South Africa’s electricity crisis and the future of supply

During his State of the Nation address last week South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma promised to do “everything we can” to resolve the country’s energy challenge, including: to develop a large nuclear fleet; construct yet more coal-fired power plants; import hydro from the Democratic Republic of Congo; import gas from neighbouring countries; develop the country’s shale gas reserves; continue to develop a privately generated renewable energy sector; and undertake demand side management measures such as solar hot water heaters, and roof top solar PV. An impressive shopping list indeed, particularly given that coal-dependent South Africa is currently facing its worst electricity crisis in 40 years. With load shedding taking place most days, the country has been relying heavily on expensive diesel peaking plants to make up the short fall.

Load shedding, or planned outages which have been taking place regularly across the country since mid-2014 are now predicted to last until 2018. In addition to arguments over what the country’s electricity demand should be, national debates rage over which options are the quickest to construct, the most affordable, the most technically feasible. The country’s 20-year national electricity master plan, the ‘integrated resource plan’ for electricity first approved in 2011, has been under revision since late 2013. Decision-making over the ideal electricity mix often reflects deeper struggles over what gets supported by the state, who gets to build it and who gets to benefit.

The electricity crisis has contributed to lowering growth rates, discouraged private investment, exacerbated the country’s large current account deficit and pushed the cost of electricity way beyond the reach of the poorest households who are connected to the grid. Approximately 25 per cent of the population, 12.3 million people, lack access to electricity in a country where 40 per cent of the electricity is consumed by the country’s energy-intensive industrial users. The country’s historical dependence on cheap coal was, under apartheid coupled with cheap labour to generate cheap electricity for the primary benefit of export oriented industry and wealthy households. The monopoly utility Eskom which to date generates 90 per cent of the country’s coal-fired electricity, is cash strapped and crisis ridden. Since 2005 Eskom has been struggling to build an additional 17000 MW of generation capacity by 2018 whilst facing a funding crisis. Electricity tariffs have tripled in real terms since 2005 and will increase by a further 12.8% from April 2015. By January 2015, one third of Eskom’s installed capacity, approximately 15,000 MW was down and the country’s reserve margin on a knife edge.

The causes of the country’s current supply side crisis are complex and deep seated. They include: decades of mismanagement; a failure by government to approve the construction of new capacity in the early 1990s and disagreement over who should do this; inadequate maintenance of the utility’s older power stations; the recent collapse of the coal silo for the Majuba Power Station in November 2014; rising coal costs; increased international demands for the country’s coal; and climate change mitigation commitments pledged in 2009. A further R23 billion has been promised by government but this won’t last long, not least because the country has long exhausted its diesel budget for the financial year.

Big coal…

Delays in the construction of the 4,800 MW Medupi coal-fired power plant, the largest coal-fired power plant on the continent have exacerbated the crisis. A controversial World Bank loan for Medupi was approved in 2010, but the plant is now three years behind schedule and subject to significant cost overruns, technical glitches and labour unrest. By January 2015 Eskom had failed to meet all previous deadlines to synchronise Medupi’s first 794 MW unit with the grid, which was originally to have been carried out in 2011. Another power station of similar size and also delayed, Kusile, is anticipated to be one year behind Medupi.

An excellent report by the Energy Research Centre of the University of Cape Town details the significant planned expansion of South Africa’s coal mines, power plants and related infrastructure for both export and domestic purposes. Among other findings the report uncovers glaring inconsistencies between the country’s coal road map, a process driven and funded by the coal mining industry, and national climate change mitigation commitments. Similarly it finds that planned investment in export infrastructure for coal is potentially incompatible with required global reductions in fossil fuel combustion. In a potential illustration of ‘unburnable carbon’ this either risks new coal developments becoming stranded assets in the medium-to-long term, or the country becoming locked into a high-carbon emissions trajectory that prevents it from meeting its own mitigation imperatives.

