Borders, belonging and ballots: the electoral marginalization of self-settled refugees in Tanzania

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Leonard Chimanda, Postgraduate Researcher, Faculty of Social Sciences: School of Law

Until refugees acquire the nationality of the host state or return to their states of origin, several years can pass. In that period, what are the avenues of political voice available to refugees? Voting rights are not the only conceivable avenue yet a central one (Dana Schmalz, 2021, p. 95) 

With just few weeks to go until Tanzania’s General Election on October 29, 2025, my mind turns to the significant democratic process unfolding in my home country. During my fieldwork in Kigoma villages, Tanzania, earlier this year, researching durable solutions for self-settled refugees in the area, the lack of voting rights for this population became apparent. Many refugees in the villages fled the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi and arrived in Tanzania in 1972 and are approaching their 53rd year without the right to vote in not only general elections but also local government elections. This creates a clear democratic gap in the country, which hosts a significant group in a situation of protracted displacement and whose political needs and preferences are ignored. 

Contextualizing the 2025 Tanzanian General Election 

Tanzania’s electoral landscape is dynamic, with the National Electoral Commission pledging a transparent, fair, and peaceful process. The commission has confirmed arrangements for 99,911 polling stations across mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with over 37 million registered voters. Notably, for the first time, prisoners will be allowed to vote in the presidential election, albeit with certain security restrictions. I find it striking, and somewhat confusing to understand, that prisoners are being granted this right while refugees, who have committed no crime other than fleeing war, are excluded; a disparity that feels contrary to principles of humanity, equality and social inclusion. 

The context of Refugees in Kigoma villages 

The plight of self-settled Burundian refugees in Tanzania is particularly complex. The Hutu Burundian refugees in Kigoma villages share the same ethnic origin as the surrounding local Ha community; their languages are mutually intelligible, reflecting the arbitrary nature of borders drawn during the 1884 Berlin Conference. This cultural and ethnic affinity with their host community is one of the factors that underpin my argument that a grant of voting rights to these refugees should be considered. Furthermore, repatriation to Burundi is challenging due to their lost connections with their country of origin, and resettlement to a third country isn’t a viable option for most. As such, for the more than 20,000 refugees present in Kigoma villages, a local solution (naturalization or grant of permanent residence status) in Tanzania would be the most plausible path. The majority were born in Tanzania, fostering deep bonds and potential sense of belonging with the country. I imagine as a parent seeing my child grow into adulthood without ever having voted and this makes me think of my own lovely daughters Samantha and Sharon, the thought fills me with sadness. 

Village market used by both locals and refugees at Kinazi village in Buhigwe District, Kigoma region. Photo by the author.

What are the Legal Standards on Voting Rights for Refugees? 

There is a developing scholarship advocating for the enfranchisement of refugees. Bender for instance, argues that, if they are affected by decisions of their host state, refugees should be granted the right to vote immediately after they get refugee status. Nonetheless, the presumption that refugee status is temporary has generally led to limited right to vote. The general presumption has been that refugees will go back to their countries of origin, immediately after the situation that made them flee ceases. This presumption has made most countries in the world exempt refugees from voting.  

Only a few countries allow refugees to vote. In Malawi, for instance refugees who have stayed in the country for at least 7 years can vote in general elections. The same is accorded to refugees in Chile, Ecuador, New Zealand and Uruguay with varying length of residency requirements; from 1 year in New Zealand to 15 years in Uruguay. Other countries though do not allow refugees to vote in national elections they grant voting rights to refugees during local government elections. In Sweden for instance, refugees who have been in the country for a minimum of 3 continuous years are allowed to vote in municipal and county elections. Another example can be picked from the United Kingdom where though voting rights are not granted to refugee per se, refugees who are Commonwealth citizens have voting rights during parliamentary and local government elections.  

While refugee exemption from voting rights can be justified, especially because of the temporality of the refugee status, the protractedness of refugee situation presents a separate case worthy to bring a different policy paradigm. In a protracted refugee situation, refugees stay in a host country for a long time without a prospect of a durable solution. In these circumstances and with time, refugees become detached from their countries of origin and become attached to their host states to the extent that the host state becomes their only hope where their rights including voting rights can be realized. The United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951 is silent on refugees’ right to political participation, as is the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969. This brings me to a question: to what extent does international refugee law address refugee problems, especially protracted refugee situations in the Global South? This question aligns with third world approaches to international law (TWAIL). TWAIL critiques the relevance of international law for marginalized groups in the Global South. Particularly, the second phase of TWAIL (TWAIL 2) while acknowledging the coloniality of international law, holds States in the Global South responsible for their failure to protect their own marginalized people even in circumstances where they can. TWAIL 2 points out human rights violations as an example of state oppression against marginalized people in the Global South countries. Affirming this TWAIL 2 proposition, Tanzania, which hosts over 200, 000 refugees (including refugees in Kigoma villages) in situation of protracted displacement, does not grant them voting rights neither during national elections nor during local government elections.  

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), a current implementation framework of international refugee law, while silent on political rights for refugees, nonetheless recognizes the precarity of refugee livelihoods especially in a protracted situation. The GCR calls for international cooperation in finding solutions for refugees in protracted displacement appreciating the fact that most of these people are in Global South countries whose economy is unstable.  

