the European
Hast, A., S. Syri, J. Jokiniemi, M. Huuskonen, and S.
Cross. 2015. ‘Review of Green Electricity Products in the United Kingdom,
Germany and Finland’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 42:
1370–84.
Hufen, J.A.M. 2017. ‘Cheat Electricity? The Political
Economy of Green Electricity Delivery on the Dutch
Market for Households and Small Business’.
Sustainability (Switzerland) 9 (16).
doi:10.3390/su9010016
Mulder, M., and S.P.E. Zomer. 2016. ‘Contribution of
Green Labels in Electricity Retail Markets to
Fostering Renewable Energy’. Energy Policy 99
(December): 100–109.
Dagoumas, A.S., and N.E. Koltsaklis. 2017. ‘Price
Signal of Tradable Guarantees of Origin for Hedging Risk of Renewable Energy
Sources Investments’. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 7
(4): 59–67.
Hamburger, A., and G. Harangoz. 2018. ‘Factors
Affecting the Evolution of Renewable Electricity Generating Capacities: A Panel
Data Analysis of European Countries’. International Journal of Energy Economics
and Policy 8 (5): 161–72.
Hamburger, Á. 2019. ‘Is Guarantee of Origin Really an
Effective Energy Policy Tool in Europe? A Critical Approach’. Society and
Economy 41 (4): 487–507. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2019.41.4.6.
Jansen, J. 2017. ‘Does the EU Renewable Energy Sector
Still Need a Guarantees of Origin Market?’ No
2017-27. CEPS Policy Insights. CEPS – Energy Climate
House.
———. 2018. ‘Should All Producers of Renewable Energy
Automatically Receive GOs?’ Centre for
European Policy Studies. 12 March 2018. https://www.ceps.eu/publications/should-all-producersrenewable-energy-automatically-receive-gos.
[vii]Gillenwater. 2013 ‘Probabilistic decision model of
wind power investment and influence of green power market’, Energy Policy, 63, pp. 1111–1125.
doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.049.
Gillenwater, M., X. Lu, and M. Fischlein. 2014
‘Additionality of wind energy investments in the U.S. voluntary green power
market’, Renewable Energy, 63, pp. 452–457. doi: 0.1016/j.renene.2013.10.003.
[viii] Brander, M., M. Gillenwater, and F. Ascui. 2018.
‘Creative Accounting: A Critical Perspective on the Market-Based Method for
Reporting Purchased Electricity (Scope 2) Emissions’. Energy Policy 112
(January): 29–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.051.
[ix] I
also investigated low-carbon
electricity contractual instruments, specifically GO certificating the
production of electricity from high-efficiency Combined Heat and Power plants.
[x] What businesses said about their motivation was taken
at face value as to assess these statements was beyond the scope of this
research.
[xi] See also section 12.3.1 (page 439) of my thesis.
[xii] Sotos, M. 2015. ‘GHG Protocol Scope 2 Guidance – An
Amendment to the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard’. World Resources Institute,
Washington D.C., USA.
https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Scope_2_Guidance_Final.pdf.
[xiii] See also concerns raised by Monyei and Jenkins (2018)
about the wider implications of PPAs.
Andy’s discussion of the ‘myth of control’ at the heart of Modernity, that is being overturned by this pandemic, has crucial implications for the restructuring of energy systems: from supply-driven to demand-led, from hierarchical to interactive and from centralised to distributed.
With so many self-appointed pundits (like me!) currently locked down with their laptops, the present rush of commentary on how to pivot to the coronavirus crisis is hardly surprising. Beyond the general news and commentary, scores of articles are exploding across the media, diagnosing what this global catastrophe means, and prescribing how it can be turned to variously-held positive ends.
But there is another point that also emerges. In many cases, the changes that authors assertively prescribe specifically in response to the coronavirus pandemic, look very similar to those they would have advocated beforehand. In this particular sense, for all the transformational language and ambition, it is ‘business as usual’.
So, if some of this effort is not to risk being seen later as opportunistic – or inadvertently (in its familiarity) potentially reinforcing of lock-in – then maybe there’s a need for as much dislocation, surprise and reorientation inside the commentaries, as many rightly call for in the outside world?
After all, the main significance of this pandemic lies not in lofty platforms for pre-entitled, indulgently-curated identities. The issues are instead about many very real further devastations of already-vulnerable lives and livelihoods, of those without the same chances to air their views. If this is ignored, then even where motives are laudable, this colossal juncture risks becoming captive to just another campaigning message, media trope, academic vanity, or expediently manipulated ‘policy storyline’. The implications are far too important to be reduced to these baubles in the usual salons.