…big networks, big nuclear

Reflecting what academic Anton Eberhard has referred to as a national paradigm of “big coal, big nuclear, big networks”, President Zuma reiterated the promise to construct a 9,600 MW nuclear fleet. It is estimated that this will cost the country R1 trillion ($85 billion) with a target to connect this fleet to the grid by 2023. The government has courted representatives from the ‘big five’ nuclear generating countries, China, France, Russia, the US and South Korea with whom it claims to have signed inter-governmental agreements . But according to Earthlife Africa, Russia is now being favoured based on an agreement designed to sidestep the constitutional requirement for open and competitive tendering. This would give Russia power of veto and prevent South Africa from entering into a contract with any other nuclear vendor.

For some environmentalists, nuclear energy has become the preferred option as a techno-fix to prevent runaway climate change. But I have never managed to find a satisfactory response to fundamental questions of finance, governance and accountability such as: who will build it, how much will it cost, who will pay for it, who will take liability for accidents, how will the R&D be shared, where will the waste be stored and how do you avoid the corruption and cost and time overruns that often go hand in hand with large infrastructure projects? Rather than a simple case of coal v nuclear, to which pro-nuclear arguments are often reduced, there are other issues at stake here relating to democratic decision-making in energy, bargaining power within contractual agreements, allocation of risk and how limited public subsidy for energy development should be distributed. See Philip Johnstone’s blog in relation to the UK’s Hinkley C for some more thoughts on this.

Renewable

More positively, in the last three years South Africa has become one of the leading destinations for renewable energy investment. According to UNEP/BNEF investment went from a few hundred million dollars in 2011 to $5.7 billion in 2012 and $4.8 billion in 2013, of which $1.9 billion for wind and $3 billion for solar. This investment is largely due to the take off of the country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ Programme (RE IPPPP), launched in August 2011. RE IPPPP is a tender system based on competitive bidding which means that potential project developers bid for a renewable energy contract below a certain cap and must meet potentially progressive socio-economic criteria in order to qualify. Successful projects sell electricity to Eskom’s grid under a 20 year local currency denominated, government-backed power purchase agreement (PPA). Just under 4,000 MW have thus far been approved and by December 2014, 21 projects had been connected.

As a colleague and I discussed in a working paper last year, while the programme has brought a diversity of new players and investment to the country, the ownership of this new sector could become dominated by international companies rather than national players who are struggling to retain a share in the market. Moreover fundamental tensions have been identified between the demands of finance and investment for ‘bankability’ and the progressive socio-economic criteria of the programme that include minimum requirements for community ownership, job creation and participation of historically disadvantaged individuals.

So technology choice is about a lot more than just technology. There is no panacea, and without discussing the other various options Zuma has so confidently promised the country (I ran out of blog space), it is clear that disagreement, uncertainty and speculation over the country’s electricity are reflected in competing political and economic interests at the national level and beyond.LucyBaker Sussex

Lucy Baker is a Research Associate in the School of Global Studies at the University of Sussex, currently working on an ESRC-funded project, Rising Powers and the low-carbon transition in Southern Africa.  She has a PhD in The political economy of socio-technical transitions in South Africa’s electricity sector, from the University of East Anglia. Her areas of expertise include: the political economy of energy; renewable energy development in low and middle income countries and climate change governance and finance. She has worked on issues of  development, environment and human rights for fifteen years, in academia and NGOs.

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The politics of the UK nuclear renaissance

The ‘nuclear renaissance’ just got nasty. Britain has threatened Austria that it will take “every opportunity” to harm the country if Austria goes ahead with plans to challenge the European Commission decision on the granting of state aid for the proposed Hinkley point C nuclear power station. In response Austria has declared that it “won’t be intimidated” and will stick to its guns in fighting for the principle of no subsidies for atomic energy.

Austria has for a long time opposed nuclear energy and has no nuclear plants itself. More specifically however, the concerns from Austria are that the granting of £92.50 per megawatt hour over the 35-year life of the Hinkley plant which is double the current price of electricity paid through consumer bills, is a market distortion that will, as Paul Dorfman argues, “[mess] with the European internal energy market” as well as messing state aid rules. Hinkley C is the key fault line in the European Energy Union more broadly. Late last year the European Commission granted the subsidy scheme for the proposed Hinkley C European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR), however since then, things have become even more complicated at Hinkley point.