Refugees in Kigoma villages have not exercised voting rights for more than 50 years since their arrival in 1972. Most of them were born in Tanzania and there is currently a fourth generation of these refugees in the country. Many of them know next to nothing about Burundi (their country of origin) and they consider Tanzania their ‘home’. They are emotionally and materially attached to Tanzania, making important economic contributions to the country, unlikely to return to Burundi, and they are affected by decisions made by political leaders elected through general elections. It is therefore pivotal and logical that the country re-considers extending voting rights to this population. 

Way forward 

Tanzania approaches its general election: a critical moment in democratic states. Reflections on inclusivity, democratic engagement, and the rights of all residents including long-standing refugee populations are vital. Recognizing the fact that protection of refugees is the responsibility of the international community and informed by the spirit of the Global Compact on Refugees, I call for effective international cooperation especially in identifying protracted refugee situations and offering appropriate support to host states towards comprehensive solutions.   

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Posted in Migration Comments, Migration Research

Outsourcing Through the Back Door. The UK France Deal Undermines the Legal Basis of CEAS

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Ridam Gangwar – Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow (India) – Final Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student and Researcher in Migration and Law

The UK’s attempt to negotiate migrant returns deal with France – with apparent EU support –may seem like yet another step in Fortress Europe’s expansion. But unlike deals with Tunisia, Libya, or Albania, this arrangement brings the logic of legal outsourcing into Europe’s core, by using a former EU member state as a return destination without CEAS safeguards. This model sidesteps the obligations and oversight mechanisms outlined under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), particularly Article 78(1) TFEU and the Dublin III Regulation. 

This is not just another externalisation agreement – it is a constitutional development that threatens to replace EU asylum law with a patchwork of bilateral deterrence regimes and may permanently fracture the idea of a common asylum system. 

Image created by the author

Bilateral Returns and the Undermining of CEAS 

The UK, under the new Labour government led by Keir Starmer, is seeking a bilateral returns arrangement to send irregular Channel-crossing migrants back to France and a formal agreement has now been reached and according to reports EU–level support is anticipated, even if formal re–entry into the Dublin system remains off the table. 

Yet this moves cuts directly against the core principles of the CEAS: solidarity, harmonised procedures, and equal protection. Article 78(1) TFEU mandates a “common policy on asylum”. The Dublin Regulation (Reg. No. 604/2013), though contested, institutionalises burden–sharing and prevents forum–shopping and ad hoc outsourcing it prevents the Undermining the CEAS’s institutional coherence.. If the UK – a third country with no access to CEAS enforcement tools such as Eurodac or the Charter  is permitted to return migrants into EU jurisdiction, this weakens the mutual trust principle that underpins the CEAS legal framework. This opens the door for third countries to become active participants in internal asylum redistribution, a legally untested and constitutionally awkward mechanism. Permitting Member States to outsource protection obligations to third countries particularly ones no longer bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights –undermines the uniformity that Dublin III (Reg. No. 604/2013) was designed to enforce, replacing a coordinated regime with fragmented bilateralism. The EU has criticised such fragmentation elsewhere – it cannot now legitimise it internally without sacrificing both legal coherence and credibility. 

Italy Albania and Externalisation Precedent 

This is not an isolated development. Italy’s 2023 deal with Albania – allowing asylum seekers rescued at sea to be processed in Albanian territory – mirrors the UK–France logic of offshoring processing and legal responsibility, albeit with the UK no longer legally embedded within the CEAS regime, the difference here is that the UK, unlike Albania, is a former Member State, raising questions about constitutional forum-shopping from within the EU’s own legal past. This is intended to prevent disembarkation, deter future arrivals, and bypass EU procedural safeguards. 

A bilateral externalisation agreement such as the UK – France deal risks operating entirely outside these judicially required safeguards, sidestepping both Charter standards and judicial review. At the time, legal scholars raised alarm over potential violations of procedural guarantees, limited access to remedies, and risks of refoulement – issues relevant under both Article 18 (right to asylum) and Article 19(2) (non–refoulement) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The CJEU further elaborated in Jawo v. Germany (C–163/17) that asylum seekers must not be transferred under Dublin where there is a real risk of inhuman treatment due to deficiencies in the reception system. Instead of resisting this drift, the UK – France case shows the EU acquiescing in the Balkanisation of asylum governance even with a third country no longer bound by the Charter or the CEAS. This sets a dangerous precedent for legal inconsistency, constitutional forum – shopping, and the hollowing out of a rights–based asylum regime. 

Legal Grey Zone of UK France Arrangement 

From a legal standpoint, the proposed UK – France arrangement occupies a troubling grey zone. For the UK to send asylum seekers to France, two legal routes could be pursued, first, classifying France as a safe country of return under UK domestic law, or striking a bespoke bilateral deal with France, potentially invoking Articles 78(3) and 216 TFEU.  

Under Article 78(3) TFEU, the EU can take provisional measures in cases of sudden inflow –but it is the Union, not individual Member States, that acts. This mirrors the concerns raised in the CJEU’s judgment in N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (C–411/10), where the Court held that Member States must not transfer asylum seekers if systemic deficiencies in the receiving state’s asylum system risk violating Article 4 of the Charter (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment). Moreover, the Dublin Regulation (currently being replaced by the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation) was designed to prevent precisely this kind of ad hoc, opportunistic returns diplomacy.  

