Germany Adopts “Efficiency First” Principle – Let’s Work to Make it a Reality

Jan Rosenow and Andreas Jahn

The German government recently published its Green Paper on Energy Efficiency and launched a consultation process inviting comments on the ideas put forward in the green book. RAP’s detailed response provides evidence and examples of the essential role that end-use energy efficiency must play in a faster and lower-cost transition to a clean energy economy. The key policy decision is to put “Efficiency First” whenever saving energy is less expensive or more valuable than investing in supply-side energy resources.

Efficiency First is a high-level principle that recognizes the central role that cost-effective energy savings can play in meeting European energy, climate, and economic goals. The green book cites Efficiency First as the guiding principle of future energy policy in Germany. RAP has developed a body of work around best practices for energy efficiency and the principle of Efficiency First, based on deep experience in U.S. states, including integrated resource planning and utility efficiency obligations, as well as a number of European examples developed over the last years. RAP’s Berlin office took the lessons learned globally from successful scale-ups of end-use efficiency and distilled them into a streamlined strategy for integrating Efficiency First into Germany’s legislative and regulatory framework. Germany is the first country in Europe to prominently adopt the Efficiency First principle—RAP welcomes this important first step.

Solar Settlement, Freiburg, Germany. Image by Andrewglaser at English Wikipedia. Attribution CC BY-SA 3.0

Solar Settlement, Freiburg, Germany. Image by Andrewglaser at English Wikipedia. Attribution CC BY-SA 3.0.

The ambition of the Energiewende (energy transition) is high. In addition to its renewables goals, the German government established aggressive targets for improved energy efficiency—a 25 percent reduction in total power consumption by 2050 (relative to 2008), even with the expectation that the heat and transport sectors will drive a significant shift to electricity via heat pumps and electric vehicles. This requires new thinking. The principle of Efficiency First helps to minimise the costs of this transition and increases its feasibility going forward. In the response to the green book, RAP draws on international experience and sets out several concrete policy recommendations for bringing Efficiency First to life.

New decision rules and metrics are needed to ensure that energy suppliers and regulators compare demand-side options with supply-side technologies before committing to major energy projects or new market rules. One approach that falls into this category involves applying the levelized cost of energy, which accounts for all of the costs and benefits of saving or supplying one unit of energy over the lifetime of an energy investment or policy choice. A recent study commissioned by RAP, in partnership with the European Climate Foundation and Agora Energiewende, confirms for Germany what international experience in this area has demonstrated: namely, that comprehensive, long-term, and aggressive investment in end-use energy efficiency in Germany will yield substantial cost savings in the power sector. The value of these savings, in levelized costs, is in the range of € 0.11‑0.15 per kilowatt-hour. Simply put, new efficiency is often cheaper than old coal, and deeper efficiency can greatly lower the cost of the needed switch to renewable power. This is powerful motivation to expand Germany’s efficiency programs, such as those delivered by the KfW Bank, and the new tenders for efficiency investments under the National Action Plan.

In addition, the Efficiency First principle should be applied to infrastructure investment decisions in the power and natural gas sectors. Decision-makers should, as a matter of standard practice, take a “hard look” to determine whether the outcomes sought through investment in utility systems can be achieved at lower cost and lower risk through energy efficiency measures. For example, major grid investments should only be undertaken after considering whether cost-efficient demand-side options could instead address the need for grid upgrades or extensions.

Energy efficiency retrofits in buildings comprise a large portion of the potential for reducing energy consumption in Germany. As part of Efficiency First in Germany, RAP recommends a reform of the property transfer tax in a way that helps building owners to make energy efficiency retrofits at the time of sale, which is often a trigger point for building works. RAP has recently developed such an approach for Germany, drawing on its work in the U.K. on the same issue. At the same time, carefully laid out minimum standards for energy efficiency applicable at the point of sale or rental agreement provide a regulatory option to ensure basic efficiency measures are implemented first. RAP also recommends revisiting the concept of an energy efficiency obligation in Germany as a regulatory tool to assist families and businesses in saving energy and lowering their energy bills on a routine basis.