In fact, there really seems only one clear truth so far, amidst the ever-present – now brutally-revealed – uncertainties. Incongruously neglected in the many confident pronouncements and predictions, this truth is that nobody knows the historic implications of this moment. A radical diversity of futures are possible. In each of these futures, a plurality of views will likely clash as much as they do now.
There is of course no shortage of apparently effective instruments available to seemingly controlling ‘cockpits’: dispassionately assured experts; precise scientific metrics; rigorous technical models; massive hierarchical agencies; apparently all-seeing monitoring; seductively informative graphics; compellingly captivating dashboards; reassuringly evidence-based plans; commanding policy levers; invisibly nudging techniques; formidable military capacities; all presided over by our ‘natural leaders’ in the same old ‘seats of power’. But in reality, what the pandemic already seems to show is not only that there is no pilot… but that the ‘cockpit’ itself has been built largely in our imaginations.
So, if this unruly open-ended indeterminacy of the world cannot be acknowledged at a time like now – when the gyres of history are turning most tumultuously – then when can it ever be recognised? And the salience of all this bites doubly hard, not because of some further confident projection of what this all will mean, but in light of what can (from many sides) already be seen to be unravelling.
However things pan out – and whatever modesty-preserving fig-leaves are later hastily installed – at least one global hegemonic casualty has already surely been revealed. This involves not just a single specific certainty of how the world is – or should be. What is now becoming devastatingly undermined, is the general credibility of any confident performance of predictive control.
Take, for example, the repeated mantras of ‘evidence-based policy’ – and ‘science-based decisions’. Evidence is of course crucial – but it is necessary, not sufficient. Actions cannot be purely ‘based on’ data or analysis, only illuminated by it. That these well-worn claims are so ironically false, is about as informative as evidence gets. ‘Control by science’ is an expedient fiction in service of power.
What the pandemic shows, then – in short – is that in the wider, long-run ‘real world’ of human affairs, control does not exist. And this is not a criticism. It is simply a fact. To criticise for lack of control is to be as misguided as to claim it.
But doesn’t this fly in the face of common sense? Control seems undeniably important. It is a potent experience, for instance, in our relations with machines. Where these work, people around the world have become very familiar with what it can mean (at least before gremlins, rust or wear take their toll) to control something – like a light switch, a water-pump, a bicycle, a mobile phone or a laptop.
As an example of control: a car steering wheel turned lightly to the left determines this single aimed-for effect and no other. The windscreen wipers don’t come on. The wheels don’t fall off. Nobody by the wayside faints. We know very well what control feels like: fully achieving the particular intended result, and only this. This is how control is imagined in the core cherished paradigm of Modernity.
But whatever instruments of control are directed at it, this is manifestly not how this pandemic is playing out. In country after country, initial reactions – whether of authoritarian suppression or complacent exceptionalism – have proven either highly ineffective or problematic in other ways.
And the story is still far from over. Unintended side-effects of control are, to some, already looking potentially even more serious than the disease. What will be the economic impacts on health? What other presently-unknown factors may yet become evident? How will the virus itself bite back? With so much already going wrong, falling short, happening by mistake, or yet to emerge, we’re very far from the familiar experiences of ‘control’ that current failing efforts are claimed to emulate.
But despite these lessons (not only from the present crisis, but from a multitude of earlier ones), the idea of control still shapes the globalising imaginations of Modernity. Just as a hammer can condition its holder to see every problem as a nail, so unfolding Modernities around the world are ironically enslaved by their perennial aspirations to control.
Indeed, once you start looking for them, imaginations of control drive every aspect variously recognised to define ‘Modernity’ itself: control by individuals of their lives; control by governments of nations; control by ‘the people’ of politics; control by bureaucracy of organisations; control by science of reason; control by industry of production; control by capital of labour; control by colonialism of empires; control in ‘the Anthropocene’ of an entire world. This is why the resonance chimes of ‘taking back control’!
And it is in each of these spheres that control has also not only failed to live up to expectations, but yielded so many perverse kinds of backlash as to often be seriously counterproductive. So what is distinctive about this global pandemic is not its novelty, but its intensity. A familiar cycle of disappointment has unfolded over weeks rather than centuries. The spectacle is too acute to ignore.
Starling murmurations / Chris Lovelock / cc by 2.0
So what conclusions to draw from this diagnosis? Is it a counsel of despair? Does the coronavirus pandemic simply herald a new intensification of already-overgrown fatalism, cynicism and nihilism?