Procedural and Rights Risks: The Subtle Yet Profound Shift and Political Temptations at Constitutional Cost 

Beyond institutional risks, this model threatens the individual rights that CEAS was meant to guarantee. The European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09) held that the transfer of an asylum seeker’s application under the Dublin system violates Articles 3 and 13 ECHR due to inhuman detention conditions and the lack of effective remedies in Greece. As past jurisprudence shows returns without safeguards risk violating non-refoulement and due process.  The UK–France joint declaration  promises “expeditious” returns “in accordance with national law” but offers little clarity on rights protections. 

 Politically, such deals offer quick wins. For the UK, it signals “control” post – Brexit. For France, it shifts the burden. For Brussels, it reduces irregular inflows. But the constitutional cost is immense. This trend also Jeopardises “common” asylum policy and solidarity mechanisms as such deals undermine burden-sharing and erode trust.  

The EU is constructing a Neo – Dublin architecture which risk’s establishing a stratified asylum system driven not by legal harmonisation or rights protection, but by deterrence and geopolitical expediency.  

Europe Must Choose Legal or Logistical Unity 

The UK–France deal would mark the first attempt to integrate a non-EU third country into the operational returns structure of CEAS –without access to its legal instruments or safeguards. The UK–France deal is more than a migration control measure. It is a constitutional test – not of Europe’s borders, but of its legal identity. If such practices continue, CEAS risks becoming an empty façade of shared governance without legal substance.  

Posted in Migration Comments

The Impact of USRAP Suspension on Family Reunification

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Author Anonymous*, Refugee Resettlement specialist

Over the course of its 45 year history, the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) has earned and enjoyed broadly bipartisan support as a vital, national private-public partnership. It has long been recognized as integral to US humanitarian commitments but also as a crucial tool of US diplomatic, security, and economic interests, as well.

Established under President Jimmy Carter as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, the USRAP is the formal mechanism by which refugees and special immigrant visa holders from around the world are referred and admitted to the United States for third country resettlement. Though the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that less than one percent of the world’s refugees (of which there are currently over 43 million) end up resettled to third countries, the USRAP has historically admitted around two thirds of those, making it a world leader in resettlement. Or at least, it was.

Copyright: Vladislav Nikonov for Unsplash

On day one of his inauguration, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order entitled Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program, enacting an indefinite suspension of the program. The reason? It was not, according to the order, considered to be aligned with national interests. The fallout was swift: 10,000 refugees with scheduled flights found their bookings cancelled, and an estimated 22,000 approved and pending travel became stranded, including Afghan military allies and US family members. The US’ ten national resettlement agencies faced immediate stop-work orders and suspension of funding.  After years spent rehabilitating critical USRAP programming from the injuries of the previous Trump administration, resettlement staff and volunteers watched as a global infrastructure ground to a screeching halt.

Six months on, countless families in the United States and abroad continue to find themselves living in limbo, unsure when or if they will ever be reunited with their loved ones: parents with children, brothers with sisters, spouses with spouses. And as the US administration continues to proclaim its supposed concern for promoting family growth and family life in the United States, it has become clear that these families do not seem to count.

Family Reunification: A Cornerstone of Refugee Resettlement

The universal human right to family unity is well established under international legal human rights, refugee, and resettlement frameworks, and assigns to individual States the primary responsibility of taking measures to avoid family separation, maintain family unity, and provide access to family reunification pathways for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection. In 2024, the UNHCR, in partnership with a large coalition global partners, produced the “Operational Guidelines on Facilitating Family Reunification for Persons in Need of International Protection”, reaffirming and building upon these global operating principles.

At the national level, family reunification has long been considered a cornerstone of immigration and resettlement policy in the United States. The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, laid the groundwork for the establishment of formal reunification specific access categories and pathways through the USRAP.

This included the establishment of the Visas 93 program, a petition-based follow-to-join pathway for immediate relatives of refugees admitted to and residing in the United States, and set the stage for the Priority 3 program, an access category designated for the specific purpose of reunifying spouses; unmarried, under 21 year old children; and parents of US based refugees and asylees. In 1989, the Lautenberg Amendment facilitated a reunification program under the USRAP for legal residents to apply for at-risk relatives in the former Soviet Union and later on, in Iran. No matter the exact program, USRAP family reunification applications submitted to the federal government undergo extensive and lengthy processing, including stringent vetting and documentation reviews, in-depth security checks by several federal agencies, expert interview rounds, and medical examinations.

Throughout the years, these reunification programs (to name a few) have represented important components of the US resettlement system and the government’s responsibility, as in all States, to provide pathways for family reunion procedures. After the previous Trump administration,  significant efforts were made under the Biden government to resuscitate the USRAP and improve access and processing efficiencies built into the system. Family reunification programming proved an important piece of these efforts. For example, an Obama era program called Central American Minors (CAM) was restarted, which facilitated the reunification of separated children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with parents and guardians legally residing in the United States, and its eligibility categories and processing mechanisms were expanded in important ways. The Priority 3 reunification program expanded eligibility after years of nationality restrictions and was undergoing review to reduce inefficiencies in documentation vetting, improve delays related to required DNA processing, etc. Too, brand new pathways were launched by the State Department: The office for the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) was formed, which worked to relocate and reunite Afghan allies and their children, as was the Welcome Corps, a new model and access category within the USRAP allowing private sponsorship by US based petitioners for refugees, including family members.

