Do teleworkers travel less? The challenge of tele-sprawl

The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered far-reaching changes in working practices, with a large fraction of the UK population now working from home for several days a week. Despite the removal of lockdown restrictions, UK travel patterns have been slow to return to pre-pandemic levels and teleworking has become an established feature of many professions.  This creates the possibility of a long-term reduction in commuter traffic, together with the associated fuel use and carbon emissions. 

However, previous research has shown that the ability to work from home may encourage people to move farther from their place of work – a phenomenon labelled ‘tele-sprawl’. If so, the travel savings from fewer commutes could be offset by longer commutes on the days that people work in the office. In addition, working from home may encourage people to take additional trips for other purposes – such as shopping or visiting cafés – which may further erode the potential travel and carbon savings. Teleworking may also influence the travel patterns of other household members – for example, by enabling them to use the household car during the day.  These complex interactions make the long-term impact of teleworking difficult to predict. 

In our newly published study, we used data from the National Travel Survey (NTS) to estimate the impact of teleworking on English travel patterns over the 15 years prior to the pandemic (2005 to 2019). We compared the weekly travel patterns of teleworkers with those of non-teleworkers over this period, while controlling for variables such as professional occupation and household income. Teleworking was relatively uncommon in our sample, with only 1.3% working from home for 3 or more days a week (‘high-frequency teleworkers’), and 4.7% working from home once or twice a week (‘medium-frequency teleworkers’).

Our results provide little support for the claim that teleworking reduces travel. First, we found that the majority of teleworkers travelled farther each week than non-teleworkers. This is partly because teleworkers lived further from their workplace than non-teleworkers, and partly because they took more trips for other purposes.  However, there was a ‘tipping point’: people who worked from home three or more times a week travelled ~7% less far each week than non-teleworkers.

Second, we found that the weekly travel distance of all household members combined was greater in households where one member was teleworking. This suggests that teleworking by one member of a household encourages or enables additional travel by other members of the household.  Whilst we cannot pinpoint the precise mechanisms, their net effect is to erode the travel savings from avoided commutes.

Third, we found that the majority of teleworkers travelled farther for business each week than non-teleworkers, thereby amplifying the difference in travel patterns between the two groups.

While high-frequency teleworking was associated with marginally less private travel, the aggregate savings were small and were not significant at the level of household as a whole. Moreover, those savings were more than offset by additional travel by the larger group of medium-frequency teleworkers.  This suggests that, prior to the pandemic; teleworking made little or no contribution to reducing travel demand in England.

However, the patterns observed in the past may not be a good guide to the future.  The pandemic has led to such a dramatic change in working practices that longer-term reductions in commuting travel appear possible.  A much larger group of people now work from home most or all of the time, and many of these may continue to do so in the future.  These ‘new teleworkers’ are more diverse in terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics, are more likely to telework three or more times a week.  In these circumstances, we may expect larger savings in commuter and total travel.  The new teleworkers may take more non-work trips, but the environmental impacts of those trips will depend upon the choice of transport mode and the average distance travelled. 

A key lesson from our study, therefore, is the need to discourage tele-sprawl.  Policy should discourage people from moving to areas of low population density that are far from their workplace; far from retail, leisure and other destinations and poorly served by public transport.

Unfortunately, there are early signs of trends in the opposite direction. For example, the Resolution Foundation found that house prices in the least-populated local authorities have increased by more than 10% since February 2020, compared to only 6% in the most populated. In addition, while the pandemic has encouraged more walking, the use of public transport remains well below pre-pandemic levels.

Carbon savings from teleworking are therefore contingent upon broader progress in sustainable transport policy and land use planning.  The key is to encourage the growth of high-density, mixed-use neighbourhoods where work, leisure and other destinations are readily accessible through walking, cycling and public transport.  This will help to maximise the carbon savings from teleworking, whilst at the same time improving quality of life and facilitating the broader transition to a sustainable economy.

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with: , ,
Posted in All Posts

It’s time to Save it for your Monergy! (and for the planet too)

By Dr Mari Martiskainen

The Energy Security Strategy misses an opportunity for deep energy demand reduction

The UK announced its long-awaited Energy Security Strategy today. As expected, it outlines  major energy supply related options: more nuclear power, more fracking exploration, developing hydrogen, and expanding on renewable energy generation. The Strategy’s focus is on fixing energy supply, but committing the UK to options like nuclear and more fossil fuel exploration will lock us into expensive and polluting options for years to come. Given the urgency, it is alarming there is very little focus on deep energy demand reduction.