In response to the green book’s treatment of European energy policy, RAP suggests that the 2030 energy efficiency targets should be binding at the member state and European level (similar to other 2030 targets) and be increased to 40 percent to bring them in line with the 2050 greenhouse gas reduction trajectory.

Over the coming years, Germany will implement the Efficiency First principle—bringing it to life by adjusting existing and introducing new policies to ensure that the Energiewende is both economical and affordable. Let’s get to work and make it happen.

RAP’s full response (in German) to the German Efficiency “Green Paper” can be downloaded here.

This blog was originally posted on the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) website.

 

Jan RosenowDr Jan Rosenow is a Senior Research Fellow for the Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand, based in SPRU at the University of Sussex and a Senior Associate at the Regulatory Assistance Project

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with: , , ,
Posted in All Posts, CIED, energy efficiency

Weighing up the case for shale gas after government gives green light to fracking

By Prof. Benjamin K. Sovacool and Suzanne Fisher-Murray

If they knew about it, what would the residents of Pawnee, Oklahoma in America have thought about Communities Secretary Sajid Javid’s decision to approve plans for fracking at Cuadrilla’s site at Little Plumpton in Lancashire, UK? Due to the government’s landmark decision, UK shale rock will be fracked horizontally for the first time.

Oklahoma’s residents experienced the largest recorded earthquake to date on Saturday 3 September. The 5.8 magnitude earthquake tremors were felt from Dallas to Chicago and a state of emergency was declared. Many smaller aftershocks have been registered since then, including a 3.8 magnitude quake on 9 September and another on 26 September.

image of a shale rig and gas well

Shale rig and gas well in America. The number of earthquakes has dramatically increased in the central USA over the past 6 years. Photo credit: Penn State outreach (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

A new study by the US Geological survey, which looked at both induced and natural earthquakes for the first time, said the risk of earthquake hazards in the central US has undergone the “most dramatic increase in seismicity over the past six years”. The 7 million people who live and work in central and eastern U.S. now face a level of risk similar to that posed by natural earthquakes in California. Oklahoma’s Office of the Secretary of Energy & Environment agrees that the state is experiencing a rise in earthquakes due to the disposal of wastewater generated by the fracking wells.

Given the earthquakes and potential future risks, Oklahomans might be ruing the State government’s decision to invite shale gas investment to the area. Production in Oklahoma has more than doubled since 2005 to more than 128 million barrels in 2014, making it one of the top five oil-producing states in the US.

Gas Security and Policy in America

Business is booming in the the US, which is now sometimes referred to as ‘Saudi America’. It could become a net exporter of oil and gas by 2017 thanks to new technological breakthroughs, such as seismic imaging, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking,’ the process of injecting a mixture of water, sand and chemicals, some of them toxic, into underground rock formations to blast them open and release natural gas. US shale gas production started to expand rapidly in the mid-2000s, growing at more than 45% per year between 2005 and 2010. [PDF]

Shale gas is reversing the decline caused by conventional gas and oil reserves drying up. It is abundant and relatively cheap, reducing electricity and heating costs for consumers and making the US more attractive to manufacturers. It’s cleaner, with half the carbon footprint of dirtier oil and gas, and with lower emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury. Shale gas is phasing out coal. It has already reduced overall US carbon emissions – which is good from a climate standpoint. In addition, combined with renewables, it could provide a path to a low-carbon future, by bridging gaps with more intermittent renewable sources of energy, such as wind and solar power.

Despite the advantages, Oklahoma’s dramatic rise in earthquakes shows that shale gas comes at a cost.

Weighing up the case for shale gas

It’s difficult to do a holistic risk assessment of shale gas because there are different winners and losers in different locations and at different times. It’s not just about costs, but about their timing and their distribution. A lot of the benefits brought by shale gas are immediate: jobs and energy supply. But a lot of the costs are delayed: climate impacts, polluted water, earthquakes that happen a few years later.