Fractured Families: The Impact of USRAP Suspension

Despite the progress made under the Biden administration, the current abrupt suspension of the USRAP (and with it, the family reunification programs that fall under its umbrella) has had and will continue to have lasting, devastating effects on family members around the world and across the United States, including legal permanent residents, citizens by birth, and long-time naturalized citizens.

News media, NGOs, and resettlement agencies are rife with examples of how the program suspension has fractured US families and exacerbated the traumas of family separation: A February letter by Refugee Council USA to Congress shares the experience of a woman who, after 15 years of being resettled in Ohio, received notice that her mother’s flight had been cancelled. While her siblings had arrived earlier on separate flights, her mother was left behind. The letter also recounts the plight of four separated Afghan children, the youngest just seven, set to reunite after three years with their parents in Massachusetts. Their bookings were also abruptly cancelled. Similarly, Church World Service (a national resettlement agency) shares the story of Wajid, their Director of Finance Business Partners, who had prepared to welcome his parents and whose sister had moved from California to help him with care arrangements. His parents had already given up their apartment and sold their furniture when they found their flight bookings suddenly cancelled. Across the country and indeed, the globe, there are countless more stories of families like these.

This month, the situation for US residents and their loved ones has grown even more grim. On June 4th, a presidential Proclamation banning travel to the US from twelve countries of the Global South was released, adding another layer of anguish to American families separated from relatives overseas. The ban contains some exceptions for Afghan SIV holders and certain minority members from Iran, but outlines none for relatives of refugees and asylees in the United States. This further signifies the administration’s rejection of family unity and reunion principles as integral to resettlement programming and to basic family life for so many around the world.

Since its inception, over three million people have been resettled through the USRAP. Today, they are the legal residents and naturalized citizens who make up the fabric of communities across the United States. They, like all people, have the right to pursue family unity. This World Refugee Day, let us remind each other of the centrality of family in global refugee frameworks and the critical role that domestic resettlement systems play in facilitating – or hindering — family reunion. And for those of us here in the United States, let us always remember that when the Administration touts the sanctity of family and family life, these Americanfamilies must count, too.

Given the current political climate, the author has asked to remain anonymous.

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Posted in Migration Comments

Community as a Superpower – Research in action.

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Ali Ali, Michael Collyer, Priya Deshingkar, Anne-Meike Fechter, Melissa Gatter, Linda Morrice, Ceri Oeppen, Judith Townend and Tahir Zaman, SCMR, University of Sussex

Refugee Week has been celebrated in the UK since 1998 around World Refugee Day,  June 20th.  This year’s theme is ‘Community as a Superpower’ – an immediately attractive title, cleverly capturing many of the ideals that Refugee Week aims to implement. It is also a neat summary of work that researchers at SCMR are involved in at the moment. Themes of mutual aid, collective action and economies of care run through our ongoing research in the UK and beyond. There is often a disconnect between research in different parts of the world, so here we bring together our collective thinking about ‘community as a superpower’.

Refugee week display, 2025

Across the social sciences ‘community’ is a classic example of a contested concept, meaning agreement of an exact definition is never likely to be achieved. Definitions are important, particularly since words with positive associations, like ‘community’ can easily be used to make regressive policies appear acceptable to a public audience. There is a long history of this linguistic evasiveness in policies towards refugees. Debates around ‘community cohesion’ in the UK in the early 2000s demonstrated how apparently laudable government objectives played down very real social inequalities and pushed responsibilities for ‘integration’ onto disempowered migrant-origin communities. The emphasis on ‘cohesion’ was eventually abandoned, but is now resurfacing.

These debates address vital concerns, certainly for academics, yet they make little sense to Refugee Week itself. ‘Community as a superpower’ projects a purely positive understanding of ‘community’ so that’s how we will interpret it here in relation to our research. People everywhere rely on other people to make their lives safer, easier, cheaper or more fun, and refugees are no different. This straightforward insight has been formalised as social capital. For refugees, the sudden disruption of social capital and the difficulties of reconstituting it differentiates them from non-migrants, and even from other migrants with less disruptive mobility. In some senses, social capital, and therefore ‘community’, may be mobile but in other ways the act of becoming a refugee disrupts that community and forces refugees to find new forms of social capital.

One recent research project conducted by members of the  SCMR, Protracted Displacement Economies, focused on refugees in situations of long-term displacement in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Myanmar and Pakistan. We were particularly interested in the ways in which the development of group connections began to define forms of community. This relational understanding of community helps us understand a particular interpretation of the meaning of community. Community is not a thing that exists before the interactions that create it. It makes no sense to think of community as separate from exchanges and connections within a group of people. It is the very act of exchange that forms a community.

 Whilst community doesn’t exist without those exchanges and connections, most refugees are living in neighbouring countries where they are often familiar with and share existing cultural practices of community.  Our research with Afghan refugees in north-west Pakistan is a good example of this, particularly in relation to gham khadi: the collective events surrounding an occasion of sorrow or joy, such as a funeral, or wedding.  All the residents of a locality (refugees and not) attend gham khadi and support each other emotionally, materially (with money and food), and physically (through the provision of labour). These occasions blur the boundary, even if temporarily, between ‘host’ and ‘refugee’ and create a neighbourly bond of solidarity and care.