Or are the signs exactly the opposite? Is the present cacophony of over-confident prescriptions more important for its vigour and diversity than for any specific strand of content (including this)? Perhaps each of this multiplicity of energetic visions constitutes a ‘necessary fiction’, provoking into life dormant political hopes and critical faculties that have been lulled into complacent acquiescence by burgeoning electoral oligarchies?
Perhaps this collectively-enacted murmuration is more important than any individually-stated aim? (Indeed, is this why ‘murmurations’ have always linked distributed dissent with exuberant flocking?) Perhaps this is why the word ‘moment’ has always quietly signalled an axis of possible movement?
Again, the answer has to be that no-one really knows. What the coronavirus pandemic might mean is not a matter to be diagnosed in advance, but to be struggled for in its aftermath – and beyond!
My main concern, then, about some of the current commentaries with which I began, lies not in any particularity of the changes they variously call for. It is that so much of this apparently critical discourse reproduces such a similar style to the incumbent interests that are ostensibly challenged.
In ways that also clash starkly with the little that we do know so far about the coronavirus crisis, many of the critics are as single-mindedly certain, as confidently predictive, as assertively prescriptive and as aspirationally controlling as any incumbent technocrat, autocrat or demagogue. And it is through such tacit support for the underlying mythology of control, that progressive intentions can nonetheless inadvertently reinforce the regressive status quo.
Either way, whatever futures may struggle into being, the present pandemic suggests these will likely turn out better if shaped in opposite ways to this failing reflex of control. This recasts ‘democracy’ not as a codified intermittent managerial procedure, but as multiple continual struggles for ‘access by the least powerful to capacities for challenging power’. So (also inevitably grounded in its own pre-existing enthusiasms!), it is in this spirit that another voice can join the clamour– directly challenging the pervasive control culture of Modernity.
Our FAIR Research Fellow Max Lacey-Barnacle shares his experiences working in policy, and how the experience interlinks with academia.
After moving from academia into policy work after completing my PhD, my time at the Energy Saving Trust (EST) as a Policy Officer has been nothing short of fascinating. Working on EST’s three core policy areas of energy efficiency, community energy and low-carbon transport has greatly expanded my knowledge of the research-policy interface as a result of this experience.
I have had numerous exciting opportunities
to travel across the UK and Europe to meet with civil servants, policymakers
and researchers working to address core energy and climate policy challenges.
In addition, I’ve been able to work closely on fuel
poverty and low-carbon transport policy with Welsh government, whilst also
devoting time towards a Horizon 2020 project focused on energy efficiency (‘ENSMOV’) and the role of European energy agencies
in the EU’s low-carbon transition through the European
Energy Network.
The passion, commitment and intelligence of the individuals and organisations I’ve been involved with has been immensely inspiring in the face of the worsening global climate crisis. Moreover, I have learned (and still have much to learn) much from the brilliant staff at the EST and their dedication to tackling climate change. After my year at EST, I’ve transitioned back to academia in a Research Fellow role at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), working primarily on the innovative FAIR project, led by Dr Mari Martiskainen at SPRU. FAIR is investigating the links between fuel and transport poverty in the UK’s energy transition and will seek to understand how low-carbon energy transition processes may exacerbate and/or alleviate these forms of inequality. I’m excited to be working on such a pertinent project with strong research and policy relevance to low-carbon transitions, particularly after working in policy.
The FAIR Team
Acclimatising
to policy
Coming from the academic world of
researching, writing and publishing original work, the change of pace was one
of the first challenges I had to acclimatise to when confronted with navigating
the policy world. Policy certainly moves at a much faster pace than academia.
Indeed, keeping up with the dynamic changes of government policy at multiple
levels of governance (e.g. local, regional, devolved and national) requires a keen
eye for how multi-level policy shifts influence the shape and trajectory of the
low-carbon economy.
Seeing the temporal disparity between the
two worlds of academia and policy led me to ask; how can the policy world be influenced by the academic world, when critical
changes occur and core outputs emerge at such different paces and timescales?
Getting original research published in
academic journals can take anywhere from three months to two years, whilst
policy outputs such as blogs or briefings – or even consultation responses to
influence policy –sometimes take just a matter of weeks. However, in spite of this disparity, it’s clear that both
worlds ‘speak’ to each other and this is evidenced through increasing
engagement concerning the links between social inequality and climate change
policy responses.
Areas
of convergence between academia and policy
Issues such as ‘energy
poverty’ and concepts such as ‘energy
justice’ and a ‘Just
Transition’ have begun to take centre stage in the policy world, whilst academics have arguably been
writing about these concepts for many years. This year alone we have seen the European
Green Deal integrate energy poverty concerns and a ‘Just Transition’
mechanism into its future plans, whilst the steady emergence
of Just Transition commissions across the world demonstrates the importance
of continued academic and policy engagement in how low-carbon transitions are
governed and managed.