The beneficiaries are the companies investing in shale gas, or those connected to the gas transmission grids who benefit from cheaper energy bills. The losers are local communities and communities and species – often thousands of miles away from the drilling site – impacted by climate change.

As set out in Fact and Fiction in Global Energy Policy, the only way to solve global energy issues is to have reasoned, evidence-based debates of the pros and cons. Shale gas brings many benefits, but in order to ensure that we minimise environmental damage, it must be properly governed and it must act as a bridge to helping us adopt renewable technologies.

As with many things, you can do things poorly or properly. It can work if there are stringent safeguards in place, and operational data is transparently shared about water use, volumes and the characteristics of waste water. Many countries, such as China and the USA are struggling to regulate the shale gas industry, and little transparency exists.

In the US, the Haliburton legal loophole prevents fracking companies from being subject to the same level of scrutiny as other energy companies. Inserted into the 2005 energy policy act on the behest of US Vice-President Dick Cheney who had been the Chairman and CEO of Haliburton Company from 1995 to 2000, it strips the US Environmental Protection Agency of its authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing. As a result, it’s far easier to frack than it is to do practically anything else in oil and gas.

Innumerable American companies are not disclosing what they are re-injecting back into their seams. They use a trade secrets argument that if they suddenly disclosed their ‘secret recipe’ that they would go out of business. But that doesn’t hold a lot of weight because fracking is very location specific and each of those wells will have unique characteristics that require different formulas.

These ‘secret recipes’ – often a chemical cocktail – may not remain contained underground. Earthquakes and changes in geology can also change water flows.

Higher standards are needed

The International Energy Agency has set out some ‘golden rules’[PDF] in a report that shows that there are companies operating to high environmental standards, with good synergies with renewables. They can have a positive overall impact on decarbonising the electricity sector. However, there are just as many poor performers in the mix. The shale gas industry needs to need to get rid of the Haliburton loopholes and follow the IEA guidelines. It needs to be properly regulated on the materials and chemicals used and follow stipulated regulations for the disposal of polluted water and for wastewater treatment.

Handmade sign saying frack free

Protest against proposed fracking plans near Blackpool. Photo credit: Victoria Buchan-Dyer (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

In the UK, following small tremors in 2011 at a fracking site near Blackpool, the then Department of Energy and Climate Change introduced new controls and checks for fracking, which include monitoring seismic activity during and after fracking and stopping operations if a tremor of magnitude 0.5 or greater is detected. These stronger regulatory standards show more promise in protecting public safety and the environment than in the US, but they have yet to be put to the test. Until now. Of course, it’s likely that anti-fracking campaigners will delay the process by asking for a judicial review, but it’s a costly process. Cuadrilla says it expects to begin fracking by the end of 2017.

In the meantime, if the residents of Pawnee, Oklahoma are wondering who was responsible for triggering the latest earthquake, where are they likely to find answers? This is part of the problem itself: more wells bring greater risks and less accountability. Companies will say: ‘It wasn’t me. It was her.”

It’s a diffusion of responsibility almost as diffuse as the gas itself.

Read Fact and Fiction in Global Energy Policy

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with: , , , , ,
Posted in Fossil fuels

Why the UK will miss its climate targets without a step-change in building energy efficiency

by Jan Rosenow & Pedro Guertler

The last 18 months have been a major set-back in the British policy landscape affecting carbon emissions from buildings: the trajectory to zero carbon new build has been paused; Government support for Green Deal finance was withdrawn with no alternative mechanisms in place to encourage and enable investment by able-to-pay households; government announced that funding from the Energy Company Obligation will be reduced again; and a review of business energy taxes has led to proposals for a new tax structure but, as yet, no coherent supporting framework to encourage energy efficiency action.

John Willoner's Eco-House at Findhorn. Turf roof, passive solar, solar panel. This image is public domain.

John Willoner’s Eco-House at Findhorn. This image is public domain.

This is despite the fact that an increase in policy action is required: In June, the 5th Carbon Budget was adopted by Government setting firm carbon targets for the period from 2028 to 2032. Parliament approved them in July. Reaching those targets will require bold and ambitious policy action across all sectors.

However, new research by the Association for the Conservation of Energy and the Regulatory Assistance Project paints a worrying picture of the UK’s prospects for achieving its carbon targets in the building sector: the Government’s own projections for abatement show that the UK will not meet the 5th Carbon Budget in buildings. Taken together, policies as they currently stand are projected by the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to achieve a 21% cut in direct emissions from buildings by 2030 compared to 1990, just 12% below the ‘business as usual’ emissions for 2030. This means that the UK’s emissions from buildings will exceed those recommended by the Committee on Climate Change for the 5th Carbon Budget, in 2030, by 18%.

Worryingly, a large part of the projected abatement from buildings (85%) is considered by the Committee on Climate Change to be ‘at-risk’, and after the vote to leave the EU there is uncertainty around which previously EU driven policies driven will remain. In other words, the majority of projected emissions abatement from buildings is seen as uncertain and may not be achieved. It may not be technically possible, and it is certainly not economical, to close this abatement gap in the power, transport and industrial sectors instead.

Consequently, we need to de-risk, reform, extend and expand existing policies, but also introduce new instruments in order to speed up carbon abatement in the buildings sector. Additional regulatory policies such as Energy Efficiency Standards at point-of-sale (as is currently being implemented in France and considered in Scotland) are needed and new build standards need to be tightened towards zero carbon or nearly zero energy. Alongside, a substantial financing scheme offering low-interest loans is required to enable households and businesses to upgrade their properties and make them fit for a low-carbon future.

Our research shows that the benefits of meeting the 5th Carbon Budget in buildings justify considerable public and private investment to capture them. We quantified the main costs and benefits generally considered for formal policy impact assessments, calculated in accordance with official guidance. The result is that the benefits exceed the costs to a similar degree as High Speed 2 (a planned high-speed railway linking London to the north of the UK) and the smart meter rollout. This means that there is a strong economic case for investing in upgrading the UK’s building stock.

We estimate the net benefit from energy savings, emissions savings, improved air quality and health, and comfort and productivity to be in excess of £45bn. And this figure does not include the value of employment needed across the country to deliver the 5th Carbon Budget in buildings, the value of avoided gas imports and improved energy security, the GDP boost it would deliver nor the additional revenue it would generate for the public coffers.

Ensuring this happens depends on the creation of a robust and long-term policy framework that supports the development of sustainable markets for low carbon retrofit and construction. The most strategic opportunity at which such a step-change can be signalled is in the forthcoming Carbon Plan; the Building Renovation Strategy due next spring also presents an opportunity.

 

Pedro Guertler is Research Director for the Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE)

Dr Jan Rosenow is a Senior Research Fellow for the Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand, based in SPRU at the University of Sussex and a Senior Associate at the Regulatory Assistance Project

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Posted in All Posts

Is Brexit an opportunity to rethink UK carbon pricing?

The UK’s exit from the European Union will make changes to UK carbon pricing unavoidable. Given the complexities and inefficiencies of the current policy mix, could Brexit be viewed as an opportunity for radical policy change in this area? And, if so, what is likely to be the best outcome?

The UK played a critical role in establishing the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the EU’s flagship climate policy. The UK has also provided an important and influential voice in the repeated attempts to reform the scheme and to tighten the overall cap. Despite the continuing problems of oversupply and low carbon prices, the EU ETS remains the EU’s flagship climate policy, and looks likely to retain that status for quite some time. In this context, Brexit creates two important challenges. It creates uncertainty about the future development of:

  • UK carbon prices with potentially negative implications for low-carbon investment in the UK
  • EU carbon prices, including the risk that Phase 4 of the EU ETS will be less stringent as a result of the UK’s withdrawal. If EU allowance prices continue on their downward trajectory, the limited incentives provided by the EU-ETS will be further undermined.

The timing of any changes in the UK’s involvement in the EU-ETS is important and will depend upon the broader timing of the Brexit process, and in particular when Article 50 is triggered. The preferred breakpoint for changes to the UK’s involvement would be end-December 2020 when Phase 3 comes to an end. If, however, the breakpoint comes earlier during Phase 3 or (more likely) later during Phase 4, it is likely to create messy difficulties in managing the transition which will only add to the burden on civil servants – as well as increasing the uncertainty for investors.

The nature of the UK’s future involvement in the EU-ETS is likely to be critical for the success of UK climate policy – and early guidance on this will be important for investor confidence. At present, there appear to be three options for UK carbon pricing post-Brexit, namely the Norway model, the Linking model and the Unilateral model.

The Norway model would involve the UK joining the European Economic Area (EEA) and thereby gaining full access to the single market. This would require the UK to fully adopt EU standards and regulations, including the EU ETS. This model currently applies to Iceland and Liechtenstein, as well as Norway, and, since it allows full participation in the EU ETS, would involve the minimum of changes to UK legislation. The critical drawback of this model is that it gives the UK little or no influence on the content of relevant EU legislation, including future targets in the EU ETS. Since this runs counter to the intent of the ‘Leave’ campaign, full participation in the EAA seems unlikely to be politically feasible, thereby ruling out the ‘Norway model’ for the EU ETS.

The Linking model would involve the UK establishing its own emissions trading scheme and then negotiating a bilateral link with the EU ETS under the terms of Article 25 of the Directive. This approach is currently being followed by Switzerland – although the agreement has not been finalised. Switzerland is one of four members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and, although joining EFTA may bring some benefits to the UK, it should not be a precondition for establishing a link to the EU ETS. Creating a separate emissions trading scheme and negotiating the terms of linking is likely to be a time-consuming process, although it could be greatly simplified by modelling the UK scheme as closely as possible on the current rules of the EU-ETS.

The main benefit of linking would be to reduce UK compliance costs through EU-wide allowance trading. But if the EU allowance price continues to be extremely low throughout Phase 4, this could also be considered a drawback. Oversupply in the EU ETS led the UK to impose a Carbon Price Floor (CPF) on the fuels used for electricity generation as a second-best means of encouraging domestic low-carbon investment. But while this may facilitate the low carbon transition in the UK, it provides no additional environmental benefit. Any additional abatement in the UK simply ‘frees up’ EU allowances that can be either sold or banked, and hence used for compliance elsewhere within the EU ETS, with the result that the CPF achieves no additional reduction in carbon emissions.[1] In addition, while the CPF raises the net carbon price faced by UK installations, it lowers the EU ETS allowance price. This means that any additional incentive to low carbon investment in the UK is offset by a reduced incentive for low carbon investment in the rest of the EU.

Identical comments apply to policies encouraging renewable electricity generation or improvements in the efficiency of electricity use. Hence, if the UK continues to participate within EU-ETS – either directly, or indirectly via a link – the ultimate environmental benefits of any policies that affect the ‘trading sectors’ in the UK will be contingent on the stringency of the EU-ETS cap. And post Brexit, the UK will no longer have any influence on the negotiation of that cap.

A third way: the UK establishes its own carbon pricing scheme

These problems point to the potential benefits of a third Unilateral model in which the UK establishes its own domestic carbon pricing scheme, but does not – at least at this stage – seek a link to the EU-ETS. This could take the form of a domestic emissions trading scheme, or it could be a revenue neutral carbon tax that either covered the same sectors or extended more widely throughout the economy. For example, such a tax could apply downstream to the public, commercial and industrial sectors, or upstream to fossil fuel producers – thereby encompassing the entire economy.

Of these two options, a carbon tax with a broad tax base has much to commend it. At present, the UK has a complex and overlapping mix of policies, including the Climate Change Levy, Climate Change Agreements, Carbon Price Floor and (until 2019) the Carbon Reduction Commitment. These policies  distort the incentives for emission reduction between sectors and fuels, increase the administrative burden for industry and regulators, and create opportunities for rent seeking and regulatory capture. As demonstrated by this report from 2002, this problem goes back many years.

Withdrawal from the EU ETS could provide the opportunity to rationalise and simplify this policy mix, while at the same time replacing the low and volatile carbon price from the EU-ETS with a higher and stable carbon price that gave confidence to investors and underpinned the UK carbon budgets. In the absence of a link to the EU-ETS, such a tax would also ensure that low carbon investment in the UK led to real emission reductions. With a wide base, such tax could also generate substantial revenue that could be used to reduce distortionary taxes, compensate losers or fund other low carbon investments.

As ever, the major political obstacles to such a tax would be the potential impact on low-income households and on energy intensive industries. These obstacles also apply to the EU-ETS, but the low carbon prices observed to date have made them less salient. Although these obstacles are challenging to resolve, potential solutions are available for both. For example, unlike the levies used to fund schemes such as the Renewables Obligation, the revenue raised from a carbon tax may be used to compensate low-income households. Similarly, energy intensive industries could potentially be protected through a system of border carbon adjustments (BCAs). While this would be challenging to establish, the UK’s exit from EU may make the process more straightforward.

In addition, a domestic carbon tax would not rule out the benefits of international carbon trading, since it should be feasible to develop some form of link in the future – either to the EU ETS, or to the broader international scheme that may evolve from the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. For example, companies could be allowed to pay taxes at a higher level than their obligation and thereby receive tax credits that could be sold into an ETS. A robust carbon pricing scheme in the UK may also have an indirect but potentially positive influence upon future negotiations of the EU ETS, through encouraging agreement on a more stringent cap.

The political and practical challenges of redesigning UK carbon pricing should not be underestimated. Moreover, given the current political climate and the multiple difficulties created by Brexit, the political will to do so may not be there. Nevertheless, the UK’s exit from the EU makes significant changes to the current system unavoidable. Given the drawbacks of the Norway and Linking models, and the complexities and inefficiencies of the current policy mix, Brexit could be viewed as an opportunity (a policy window) for radical policy change in this area.

[1] The resulting allowance surplus and low carbon price may encourage the negotiation of a more stringent cap in subsequent phases, but this indirect impact is highly uncertain.

Professor Sorrell is currently Professor of Energy Policy in the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex, Co-Director of the Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED) and member of the Sussex Energy Group (SEG).Steve Sorrell

*Image by Arnold Paul cropped by Gralo shared under Creative Commons licence (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with: , , ,
Posted in All Posts, CIED

We Need a Lorry-Load of Energy Savings; in the new ECO, the Government Delivers a Hatchback

by Jan Rosenow and Richard Cowart

The United Kingdom was once a world leader in energy savings. We proved that investing in buildings, insulating lofts, and switching to efficient boilers, motors, and lighting created jobs, saved money, and lowered the environmental costs of energy systems. But in recent years we have turned our back on our own evidence, reducing the breadth and depth of energy efficiency programmes.

In this less ambitious scene, the government has finally revealed its plans for the next phase of the Energy Company Obligation (ECO). Happily, the new version contains some important design improvements over earlier plans. Unhappily, the programme as a whole is still too narrow and too small, failing to deliver bill savings to the vast majority of UK households (businesses remain unserved too). Read more ›

Follow Sussex Energy Group Facebooktwitterlinkedin
Tagged with: , , ,
Posted in All Posts, CIED, energy efficiency

Follow Sussex Energy Group on Twitter

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the individual authors and do not represent Sussex Energy Group.

Subscribe to Blog via Email

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 102 other subscribers.

Archives

Subscribe to Sussex Energy Group's quarterly newsletter