In some of the places we researched, such as a settlement in southeastern Myanmar, boundaries between ‘residents’ and ‘people recently displaced’ are not clearly drawn either. Due to decades of violent conflict, intensified by a military coup in 2021, those who had lived in the settlement for years were happy to extend support to newly arrived ones. As some long-term residents mentioned to our researchers, ‘we don’t think of ourselves as displaced people any more’, and from a modest income, such as from a small business, some were able to offer food, building materials or employment to ‘new’ internally displaced people’.

Our research among Somali refugees in Ethiopia also shows that boundaries between hosts and refugees are extremely hazy and complicated, because of shared cultures and histories of displacement. Somalis have a very long history in Ethiopia and are one of the largest ethnic groups. The 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war resulted in the exodus of nearly a million Somalis from Ethiopia to Somalia. Many were forced to return after the civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991. Another large influx followed after 2008 because of drought and conflict and there has been a steady migration ever since. While the government attempts to differentiate between hosts (which includes returnees) and refugees, these identities do not make sense on the ground where Somalis function as a community, supporting each other through the exchange of food, care and credit.

In the US, where asylum seekers and migrants are under increasing threat of deportation under a far-right government, community has become the source of collective resistance. In our research in Chicago and New York City, the two largest sanctuary cities in the US, we find community organising wherever it is needed – in churches, on the streets, and outside immigration courthouses. Using social media to communicate and coordinate, citizens, established migrants, and asylum seekers support and protect each other where local and national government has failed to do so. Some community organisers tell us they are simply upholding the values of their faith, others identify with traditions of mutual aid and racial justice work, and many have backgrounds in union organising. In this context, community finds its power in making itself visible. Where federal immigration agents track asylum seekers, community organisers track the agents, confronting and sometimes deterring them from detaining and deporting asylum seekers on a daily basis. Community does not always succeed, most recently failing to prevent the ‘surprise’ public arrests of asylum seekers by federal agents in Los Angeles and Chicago, but organising continues, with hundreds taking to the streets to challenge the immigration system just as publicly.

Asylum seekers ‘shop’ for fresh groceries at a community food pantry designed to offer the experience of a market in Little Village, a Latino neighbourhood in Chicago. Photo by Melissa Gatter.

A recent research trip to Syria provoked further questions around community in processes of mass displacement: the communities that refugees left, those that have been destroyed, and the community that is transformed as a conflict ends. Areas that opposed Assad-rule were punished with sieges, starvation and bombardment. The desolate landscapes of Jobar and Qaboun neighbourhoods in Damascus or al-Yarmouk camp, are witness to the ghosts of community-capacity. In the case of Syria, what does return – and the language of community cohesion – mean when the elements that comprised those once thriving communities no longer exist or have been scattered? The echoes of mass displacement continue to sound as Syrians from across the country are relocating to the capital, Damascus, seeking out new opportunities. 

The once small town of Azaz, in the far north of Syria close to the Turkish border, is now thought to have 300,000 residents. Its proximity to Turkey meant that it was not bombed by the Syrian Airforce, and thus a relatively secure area with economic opportunities that led to a rise in real estate prices. Economic ties to Turkey were evident during our visit – the currency used was the Turkish lira.  A Turkish post office building, where salaries could be collected by employees of Turkish NGOs, stood alongside new mosques mimicking Ottoman architecture, a Turkish language institute, and many new residential buildings. Since the toppling of Assad, we heard that many people are returning to their former homes elsewhere and that housing costs in Azaz have fallen significantly. A new university, established with support from the Turkish humanitarian organisation IHH, is also seeking to relocate to Damascus. What will happen to communities in Azaz, and Damascus, and elsewhere in post-Assad Syria remains to be seen.    

It is sobering to consider communities that refugees have been forced to leave, but also an illustration of the fragility of community. Where community is not continually remade it is threatened. The University of Sussex is a University of Sanctuary  – not a status to be complacent about but a continual effort to engage in this work of community: maintaining scholarships for asylum seekers, providing ESOL lessons for refugees and trying to ensure the University is a welcoming place for everyone. Experiences such as our recent visit to post-war Syria remind us what is at stake and why this is so important. People who have seen their communities destroyed deserve to be made welcome. Our research around the world enables us to bear witness to the power of an inclusive community. The process of welcoming itself can be the beginning of a new community.  This is what we celebrate during Refugee Week. If you are in Brighton and Hove this week, please join us.

Events to celebrate Refugee Week 2025 in Brighton and Hove are listed here: https://brighton-and-hove.cityofsanctuary.org/refugee-week-2024-2

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Posted in Migration Comments, Migration Research

Starmer’s ‘Island of strangers’ takes a page from Trump’s migration policy book. Spain shows a different path is possible

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Caterina Mazzilli, ODI Global and Gonzalo Fanjul, Fundacion por Causa and ODI Europe

With the presentation of his White Paper on 12th May 2025, UK Home Secretary Keir Starmer has been the latest to join the anti-immigration epidemic sweeping across OECD countries. The wide range of measures presented by his government includes a tightening of the language standards required of foreign workers who want to settle in the United Kingdom. It also doubles to 10 the number of years required to obtain permanent residence and raises to a level equivalent to a university degree the minimum qualification required to access all those jobs that are not part of a slim ‘essential occupation list’. Expressions such as ‘island of strangers’ have reminded some of us of the infamous language of British nativist politician Enoch Powell and the most radical measures of recent Conservative governments; but the form and substance of this proposal seem to be inspired more by Donald Trump. The US President also views immigration as a threat to the national economy and has made its control a priority for all federal agencies.