It is perhaps a good time to remember the 1975 Save it and 1986 “Get more for your Monergy” energy saving campaigns in the UK. In the 1970s the oil crisis saw concerns about prices and energy waste. 1986 was even titled the “Energy Efficiency Year”[i]. The world is struggling again and the current energy crisis needs a mixture of measures to deal with this. Addressing energy consumption and speeding up those solutions which we already have at hand is the most sensible way forward. We can start by insulating every home in the UK first, and switching to renewable heating like heat pumps. This would reduce reliance on gas and reduce emissions, and more importantly help those who now have to choose between heating and eating due to energy price hikes.

We have the methods to fix our leaky and cold homes, and now is the time to finally take action (an option like hydrogen for home heating is a very distant option, if even that). A national home energy demand reduction programme, coupled with a national energy demand reduction campaign, should be an essential part in fixing the energy crisis. We know that the more ambitious energy efficiency programmes of the 2000s have had an impact on energy use in homes, which peaked at the end of the decade and has declined ever since. That’s why the government needs to reverse the collapse in investment in insulation and other efficiency measures. Carbon Brief estimates that cuts to programmes since 2013 have effectively added £808 million onto total household energy bills.

Finally, this is an Energy Security Strategy. Where is climate change in the content? In case the government was too busy exploring North Sea oil and gas options, the latest IPCC report also came out earlier in the week. It makes sombre reading, showing that we have no time left to keep average temperature rise to 1.5 Degrees. More fossil fuels now will not help fix the climate crisis – quite the opposite. But rapid and deep energy demand reduction might just about help us avoid the worst of it, whilst also helping to improve energy security.

[i] Mallaburn, P.S., Eyre, N. Lessons from energy efficiency policy and programmes in the UK from 1973 to 2013. Energy Efficiency 7, 23–41 (2014).

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Posted in All Posts

Reflections on “Industrial decarbonisation where does it come from, where might it go?”

This is a repost from

Last week I gave a seminar as part of the Sussex Energy Group’s seminar series. This was, for me, a Big Deal, because the Sussex Energy Group is a very cool collection of scholars, mostly from the Science Policy Research Unit but also from University of Sussex (the clue is in the name) more broadly.

I’d given my seminar the catchy title “Industrial decarbonisation: where does it come from, where might it go?

Attendance was good, the questions were good, it was all okay (I think). This blog post, written out of narcissism disguised as reflexivity/iterativeness, will cover (not briefly enough) the process, the product – though you could watch it here) and the outcomes. The “what would I do differently” question gets a run too.


A couple of months ago I offered to do a seminar on the industrial decarbonisation project that I am a research fellow on. The date of March 8th was pinned down and I made plans to spend some time putting it together, bit by bit so it wouldn’t be a mad rush at the end.

I then of course ignored those plans. Then came the strike (a whole week, and half of a week over the next two weeks).  It was all a bit like that odd scene in Monty Python in the Holy Grail where the guards in the room are looking out the window at some guy in the distance charging towards them. He never seems to get any closer, and so they don’t do anything and then – suddenly, impossibly quickly – he is in the room killing them….

And who am I kidding – if it hadn’t been the strike, there’s have been Something Else.

So there is the Six P rule – “Proper Planning Prevents Pretty Poor Performance”

And then, in the real world – or my real world – there’s the Four Ps.

Procrastination (which is more disorganisation and fear than straight-up laziness)

Pivotting away from other important stuff I was doing (trying to get my head around clusters and their internal workings)

Productivity – Initially I thought to write my script and then do the slides. I found that a bit alien, and couldn’t sustain it, so I created the slides, and then the script. Over time I refined the slides, talked it through to myself a couple of times, consolidated some stuff. I thought about throwing the International Women’s Day stuff overboard, but then chose to keep it, and am glad I did

Panic – there wasn’t too much of this. I knew that as long as I didn’t go over time, then then it wouldn’t be a disaster.


You could watch the whole thing here if you wanted.

So, after a nice introduction, there was a tolerably smooth 30 minute talk, which covered a lot of ground.  I put in a “questions of clarification” moment about halfway through, but nobody availed themselves, so I ploughed on to the end

There was then about 25 minutes for questions (I absolutely hate those talks where someone says they are going to leave plenty of time for questions and then they keep going and going and there’s only time for two or at most three.  I think it’s either rude or cowardly or both. I am sure I’ve been guilty of it in the past, but at least on the 8th I was not).

Immediate Outcome

Some really good questions (which I could have answered more clearly and concisely)

I also got sent two very useful sources, one known and one not.