Being familiar with these concepts, I sought to integrate these ideas into many aspects of my policy work at the EST. What stood out the most during my time there, was the willingness of the devolved governments to embrace the critical work and ideas of academics, potentially more so than the UK government. For example, both the Welsh and Scottish governments seem to show more progressive attitudes towards tackling climate change and social inequality together e.g. via innovative Welsh legislation (Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015) and Scottish legislation (Fuel Poverty (Scotland) Act 2019). Additionally, Scotland has already established a Just Transition commission and Wales has announced intentions to set up a ‘Climate Justice Advisory Group’ that would perform broadly similar functions – monitoring the economic and social impacts of decommissioning fossil fuel power plants and what this means for fossil fuel industry workers. In addition, Just Transition commissions can be tasked with analysis of the social impacts of new low-carbon energy infrastructures and services. Currently, there are no equivalents in England, Northern Ireland and at the UK level.
Wales are monitoring economic and social impacts of decomissioning fossil fuel powerplants
The
contribution of social science to energy and climate policy
Connecting these research-policy
interactions forced me to think broadly about what social science research
intends to achieve when analysing policy: do social scientists want to
influence new policies or critically deconstruct the performance of existing
ones? Is it possible to successfully do both? In many ways, the ultimate aim is
to do both, particularly for policy oriented researchers.
However, one of the core goals of academic
research is to shed new light on areas that have been neglected or ill
considered. While academics may not see the immediate impact of their research
on unexplored policy areas, patience may be a virtue if long-terms trends give
rise to a renewed focus on their chosen area of research.
In addition, social scientists rightly feel
compelled to highlight the potential exacerbation of social inequality by
various policy responses to climate change, and to ask challenging questions in
new contexts. For example, academic work on fuel poverty and ‘transport
poverty’ shows a strong involvement of academics and researchers on the fuel
poverty side and less so on the transport side. This is because the idea of
transport poverty is a particularly novel idea in UK policy.
There is therefore room to expand the
concept of transport poverty and issues of social equity in low-carbon
transport innovations. However, it will be some time before such as concept
becomes the ‘norm’ within mainstream policy discourse.
Whilst my year working in policy has shown
me that the diffusion of such concepts into policy takes time, it is comforting
to know these ideas are not falling on deaf ears – particularly in Wales and
Scotland. As policy responses simultaneously addressing issues of social
inequality and climate change intensify, policymakers will increasingly be
forced to listen.
This
article is based on an earlier 2020 blog post published by the RIPPLES research group,
the original article can be found here.
It’s the season for decorating your tree, wrapping presents in dubiously recyclable paper and heading off to see friends and family.
Here at SEG all we really want for Christmas is a low carbon transition, but even as the evidence for climate change piles up some people remain unconvinced. So if Great Uncle Nigel starts a sherry driven tirade about all things ‘green’ over Christmas dinner, what are you going to say to win him round?
Luckily SEG academics Benjamin Sovacool, Mari Martiskainen, Andrew Hook and Lucy Baker have delivered the present you need in the not so festively titled Beyond cost and carbon: The multidimensional co-benefits of low carbon transitions in Europe. Published in this month’s issue of Ecological Economics, the paper outlines 128 reasons to adopt low carbon practices, examining the side benefits of German solar energy, French nuclear power, smart meters in the UK, and electric vehicles in Norway.
You can read the full paper here. We’ve also boiled them down to the somewhat festively themed 12 Benefits of the Low Carbon Transition.
Solar Panels on Snow With Windmill Under Clear Day Sky / Pexel.com
Improving access to affordable
energy:
As low carbon energy technologies are rolled out worldwide, vital social goals can be targeted as a core part of the process. France’s pioneering expansion of nuclear energy included the ‘péréquation tarifair’, a cross subsidy which equalises tariffs across the country, particularly benefitting groups such as rural energy users who historically paid higher energy costs.
In the UK, gas and electricity customers using pre-payment meters have paid more than households on standard meters, with the added burden of enforced shop visits to top up credit. Smart-prepayment meters have not only reduced the price differential, but also allow customers to top up their credit online or over the phone.
Helping the Neighbours:
Large German investment and subsidies for solar PV systems are recognised to have played a huge role in kick-starting the global market. The economies of scale created by the German market led to a huge fall in the price of PV systems, which has produced global benefits for individual households and public/commercial bodies incorporating solar in their energy mixes
France’s substantial investment in nuclear provides a surplus which is exported to their neighbouring counties. Along with providing other European countries with low carbon electricity, France has benefited from €3 billion a year coming from energy exports, and increased energy security through reducing its reliance on imports.