The Labour Party would do well to seek economic guidance outside of national populism. Mass deportations are almost always immoral and often illegal, but for the US they are also proving to be a shot in the foot from a financial point of view. Fear of raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has kept many migrant workers at home, and negative effects are already visible in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and hospitality. As Nobel Prize economist Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out, whether Trump voters like it or not, American prosperity grounds on the labour of those who come from abroad. When they are expelled or are too afraid to go out, they do not work or consume, and the economy weakens. Some estimates predict a reduction in US GDP of between 1.2% and 7.4% by 2028, recalling the effects of similar interventions in the past.To be fair, this is not an easy dilemma. Even without Donald Trump’s violent theatrical ways, many other leaders are faced with the need to make decisions that protect their economies from the effects of ageing and undersupplied labour markets, while promising to tighten border control, increase deportations of migrants without documents and move asylum seekers where they cannot be seen.

How can we get out of this tough spot? Spain may offer some answers. In recent years, this country has cultivated a narrative of welcoming migrants residing in Spain—including those who are undocumented—on which government officials and citizens seem to agree. Comparative research, such as that conducted by ODI Global in 2021, shows that Spanish society maintains more tolerant attitudes toward immigration than our neighbouring countries, and that these attitudes are supported by political discourse. The difference with other cases is that Spain has led by example by relaxing its legislation to improve the social and labour integration of foreign workers. And it has done so comprehensively. Three rounds of legal reforms carried out in the last four years have allowed the government to massively expand work and residence permits for migrants without documents through ordinary regularisation; facilitate family reunification; simplify visa procedures for workers and employers; reactivate existing tools such as the job-seeking visa; and renew the catalogue of occupations for which employers are authorised to hire non-EU workers. At the same time, labour migration programmes – mostly circular or temporary – have been accelerated, including a development perspective that seeks to optimise the impact of such schemes on countries of origin.

A man standing on a ladder next to a building
A man who was working on a wall in Navalperal de Pinares, Spain. Matteo del Piano for Unsplash

Spain’s performance is by no means perfect. Some of the changes have not yet been implemented or have had undesirable consequences. The popular legislative initiative for the extraordinary regularisation of migrants, supported by more than 600,000 voters, remains is still to be approved by Parliament. What is more alarming is that social organisations and journalistic investigations have been denouncing human rights abuses on the southern border for years, where Spanish policies are as harsh and ineffective as those of its EU neighbours.

Despite this, the set of reforms on migrant labour mobility has contributed to Spain being the best performing economy in the world  in 2024. When everyone else is going in the opposite direction, comparatively liberal policies can show the way to stronger national economies and more welcoming societies. The Minister of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, Elma Saiz, put this potential into numbers: immigration would increase Spain’s wealth by €17 million (1.3% of GDP). In 2024 alone, the national economy grew by 3.2%, driven by tourism (+7%), agriculture (+7%) and manufacturing (+3.9%), crucial sectors where EU countries have identified urgent labour needs and where immigrants are well represented.

By facilitating regularisation, the government also seeks to protect foreign workers in sectors with informal employment and exposed to organised crime from exploitation. The certain prospect of a demographic winter is a compelling reason for Spain’s reformist stance. The deteriorating demographic context of the EU, the Spanish national population has grown at a rate of 4.2% in the last six years. According to the Labour  Force Survey, 468,000 people were included in Social Security as new workers in 2024; of these, only 59,000 were Spanish (native or naturalised). The contributions of new workers are essential to sustaining the country’s welfare, especially considering that, over the next 15 years, seven million contributors will have retired. The ageing population is driving up costs in pensions, healthcare, and dependency, while jeopardising productivity and consumption. In a country that needs between 250,000 and 300,000 new workers per year to sustain its welfare state, the possibility of regularising a million immigrants in three years is pure common sense.

To be clear, neither is migration a silver bullet, nor will Spain be able to overcome the difficulties posed by this historic transition. Access to housing, the sustainability of public services, and harmonious coexistence in neighbourhoods will continue to be major challenges for the state. The economic cycle will change, and migration policy will require adjustments. But for now, a large part of Spanish society and its leaders have decided to address this issue on the basis of political realism and common rights and responsibilities, rather than turning it into a confrontation defined by passport. Reducing collective hysteria and acknowledging the contribution of migrants is the most effective way to escape the political and narrative trap that the far right has so effectively set. The British government is already trapped, but Spain still has the opportunity to offer an alternative to one of the great challenges of our time: ‘shared prosperity’ instead of ‘island of strangers’.

This post was originally published: Frente a las ‘islas de forasteros’, la prosperidad compartida | Opinión | EL PAÍS

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The current Colombian administration’s response towards Venezuelan migration: A clash between a liberal rhetoric, foreign policy and domestic politics

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Manuel Alejandro Núñez Ochoa. Migration Studies MA alumnus (University of Sussex) and former Associate Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Officer. 