Hydrogen Enabling Green Hydrogen: Industrial Policy, Certification Systems, and Inclusiveness (

Green hydrogen for industry: A guide to policy making (

And a reminder of a paper called “Moving policy implementation theory forward: A multiple streams/critical juncture approach” by Michael Howlett, 2019 (

As a semi-direct outcome of delivering the seminar, I also am now supervising a Masters dissertation (my first, and here’s me without an actual Masters myself…)

Doing the seminar also contributed to further discussion between me and the PI about the project, which is now significantly different (in an improved way).

Next time

I should

  • improve my image creation skills – there was a slide which created confusion about windows and entanglements
  • get more confident with screen sharing so that I don’t dump any work on anyone else.

And voila,  it turns out that I will be doing another seminar in October – will let you know. Right now I am pretending that it will be 6Ps instead of 4Ps.  Wouldn’t it be pretty to think so.


Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Posted in All Posts

The Sussex Energy Group Research Showcase: March 8–22

The Sussex Energy Group Research Showcase in March will focus on two exciting research projects led by the Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex . The series will outline IDRIC’s insights on the politics of decarbonisation processes in the UK, and JUSTNORTH’s work on the energy transition and its prospective impact on Artic communities.

You can see the full list of events below, and we hope to see many of you there.

Industrial decarbonisation: where does it come from, where might it go?
Mar 8 13.00-14.00

Marc Hudson outlines the University of Sussex IDRIC project looking at the politics of industrial decarbonisation policy in the UK.

This seminar will explain the processual approach they are taking to examine how five overlapping policy domains – climate, energy, industrial strategy, regional strategy, innovation strategy.- came to be spoken of in the same sentence. He will share some initial findings, and offer reflections on how industrial decarbonisation will be shaped by the policy histories and the ongoing mobilisation of political, economic and cultural interests at sub-national, national and international levels.

JUSTNORTH – The energy transition and justice in the Arctic: Part 1
Mar 15 13.00-14.00

JUSTNORTH is an EU Horizon 2020 project which investigates the ways in which the multitude of ethical systems that coexist in the Arctic can be used as a critical element for assessing the viability of new economic activities (including energy development) in the region.

Part I will focus on the barriers to the ongoing energy transition:

• “Stranded Assets, Path Dependencies & Carbon Lock-in: Short/Medium/Long Term Implications of Oil & Gas Development in the Russian, Norwegian and U.S. Arctic ” by Anna Badyina and Roman Sidortsov (SPRU) and

• “Corporate Cultures & Geopolitical Aspirations: Exploring Socio-Political Barriers to the Energy Transition in Russia & Norway” by Darren McCauley (Erasmus University of Rotterdam).

JUSTNORTH – The energy transition and justice in the Arctic: Part 2
Mar 22 13.00-14.00

This is part two of a two-part seminar series based on the results of JUSTNORTH, an EU Horizon 2020 project.

Part II of the series will focus on the opportunities for the energy transition in the High North, as well as the challenges that come with these opportunities. The following three presentations will comprise the second seminar:

• “Sustainable Digitisation & Resilient Communities: Low Carbon Data Centres in Greenland, Iceland & Norway” by Chukwuka Monyei (SPRU)

• “Renewable and Ethical?: Motivation for Wind Power Resistance in Sápmi & the Norwegian Arctic” Ragnhild Freng Dale (Western Norway Research Institute)

• “Liabilities into Assets—Reviving Post-Industrial Communities Through Repurposing Industrial Infrastructures in the Swedish Arctic” by Anna Badyina (SPRU) and Timothy Scarlett (Michigan Technological University)

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Posted in All Posts

10 Recommendations for Direct Air Carbon Deployment Policy in Europe

These ten recommendations were submitted as Supplemental Testimony to the Technological Innovations and Climate Change: Negative Emissions Technologies Inquiry held by the UK Parliament’s Environment Audit Committee in January 2022.

Follow the Bellona Principles

Principle 1 is to emphasize collection of CO2 from the atmosphere. Principle 2 is to store it in a manner intended to be permanent – see also the need to prioritize utilisations which are more durable.  Principle 3 is that monitoring, reporting, and verification approaches must look at all upstream and downstream emissions (regarding both the full life cycle of the product or process and along supply chains), as well as to comprehensively estimate and include them in the balance.  Principle 4 is, at the end of the day, to remove more CO2 than is emitted. 

Prioritize long-term carbon storage and ensure robust life cycle assessment

Removal and long-term storage of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere should take precedence over less durable/stable utilizations of removed carbon.  Utilisation should focus on where it is important to move away from fossil carbon to sustainable carbon, for example, feedstock for building materials (e.g. concrete) or in synthetic aviation fuels in the scope of  Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) mandates.  . 