New Toys
In Norway, EV drivers report that, beyond the environmental benefits, their
cars are quieter, smoother and just ‘nicer’ to drive than conventionally
fuelled vehicles. One participant in the focus groups used in this study noted:
“Anyone who has an EV feels it is a better car, just more comfortable for the driver. That comes in addition to the environmental benefits. It is smoother, responds better to your signals, can drive as slow as you like or it accelerates easily, you have better control. Most people I know who have bought an EV say “Oh! It is so nice to drive.” It works very quietly, compared to a traditional car with gears.”
The Giving Spirit
Government subsidies are often pivotal in encouraging the public to adopt new low carbon technologies. Norway has approached this issue with a comprehensive set of benefits to entice its population to electric vehicles. Not only are they exempt from purchase tax and VAT, but they also enjoy free charging, free parking, access to bus lanes and reduced rates on toll roads and ferries. In 2020/21, the UK will reduce the current 16% ‘benefit in kind’ tax rate for company car drivers to 0%, helping making electric vehicles a low cost option for company car drivers, and hopefully a broader set of benefits will follow for regular consumers.
Adopting smart meters can encourage better (cheaper) decisions
regarding energy use. The increased level of energy visibility and awareness
they provide can lead consumers to change their energy use habits, switching
off appliances and using energy more strategically.
Home Comforts
Unexpected visits by strangers are a common source of anxiety for older
people. Smart meters remove the need for meter readings, and eliminate this
potential source of anxiety.
Smart meters may even have the capacity to help monitoring vulnerable households. For example: if a resident has not turned their cooker or TV for a period of time, it could be cause to alert family members in order to check on their wellbeing.
Bringing People Together:
Renewable energy facilities are generally installed in the countryside. In Germany, a large social benefit of solar, along with other technologies such as wind and biomass, has been reversing the tide of people moving from the countryside to the cities through the employment these large projects can bring.
Solar PV in Germany has also led to a greater level of autonomy in communities through self-supply, which has allowed them to move away from the dominant energy suppliers. This trend has brought benefits such as generating awareness of renewables and widening civic participation in policymaking, along with increasing individual choice in an increasingly competitive energy market.
Look to the Future Now – It’s Only Just Begun
Adopting one environmentally friendly technology can spark changes in other areas of people’s lives. In Norway, focus group members commented on how “people become green after buying an EV”, and how their widespread adoption had spurred interest from beyond the initial groups of environmentally-motivated ‘pioneers’ to the wider public.
Have yourself a carbon-neutral Christmas
(And a merry one too)
Sovacool, BK, M Martiskainen, A Hook, and LH Baker. “Beyond cost and carbon: The multidimensional co-benefits of low carbon transitions in Europe,” Ecological Economics 169 (March, 2020), 106529, pp. 1-19.
Edit 12/12/19:
And a big thank you to Dr Charlotte Louise Jensen, of Aahlborg University, for composing a christmas carol on this topic. Please feel free to use these lyrics for climate activist carolling this month.
Have yourself a low carbon Christmas Make your footprint light If you do your troubles will be out of sight Have yourself a sufficiency-based Christmas Make Yuletide commerce-free From then on your troubles will be miles away Here we are as in tomorrow’s days Happy green new deal of now Gaian friends who are dear to us Gather near to us once more Through the years we all will be together If the rising seas allow Hang a shining hope upon the highest place So have yourself a sustainable little Christmas Have yourself a sufficient little Christmas So have yourself a loving little Christmas time.
Edit 18/12/2019
And another contribution from Darrick Evensen
The Twelve Days of Low Carbon Christmas By: Darrick Evensen (and Benjamin Sovacool) [to be sung to the 1909 arrangement of the traditional folk melody by English composer Frederic Austin]
On the first day of Christmas, we’ll live sustainably through…
Civic participation
On the second day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
EV driving, and Civic participation
On the third day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the fourth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the fifth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the sixth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the seventh day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the eighth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
German rural solar, Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the ninth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Falling UK tax rate, German rural solar, Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the tenth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Norway’s subsidies, Falling UK tax rate, German rural solar, Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the eleventh day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Péréquation tarifair, Norway’s subsidies, Falling UK tax rate, German rural solar, Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
On the twelfth day of Christmas we’ll live sustainably through…
Market competition, Péréquation tarifair, Norway’s subsidies, Falling UK tax rate, German rural solar, Behaviour spillovers, Early adoption. Economies of scale! Demand reduction actions, New smart meters, EV driving, and Civic participation