The Colombian response to Venezuelan forced migration has undergone significant changes since the administration of Gustavo Petro took office in 2022. As the first left-wing president of Colombia, his views on immigration resemble the early 2000s discourses of leftist governments in the region, questioning the restrictive immigration policies of migrant recipient countries, especially those of the United States since the first Donald Trump administration. Petro does so by presenting his approach as bringing a human, ethical and moral response towards migration.  

Petro’s liberal migration discourse, based on the promotion of migrants’ rights, the non-criminalisation of migrants, anti-racism, and freedom of movement, supports his domestic electoral goals by connecting with his supporters. At the same time, it enables Petro to position himself as a credible left-wing leader in the region. However, there is a gap between his liberal rhetoric and the weak and restrictive response of his administration towards the Venezuelan forced migration in Colombia. 


 
The liberal discourse on migration of Gustavo Petro 
 
As Freire and Castillo have noted, a president’s agenda largely determines the migration policy in most South American countries. Since taking office, Gustavo Petro has been very vocal regarding the protection of Colombian migrants in Europe and the US; he has promoted a welcoming response to Palestinians since the war in Gaza intensified; and he has been critical of the US administration’s repressive measures against migrants.  

Colombian flag. Flavia Carpio for Unsplash

For instance, in a talk at the IV Foro Abierto de Ciencias de América Latina y el Caribe (CILAC) in December 2024, President Petro condemned King Charles III and the UK labour government for imposing visa restrictions on Colombians following a rise in asylum requests from Colombians, accusing them of reverting to a mindset reminiscent of enslavers and considering Colombians as “inferior”. Responding to the imposition of visa restrictions to Colombian citizens arriving to the UK, Petro threatened to implement visas for British citizens arriving in Colombia. In the same context, Petro also advocated for free global mobility, trying to engage with his constituents. 

Furthermore, the Colombian government has stated that it will host Palestinian refugee children injured in the conflict in Gaza to receive medical care in Colombia. This mirrors the initiatives taken by Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay in 2015 to accept Syrian refugees. Since January 2025, after the US president Donald Trump ordered the deportations of undocumented migrants in the US, the Colombian president has demanded that migrants have to be treated with dignity and respect. He has advocated for the human rights of Latin American migrants and for the non-criminalisation of migrants in the US. In addition, the Colombian president has called for Central American and South American countries to demand the respect of human rights and the non-criminalisation of deported migrants from the US. Furthermore, he criticised the detention of migrants by the US administration in El Salvador, arguing migrants are not criminals, nor slaves, and that Latin America must respect their dignity. Moreover, in an X post published in February 2025, the Colombian president praised how the 190 undocumented Venezuelans who were deported from the US were not handcuffed on the flight and treated with dignity. 

Gustavo Petro has also criticised the criminalisation of Venezuelan migrants by the US government. The Colombian president expressed criticism towards the United States government for its allegations regarding Venezuelans being affiliated with a criminal gang.  Conversely, Petro condemned the Salvadorian president Nayib Bukele accusing him of criminalising Venezuelan children and demanding the release of Colombians detained in El Salvador.  

The current Colombian administration’s response towards the Venezuelan migration 

President Petro’s use of liberal rhetoric on migration aims, first, to achieve popular support for his political reforms. Second, it seeks to position his government internationally. The relationship with the United States significantly shapes migration policy outcomes that align with the presidential ideology. Consequently, Petro’s administration can leverage its foreign policy strategy, particularly in its stance against the new U.S. president, Donald Trump, by employing liberal rhetoric toward migration. 

However, his domestic political agenda is driven by the promotion of a peace deal with the Colombian Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) guerrilla, which requires the support from the Venezuelan government. At the same time, his foreign policy  rejects the USA’ economic sanctions against Venezuela. Unlike his predecessors, Petro’s administration has taken a restrictive approach towards Venezuelan forced migration. This aims to facilitate achieving peace with the ELN guerrilla and to establish himself as a left-wing leader in the region. As a result, his response to Venezuelan migration is relatively timid, sometimes even aligning with Nicolás Maduro’s administration in Venezuela by downplaying the reality of forced migration from Venezuela. 

Since coming to office, Gustavo Petro has not extended the complementary protection for Venezuelans, known as the Temporary Protection Permit (PPT). Instead, he has implemented an ad hoc measure by creating a special two years, non-renewable visa (Visa V) to regularise Venezuelan migrants who entered the country undocumented before December 4th, 2024. There are multiple obstacles to obtain a Visa V, however. The first relates to cost, as the visa application incurs a fee of around £26,45. Given that the average monthly income of a Venezuelan migrant in Colombia is approximately £65.60, migrants are effectively requested to allocate nearly 40% of their monthly income to cover the visa application fee. In border regions, where migrants encounter higher unemployment rates and greater job informality compared to larger cities like Bogotá, affording the visa fee becomes nearly impossible. Secondly, many visa applications have been rejected due to additional documents required by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Colombia during the applications – e.g. education documents apostille and a passport, the cost of which is prohibitive for many applicants (a Venezuelan passport application costs on average £126, plus a £90 fee charged at the consulate). At the same time, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Colombia   requests documents that are declined for issuance by the Colombian Migratory authority, the Special Administrative Unit of Colombian Migration. Finally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Colombia has the discretionary power to deny the visa application if it considers the applicant to be a potential threat to the country.  