Appreciate and incentivise scale

Set an aspirational objective of 5 million tonnes per year for permanent carbon removals by 2030. Move towards large-scale demonstration for first-of-a-kind installations, with possible domestic matching support from the EU Innovation Fund and Breakthrough Energy Catalyst, or the Energy Systems Catapult in the UK.

Co-develop with upscaling for CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure

New Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACS) approaches rely on much of the same energy, storage, and utilization infrastructures as point-source carbon capture – which was already introduced to climate policy in 2005, and upscaling of which has been slow to date. Deploying DACS requires building out open access CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure.  It also adds financial longevity to pipelines, given it is a growing industry.

Phase in a robust, reliable carbon price

Carbon is ultimately a waste product, with a limited scale of cascading uses, and as such needs to be treated, and adequately priced, as a pollutant.  Waste removal must be treated as a public good, or it will not occur.  DACS deployment therefore demands a suitably high carbon price to provide a signal to markets and encourage innovation, upscaling, and economies of scale – such activities and aims must be underpinned by strong government funding, incentives, and regulation. 

Ensure coupling with locally appropriate and renewable sources of electricity and heat

DACS should be subject to robust life cycle assessment to ensure its full climate-mitigation potential to be served – and to avoid social legitimacy issues. Innovative couplings of direct air capture with hydroelectricity in Canada and Norway and with geothermal energy in Iceland are already being developed, along with potential couplings with wind energy in Texas and solar energy in New Mexico. Regional deployment across the UK must consider other geographically relevant couplings with renewable energy, possibly in line with the devolved powers, for instance with wind energy in Scotland or even tidal and marine energy in North Wales.

Harness hub deployment

CO2 storage is only available to certain countries. Hubs and spokes can be utilized to transport and store CO2, including through the kind of “Projects of Common Interest” approach utilized for renewable energy facilities, cross-border electric transmission networks, or smart grids.  Open access could be created for CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure, with possible support based on Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation, or the Levelling Up agenda in the UK. Multiple modalities may be needed to transport CO2. In general, support of regional DACS hubs, for purposes of research, development, and deployment, also offer the means for promoting a just transition and levelling up of regions previously linked to fossil fuels.

Maintain separate targets, metrics, and emissions baskets between permanent carbon removal and conventional-emissions reductions

In order to prevent fungibility between measurements of carbon removal and mitigation activities and avoid the impression that the former can be understood to substitute for the latter.  In particular, ensure ‘residual’ emissions from ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors are robustly calculated, as these will demand the first slice of promised permanent engineered carbon removal. This could be one of the next big ‘gaming the metrics’ arenas by exacerbating the double-counting and limited additionality of emission reductions. Net targets must therefore be accompanied by ambitious mitigation action in the near term and safeguards for the role of high-integrity, permanent engineered carbon removal.

Embrace robust certification for carbon removal and integrate into compliance frameworks

This could be achieved through a system for the monitoring and management of captured CO2, through earth systems, along supply chains, and between sectors. Certification should be sufficiently granular to differentiate on the source of CO2 and the degree of permanence of the storage.  Robust certification is essential given the narrow timeline for climate mitigation and so that integration into compliance frameworks for high-integrity, sufficiently permanent carbon removals can be attained by 2025.

Recognize the criticality of social acceptance

DACS will not thrive in areas where it does not have a social license to operate.  Germany and Austria offer examples where the issue of CO2 storage is fraught, limiting the potential for transportation and storage services up to the North Sea. Public and regulatory engagement in line with the principles of a just transition and devolved powers is thus crucial for building legitimacy. This connects back to the need for a hub strategy adjacent to the pursuit of levelling up whereby carbon can be transported out of areas where storage may not be possible, and generally to develop a novel supply chain for a post-carbon society.

Benjamin K. Sovacool, PhD Professor, University of Sussex and Aarhus University

Helen Bray, PhD European Policy Director Carbon Engineering Ltd. EU Transparency Register: 598986244386-27

Dr. Amy Ruddock, VP Europe Carbon Engineering Ltd.

Chad Baum, PhD Research Fellow in Negative Emissions Policy Aarhus University

Sean Low PhD Research Fellow in Negative Emissions Policy Aarhus University

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with:
Posted in All Posts

Follow Sussex Energy Group on Twitter


The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the individual authors and do not represent Sussex Energy Group.

Subscribe to Blog via Email

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 104 other subscribers.


Subscribe to Sussex Energy Group's quarterly newsletter