EDF have postponed their final investment decision, which was supposed to have been made by the middle of last year. Negotiations have faltered between EDF and China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power. Then there is the dire financial situation of reactor vendor Areva, and of course, the fact that the EPR reactors under construction in Finland and France are vastly over budget and years behind schedule. Tony Roulstone, a nuclear engineer and advocate of nuclear, referred to the EPR design set for Hinkley as being potentially ‘unbuildable’. Hinkley C would likely be the most expensive nuclear reactor in the world if it is ever constructed.

What is once again clear is the central contradiction in the politics of pro-nuclear advocacy: the simultaneous enthusiasm held by the UK political consensus in terms of a near-religious devotion to ‘liberalised markets’ and a hatred of state intervention, alongside a desire to construct new nuclear power which has never been built in a liberalised energy market before. As pointed out in a recent report by Energy Fair, quoting a Citigroup analysis: “Three of the risks [of nuclear power] faced by developers: Construction, Power Price, and Operational are so large and variable that individually they could each bring even the largest utility company to its knees financially. This makes new nuclear a unique investment proposition for utility companies.”

What this means is that private investment is unlikely to take on the full costs of such risks and requires protection from these risks through state financial support in various forms. State funded energy policy can be a good or bad thing depending on your ideological preferences however nuclear proponents should just be more honest about the levels of support likely to be required in order to have an actual ‘renaissance’ of any scale. There are 69 reactors under construction in the world but only one is being constructed in a liberalised energy market: Hinkley C. It is already 5 years behind schedule and is at least double the initial cost estimates.

Also, lets not forget, the state has already done a tremendous amount – in fact, almost everything it can – to make new nuclear happen in the UK. Every wish of the nuclear industry has been granted by the UK government. The British planning system has been ‘streamlined’ with nuclear a key inspiration of the need to speed things up. Government has created one of the best institutional contexts in the world for developing nuclear with the new Office for Nuclear Regulation and the Office for Nuclear Development in DECC, and UK Gov has ensured that nuclear regulators are equipped to pre-license designs for new build (Generic Design Assessment). As well as this a strategic siting assessment and environmental assessment were carried out further ‘streamlining’ the process of new nuclear construction. As already mentioned, Electricity Market Reform has been brought in, where, despite being a mature technology, nuclear was granted Contracts for Difference at double the current market rate for the next 35 years.

As well as this, there have been signs of less visible kinds of governmental support. As Rob Edwards reported in The Guardian, there has been collusion between government and industry in ensuring the ‘correct’ nuclear message – i.e one that is pro-nuclear, was conveyed following Fukushima. Just days after the accident (when surely there was no way to know the full consequences) correspondence between DECC and EDF stated that “We need to ensure the anti-nuclear chaps and chapesses do not gain ground on this. We need to occupy the territory and hold it”.

What is more there is a political consensus on nuclear power where all main parties agree it should get the go-ahead, and public opinion is said to be favourable to the technology. It is important to be reminded of these facts because commentators like Mark Lynas and George Monbiot have filled newspaper pages with articles that have quite successfully convinced people that a rampant anti-nuclear movement has been the major problem leading to a stalled renaissance. Rather, what we are seeing is that in the UK, these ‘obstacles’ (pesky public opposition and the like) have largely been removed, yet their removal has done absolutely nothing to speed up or make cheaper the construction of nuclear power. As David Toke writes, the complaints by the Austrians may in fact be useful for the wider nuclear industry as this intervention can be held up as the sole reason for the stalling ‘nuclear renaissance’ deflecting attention away from the endemic problems and contradictions presented by the attempt to construct new nuclear power.

As Steve Thomas writes, the key question that needs to be asked is this: “Competitive energy markets and nuclear power: Can we have both, do we want either?” It does seem that if you want nuclear then you must also want state-led government intervention. Perhaps you also need the state to intervene in other ways such as silencing nuclear “chaps and Chappesses’ (whatever they are) as well as threatening sovereign nations who launch legitimate legal challenges due to concerns about the distortion of the European Energy Market in which they are a part. Placing more focus on the changes in governance and government behaviour that nuclear potentially requires would make for a more honest debate where the ‘actual sustainability’ of nuclear can be assessed, beyond a singular focus on CO2 which has trumped all ethical discussion related to nuclear technology in the UK context. This has contributed to unrealistic expectations of what nuclear can deliver, and the costs and timescales that such delivery will involve.

Dr Philip Johnstone

Dr Philip Johnstone is a Research Fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit and a member of The Sussex Energy Group

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Shadows over COP21

While the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report demonstrates an increased confidence among the world’s climate scientists of the causal relationship between anthropogenic (man made) greenhouse gas emissions and a dangerously warming planet, paradoxically, it will not necessarily be the science that drives the negotiation processes at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to be held in Paris, later this year.

Much of the burden of necessary economic and societal change to meet the IPCC’s warming target of no more than 2 degrees celsius average global temperature rise above pre-industrial levels, will fall on the energy sectors of the world’s industrialised and industrialising economies. But country negotiators, charged with protecting their national economic interests as well as acting responsibly in the face of the climate threat, have complex trade-offs to consider. Not the least of these is the notorious prisoner’s dilemma paradox, which requires that no single negotiating party (and over 190 countries will take part in the Paris negotiations), can play for the most advantageous outcome from its individual perspective without imperilling the collective, in this case the planetary outcome.

But this is only the beginning of the complexities inherent to the negotiation process. With respect to energy systems, each country will seek to resolve a difficult balancing act between achieving energy security, (so that the lights don’t go out) affordable energy (so that the economic burden of transition to a low carbon system doesn’t cripple the rest of the economy) and a rate of system change (decarbonisation) that meaningfully addresses climatic imperatives.

To date, countries have negotiated to achieve a reasonable balance within the “energy trilemma” by simply delaying making binding commitments to deep decarbonisation of their energy systems. But further delay is no longer an option if the 2 degrees target is to be taken seriously. On this matter, the 5th Assessment Report is very clear.

The word is out that country negotiators expect that a binding agreement will emerge from the Paris Conference. But what kind of an agreement will it be? A second, and perhaps more ominous trilemma overshadows the negotiation process. This is the trade off between pragmatism (what rate of system change is actually feasible given the lock-in and path dependence of complex energy systems embedded within complex industrial economies) time sensitivity (to what extent can an affordable rate of change be ordered and delivered so that in a time sense, the process of change is front loaded – more delay pushes up costs and infringes on feasibility) and finally the rigidity of the target. How robust is the commitment to 2 degrees?

Because it is the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions that drive global warming and thereby, climate change, the global warming target determines the available carbon budget that can be spent before the greenhouse gas ceiling is reached. At current emission rates and a 2 degrees warming target, we blow the budget some time around 2025.

In climate negotiation, complexity is piled upon complexity, and with each complexity, unknowns are piled upon unknowns so that calling the outcome of the negotiating process is a fools errand. What will give? Whose interests will most dominate the outcome? Past performance suggests that those with the least standing, those whose voice is the most quiet (or the most effectively silenced) will lose out. But there again, complexity may have the upper hand. With so many complex systems teetering on the brink, one thing can be assured, the past will be a very poor guide to what the future holds in store.

This blog is inspired by a recent Grantham Institute seminar on the IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report held at Imperial College London under Chatham House Rules.

Nick Gallie is a doctoral researcher at SPRU. His research is focused on climate change discourse. Nick holds Masters Degrees in Political Economy, Human Rights and Science and Technology Policy Studies

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The time is right to end fossil fuel subsidies

When the price of the world’s most widely-traded commodity halves within a 6-month period, it has a tendency to draw attention from governments, industry and the media alike.  North Sea oil has recently been selling at around $45 per barrel, a 6-year low following a fairly steady average of around $110 since mid-2011 (fig. 1).  This is not the first time we have seen dramatic changes in the oil price, either; in the months and years preceding the 2008 crash, economists and policy makers were getting used to the idea of impending $150+ oil.  In the month of August that year alone, it plunged by 70%.  For now, the price is potentially beginning to level off, but the volatility of the oil markets is sure to remain an important part of the economic sphere far into the future.

graph

Fig. 1: Brent Crude was trading at $48.50/bbl on January 28th 2015.  A year earlier it was nearly $110/bbl. (FT markets)

What does the recent price fall mean for the nascent sustainable energy transition?  Some see it as bad news; falling oil prices mean higher demand, more carbon emissions and less interest in sustainable alternatives.  We’ve already begun to hear tales of increased SUV sales in the US, and as the price of natural gas is linked to that of oil (in Europe at least) it might be the case that gas-fired electricity generation could become more attractive, offsetting renewables.

On the other hand, in many regions like Europe, renewable generation is mandated by national and regional policy – utilities have to derive a certain amount of electricity from these sources – and many governments have put in place price incentives to do so, with Germany (and others’) Feed-in Tarriffs a prime example.  Renewables are thus sheltered to some degree from the kind of market activity we have recently seen.  In fact, the whole point of these subsidies is to provide an incentive for their use, and the more we deploy these technologies the cheaper they become; a phenomenon which has been borne out in recent years.  ‘Grid parity’, whereby the levelised costs of renewable energy becomes competitive with coal and gas, is now a reality in many places, particularly for solar PV, and is soon to become so elsewhere.  Meanwhile, it’s becoming ever more apparent that the volatility of oil and gas isn’t going to stop any time soon, leaving this kind of energy use (be it in electricity generation or petrol) vulnerable to short- and long-term fluctuations.

But instead of just waiting for cheaper sustainable energy, why not level the playing field?  Fossil fuels enjoy enormous subsidies from governments every year – far more so than renewables.  The IEA estimates that in 2010 subsidies to the fossil fuel industry amounted to $409 billion worldwide, with those to oil companies representing almost half of the total.  These are generally in the form of tax allowances for exploration and production companies, by governments who are keen to see investment in their economy.  But, as unconventional oil and gas (such as that from shale or tar sands) is increasingly relied upon, the costs of production are growing which in turn drives up the cost of subsidies.  What’s more, many of the highest subsidy rates are in emerging nations such as Venezuela, Algeria and Egypt, which ties up a significant amount of potential government revenue which is much needed elsewhere within their economies.

If governments were to begin phasing out these subsidies, companies would pass these extra costs through to consumers.  Hence, energy prices would inevitably be driven up – a politically-challenging issue for any policy maker.  However, with recent market events we find ourselves in the very unique situation of falling prices of clean energy alongside the low price of oil, gas and coal; removing handouts to industry now would cause the least amount of pain for consumers worldwide, whilst bolstering the growth of sustainable alternatives.  We could go further, too.  Effective carbon pricing – much discussed but long unattainble – is unlikely to be much easier to implement in the future than it is now.  Though it would drive up (currently low) costs in the short term, it would do wonders in spurring the development of sustainable energy forms, as investors are provided a clear indication of the direction of government policy and an incentive to act.

As The Economist recently put it, policy makers should act boldly and “Seize the Day”, scrapping “nonsense” energy policy and replacing it with more prudent alternatives.  Though it would require significant co-ordination and political will (perhaps bravery), the imperative to act has never been greater; this year’s UN climate talks in Paris are regarded by some as the last chance to make a meaningful and effective global agreement, and recent research on unburnable carbon highlights the need to leave the majority of proven reserves in the ground.  It seems obvious, then, that governments should begin a concerted effort to reign in an industry whose business model is incompatible with a sustainable future.

 

Biography

photo of Jack MillerJack Miller began his PhD with SPRU and CIED in September 2014, conducting research into the role of energy efficiency in economic growth.  His work centres upon the concepts of ‘exergy’ and ‘useful work’, or the portions of energy inputs into the economy which can prove useful to economic activity and societal needs.  He completed an MSc in Energy Policy for Sustainability with SPRU in 2014, having undertaken a project looking at the prospects for future shale gas development in the US.  He has a degree in Physics (MPhys hons, University of Sussex, 2013), and has previously taught maths and physics from KS3 to first-year undergraduate level.

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A response to Harry Saunders’ “Divestment will not keep carbon in the ground”

This blog post is a response to a recent article on the divestment of shares in fossil fuels by Harry Saunders.

Jack and Emily are part of the ‘Fossil Free Sussex’ campaign, which aims to encourage the University to move its investments away from the oil, gas and coal industries.  In his well-written and thought-provoking article, Harry argues that ‘divestment will not keep carbon in the ground’, by pointing out that shares in a company represent a stake in the ownership of that company, but do not affect the fundamental production economics, even if widespread divestment does occur.

These kinds of arguments against divestment seem to be based upon the view that the campaign is trying to bankrupt the industry. Whilst campaigning at Sussex, we have said from the beginning that the damage we are attempting to do is not financial; UK universities have a combined endowment wealth of around £10bn (People & Planet estimation, 2013), of which around 5% can reasonably be thought to be represented by fossil fuel stocks.  We are aware that £500m is never going to financially harm the industry (and after reading the article, it is apparent that were this figure to be much larger, it still wouldn’t).

What we are instead trying to do is inflict reputational impact. The oft-made analogy between divestment in fossil fuels and Apartheid South Africa highlights where this has been successful in the past (though there are of course distinct differences between the two – this analogy is slightly challenging but the basic principles are the same). Our universities do not invest in tobacco, arms manufacture, pornography or gambling industries. The arguments Harry has made apply equally to these companies, yet they have a reputational tarnish and thus have seen their shares sold by certain institutions. We believe this industry should be added to that list, because of issues like unburnable carbon; we are not saying that we should divest to stop carbon emissions (directly), but that because of carbon emissions we should divest.

The divestment campaign is not attempting to halt – or even particularly to slow – fossil fuel extraction. In fact, it is precisely this absence of grand ambition which is appealing, since it thereby avoids the problems of intractability which tend to plague public attempts to tackle climate change. Instead, the campaign seeks to redefine what we mean by an ‘ethical investment’. Most universities (and churches, and other institutions who are considering divesting) already have an ethical investment portfolio, which avoids arms, tobacco etc. What is needed is a redefinition of ‘ethical’ to include concern for the climate. An investment in fossil fuels should not be considered an ethical investment, assuming that protecting the environment and mitigating climate change is an ethic we hold dear.

In this sense, perhaps better parallels can be drawn with other types of ethical investment, such as switching to an ethical bank account or buying fair trade. No-one claims that ethical bank accounts such as Triodos are going to put a stop to the arms trade; it is more a case of feeling that our own money should not be used in ways we feel uncomfortable about. It should not always have to be a choice between changing the world or doing nothing at all; sometimes small actions are correct for moral, rather than pragmatic, reasons.

This campaign is empowering people – in Sussex and worldwide – who otherwise feel they can do nothing about climate change, save ride their bike more and listen whilst policymakers squabble. Even if Sussex doesn’t divest but we cause a few more people to become interested in climate, then we will feel that the campaign has been a success.

Biography

photo of Jack MillerJack Miller began his PhD with SPRU and CIED in September 2014, conducting research into the role of energy efficiency in economic growth.  His work centres upon the concepts of ‘exergy’ and ‘useful work’, or the portions of energy inputs into the economy which can prove useful to economic activity and societal needs.  He completed an MSc in Energy Policy for Sustainability with SPRU in 2014, having undertaken a project looking at the prospects for future shale gas development in the US.  He has a degree in Physics (MPhys hons, University of Sussex, 2013), and has previously taught maths and physics from KS3 to first-year undergraduate level.

 

Emily Cox imageEmily Cox is a PhD researcher with the Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex, researching electricity security in the context of a low-carbon transition. She is developing a methodology which can be used to assess low-carbon transition pathways for their resilience, affordability and sustainability. She has recently worked for the Royal Academy of Engineering, undertaking research for the Council of Science and Technology into the social and economic impacts of electricity shortfalls. She has also spent time working for E.ON Technologies at the Ratcliffe-on-Soar power station, carrying out policy research into energy security, district heating, distributed storage, and the new UK Capacity Market. Emily is an Associate Tutor at the University of Sussex, tutoring an MSc in Energy Policy and a new BSc elective in energy transitions. She has also worked for a variety of NGOs, including as a regional network coordinator for Greenpeace; as such, she has tackled energy issues from within a broad spectrum of sectors including industry, academia, policy and civil society. She holds an MSc in Climate Change and Policy, a BSc in International Relations, and half of a rather ill-advised BA in music.

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