For those Venezuelans who entered Colombia after December 4th, 2024, there are no regularisation options and Venezuelan nationals travelling to Colombia by air must comply with strict entry requirements established by the Colombian Migratory Authority.  Moreover, the other complementary protection measure issued by the Colombian government for Venezuelan migrants who are parents or legal guardians of Venezuelan children, of children who have obtained a Temporary Protection Permit before December 31, 2023, lacks the regulation of the law to be implemented. Furthermore, the Petro government has not managed to address the significant backlog of asylum requests and has still a low rate of refugee recognition. According to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, between 2017 and 2023, Colombia received more than 55,000 asylum applications, but only 1,475 requests were approved. Of the total requests approved, 1,357 applications were from Venezuelans.  

In contrast to the welcoming discourse promoted by the Gustavo Petro administration towards Palestinians, the current Colombian administration has refused to receive Venezuelan migrants and asylum seekers who can be deported from the US. Moreover, the president claimed that he would run a program promoting the voluntary return of Venezuelans, which is in opposition to recommendations by the UNHCR and human rights organisations that highlight the risks of returning Venezuelans to their country of origins. Additionally, the Colombian Migratory Authority has arbitrarily denied more than 400 Temporary Protection Permits (Permiso por Proteccion Temporal, PPT) to Venezuelan residents without providing an opportunity for appeal. After the denial, Venezuelans are at risk of being deported and are not allowed to remain in the country for more than 30 days. In some cases, the Colombian Migratory Authority argues that having an administrative fine, e.g. a traffic fine, is a legitimate reason for denying a PPT.  

To further curb Venezuelan immigration in Colombia, the Petro administration has increased migration control operations – that Venezuelan refugee-led organisations have described as “raids” –  from 37,000 in 2021 to 218,000 in 2022, driven by public stigmatisation of Venezuelan migrants as criminals. These operations in Bogotá were conducted by the Colombian Migratory Authority, the National Police, and the Mayor’s Office, targeting Venezuelan migrants to verify their documents and criminal records and to enforce criminal law. However, according to testimonies from refugee-led organisations and from a Bogota Mayor’s office official, these operations did not follow due process. Many migrants who were detained and subjected to these checks were unable to access their human rights protections. Although these operations were overseen by the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia and civic rights organisations to protect migrants’ rights, those organisations were not present in the actual operations. Furthermore, underage Venezuelan migrants were also detained during these operations. The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF), the country’s child protection institution, was not informed or involved in the migration controls, despite legal requirements for their participation.  

Conclusions 

The president of Colombia Gustavo Petro has instrumentalised the political discourse of non-criminalisation of migrants to promote his domestic and foreign policy goals. He is aligning himself with his electorate using an anti-American, pro-migration and pro-Colombian rhetoric. At the same time, his pro-migration rhetoric enables him to develop his foreign policy agenda, opposing the US and establishing a left-leaning regional agenda in line with his political objectives. However, the Petro administration has increasingly adopted restrictive and in some case repressive measures towards Venezuelan migrants in the country, allowing the president to gain support and popularity domestically and pursuing his domestic policy agenda. Therefore, a gap between the political rhetoric and the practical responses towards Venezuelans has emerged as the goals and ideology of the Colombian president in his domestic and foreign policy goals drive the response to Venezuelan migrants in Colombia.  

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From Mahidol to Sussex: A Doctoral Fellow’s Global Research Experience

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Ken Calang, Mahidol University and Doctoral Visiting Fellow, SCMR

Ken Calang, a PhD candidate in Multicultural Studies at Mahidol University, recently completed a Doctoral Visiting Fellowship at the University of Sussex. From February 3 to March 28, 2025, he was hosted under the ‘Doctoral Researcher Supervised Visit Under Partnership MoU’ scheme at the School of Global Studies, where he deepened his engagement with critical migration studies. The fellowship was also funded by Mahidol University through the Scholarship for Postgraduate Student Mobility Program 2025.

Throughout his fellowship, Mr. Calang actively collaborated with scholars at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR), benefiting from a vibrant academic exchange. Under the guidance of his host adviser, Dr Sarah Scuzzarello, he participated in regular seminars and contributed with insightful perspectives to ongoing discussions. His time at Sussex was dedicated to advancing the three empirical chapters of his dissertation, which now stand as well-developed drafts. Reflecting on his experience, Mr. Calang described the fellowship as a vital experience in his academic journey.

This opportunity has been incredibly enriching, both as a PhD student and as a researcher immersed in the complexities of migration studies. Engaging with leading scholars, refining my theoretical approach, and working within such a dynamic academic environment have significantly strengthened my dissertation on migration. Beyond academia, this experience has broadened my global outlook, emphasizing the value of global collaboration.

His dissertation, which examines the intersectionality in the lives of Filipino migrant workers in Bangkok, took significant strides forward during his time at Sussex. With a strong focus on the development of key chapters, he leveraged the fellowship to refine his research arguments.

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As he continues his doctoral journey, Mr. Calang’s experience at Sussex stands as a testament to the power of academic mobility in shaping research and fostering cross-cultural intellectual exchange. “My time at Sussex was more than a research visit—it was a period of intellectual growth, self-discovery, and meaningful academic engagement,” he shared.

This post was originally posted on the Phd Program in Multicultural Studies, Mahidol University’s Facebook page

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The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the individual authors and do not represent the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR).