Limits to growth or opportunities for prosperity?

Last week, in a hot and crowded room deep within the Houses of Parliament, myself and fellow researchers from The Sussex Energy Group (SEG) and The Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand attended the launch event of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Limits to Growth. The APPG, chaired by Green MP Caroline Lucas and co-chaired by Scottish National Party and Labour MPs, aims to “provide a new platform for cross-party dialogue on economic prosperity in a time of environmental and social transition” [pdf].

Based on the (in)famous landmark publication by the Club of Rome in 1972, Limits to Growth takes a critical analytical look at an array of social, economic and environmental parameters and attempts to model possible future societal outcomes. The results paint a fairly bleak picture; two thirds of the scenarios predicted the future collapse of population, caused in part by food shortages and/or excessive pollution, by the mid- to late-21st century. This, the authors argued, suggested that we must reconsider what it means to live on a finite planet with an ever-growing economy.

Image of a graph

Models of Doom – societal collapse predicted in LtG’s standard run. Jackson & Webster: “Limits Revisited” (pdf), 2016, fig. 1.

SEG, via its home institution Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), has a certain degree of affiliation with this topic. For one, Caroline Lucas, the UK’s first Green Party MP, is the MP for Brighton & Hove, with the University of Sussex falling within her constituency boundary. Moreover, though, SPRU was one of the early critics of the Limits to Growth report. Shortly after its publication, Chris Freeman and other SPRU titans produced a trenchant critique, in part arguing that its authors had paid far too little attention to the potential for technology and innovation to bolster productivity and stave off the deleterious effects of resource depletion. “Malthus with a computer”, others suggested, would prove to be just as duly discredited as was the original 19th-century cleric.

Controversy aside, the publication certainly helped to spark a much-needed debate on humanity’s use of resources, and remains the highest-selling environmental title to date. Nearly half a century later, the APPG, with the help of Tim Jackson (author of Prosperity without Growth) and Anders Wijkman (co-author of the original report), have returned to the subject to see what has changed. Evidently, society hasn’t collapsed. Although, more a cause for concern, many of the parameters in the “standard run” of the original model have tracked reality well in the intervening years. The concept of “Planetary Boundaries“, which has gained prominence in recent years, also suggests that we are, in some respects, beginning to irreversibly overshoot certain aspects of the Earth’s carrying capacity, namely in the domains of climate change, biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle. This certainly rings true with some of the Limits’ suggestions.

Limits to energy use – energy or carbon decoupling?

As scholars of energy demand and efficiency, what have we witnessed in the intervening years and what can we say about the future?

Many interpreted the original Limits theory as suggesting that we would “run out” of non-renewable resources before the end of the 20th century or soon thereafter; evidently not the case. However, the quality of unconventional resources being extracted is certainly diminishing. Although the Peak Oil debate is on something of a hiatus, the Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI) of shale oil and other unconventional fuels is much lower than that of conventional production. A declining productivity of resources – both in terms of EROEI and economic return – was in fact one of the predictions of the original Limits report. Whilst we may currently be seeing an era of abundance due in part to ever-more efficient road vehicles as well as a geopolitically motivated excess of supply, this hasn’t translated into the conventional boon for global economic growth many expected it to be.

Of course, the debate around whether or not we can continue to experience green growth on a finite planet relies upon our ability to decouple GDP from carbon emissions (as well as other environmental damages, of course, but our focus here is primarily on carbon). Whether or not this requires a decoupling of energy use from economic growth depends upon the ability to decarbonise our primary energy supply and reach “net zero emissions”. The feasibility of doing so remains to be seen.  The process of capturing waste carbon dioxide (CO2), called Carbon Capture and Storage, and nuclear energy have faltered somewhat, biomass for energy  faces huge land competition, and whilst renewables are looking increasingly promising, their deployment remains in its nascent stages. Embracing energy-GDP decoupling, then, may be necessary too. This would entail increasing the efficiency with which we convert primary energy into its useful forms, as the inputs to energy services we demand as users. Energy efficiency has been touted as a “first fuel”, yet still doesn’t receive quite the same level of attention as the construction of big, shiny new power stations.

Primary energy decoupling in the UK. Left: Total primary energy supply in TJ, red (IEA) and real GDP in £bn 2000, blue (ONS), 1960-2013. Right: Decline in the ratio TPES/GDP.

Primary energy decoupling in the UK. Left: Total primary energy supply in TJ, red (IEA) and real GDP in £bn 2000, blue (ONS), 1960-2013. Right: Decline in the ratio TPES/GDP.

Empirical data suggests that many countries in the developed world are decoupling primary energy use from economic growth. In the UK, for example, primary energy consumption has declined whilst GDP growth has remained positive in recent years; the ratio of the two (the “economic intensity of primary energy”) has thus fallen. Does this disprove the theoretical basis for the Limits? Perhaps not. This “absolute decoupling” is far less than the required levels to fully dematerialise the economy, and the rather crude primary energy intensity measure belies the significant levels of embodied energy within our imported goods.

But recent research also suggests that looking at primary energy is getting the wrong end of the stick. Rather, energy demand should be examined at the useful stage (and in reality, useful exergy is the more appropriate measure). It would appear, according to some authors, that the ratio of useful exergy to GDP is more constant than that of primary energy. If this were the case, there would be implications for the extent to which energy-GDP decoupling can occur through energy efficiency alone, suggesting that decarbonisation should be a high priority, as well as a potential shift in focus from efficiency to sufficiency.

Limits to growth or opportunities for prosperity?

How politically feasible would a transition to a steady-state, or low/no growth economy be? How might we prioritise measures of wellbeing other than GDP? Are any of these even necessary? It was admittedly a pleasant surprise to see these issues having made their way even to Westminster, even if it was just a stuffy committee room. Of course, there still remain significant political challenges for a sensible discussion on environmental limits vs green growth, such as the dominant neoclassical economic paradigm which enjoys the favour of policymakers. But with the threats of secular stagnation, rising inequality and incessant climate change increasingly obvious, perhaps even the formation of the APPG in itself should be a celebrated as an opportunity to open up the discussion of our future prosperity – economic or otherwise – to those who would otherwise ignore it.

Biography

photo of Jack MillerJack Miller began his PhD with SPRU and CIED in September 2014, conducting research into the role of energy efficiency in economic growth.  His work centres upon the concepts of ‘exergy’ and ‘useful work’, or the portions of energy inputs into the economy which can prove useful to economic activity and societal needs.  He completed an MSc in Energy Policy for Sustainability with SPRU in 2014, having undertaken a project looking at the prospects for future shale gas development in the US.  He has a degree in Physics (MPhys hons, University of Sussex, 2013), and has previously taught maths and physics from KS3 to first-year undergraduate level.

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Intermediary actors in low energy transitions

Intermediary actors can be crucial for bringing about low energy transitions. This blog explores what they are and provides some key insights about intermediaries in low energy transitions.

It has long been recognised that changing the way we produce and use energy is of crucial importance to tackle the challenges related to depleting fuel resources and their environmental impacts. For things to change, actors facilitating these processes and connecting people are important.

The capital city of Helsinki, Finland, has set up an innovation unit, Forum Virium, which coordinates the construction of a smart city district within the city combining the use of several innovations, including solutions for energy storage and management, car-free blocks and services, including a smart application which allows residents to control appliances, lighting and heating remotely. In this development, according to ongoing work by Eva Heiskanen and Kaisa Matschoss, Forum Virium has acted as an intermediary identifying new innovations and organising networking events for information sharing, among other things.

An image of One Brighton, which is ten stories high.

One Brighton. Credit: Dr Mari Martiskainen

In the UK, an independent organisation, called Bioregional, has been a crucial intermediary in low- carbon building projects. In Brighton, Bioregional acted as a developer for One Brighton, a multi-residential energy-efficient, insulated and triple glazed building heated by woodfuel pellets with a community space and social housing developed to the principles of One Planet Living.  It builds on the experience of BedZED, a pioneering low energy housing development built in early 2000s in London. With Mari Martiskainen we have explored how Bioregional acted as an intermediary to One Brighton in several ways. It created a tangible vision for the building project by adapting previous learning from projects like BedZED, carried out project management activities and connected the local council, the builder and the local community together.

These kinds of Innovation intermediaries are organisations – or sometimes individuals – which can act as go-betweens for people, funds, knowledge and ideas that in combination may result in innovation. Intermediaries may:

  • connect actors that have not previously connected with each other
  • fill knowledge deficits by transferring information from one source or actor to others
  • match-make between actors to connect human and financial resources with innovation processes, or
  • create demand for policy change without driving the interests of any specific party.

Despite the important role that they can play, these intermediary actors in energy transitions are often invisible and their roles under-played. A workshop held on March 9-10 co-organised by the TRIPOD project and Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED), aimed to better understand the role that intermediary actors in energy transitions play. Three important insights were made:

1. What’s the role of innovation intermediaries? 

Innovation intermediaries can drive change (akin to innovation champions or institutional entrepreneurs) or mediate and connect individuals, groups, resources and knowledge across sectors (and so are sometimes called boundary spanners, knowledge brokers or hybrid actors). While many intermediaries act as distributed change agents across networks and systems, intermediaries can take on broader roles and operate on many levels. The kind of roles innovation intermediaries carry out depend on their focus, degree of financial or political independence and mandate, among other things.

Examples from the processes of creating low-energy buildings, installing heat pumps and setting up community energy schemes presented at the workshop showed how intermediation has evolved from simple advice and information dissemination to the development of tools, business partnerships, professional services, and policy advocacy.

For example, in the context of low energy building, intermediaries can:

  • facilitate building projects, create niche markets and implement new practices in public housing stock at a local level
  • feed local building project and planning innovations to national planning or to the global business of low-energy building
  • facilitate or configure new business development in national and local levels; and
  • advocate changes in the regional and national building regimes by influencing politicians, building industries, house buyers and others.

Perhaps a key question is what kind of intermediaries are most useful to advance sustainable energy transitions, and can such intermediaries be intentionally orchestrated? And should they? These are pertinent areas for further research.

2. What kind of intermediary activities will bring about more sustainable energy systems? 

The intermediary activities required are likely to differ depending on the phase of energy transition or the stage of innovation. This is also likely to define the extent to which intermediation between actors and processes is needed at all. Also, intermediary actors may experience favourable or hostile contexts, which require different strategies. We scholars continue to have different interpretations on the scale and definition of intermediation activity. In the workshop, there were differences in opinion regarding the degree of advocacy and of neutrality (intermediaries as benefactors or businesses) that the intermediary actors possess, or should possess. What we did agree on, however, was the need to make intermediation more visible. This is a fine balance however, as intermediaries should not take centre stage if they are to act as effective brokers between actors.

3. What do intermediaries deliver? 

Intermediation focuses on delivering a key object or a service. This can range from shared energy output (from a community energy scheme, for example) and technologies (such as heat pumps) to more broadly facilitating low-energy transitions or niche areas, like low-energy buildings. The focus partly determines if the intermediary is regarded as neutral (politically, financially or technologically) or if it seeks to advance particular interests. Both types are needed but, it was felt by workshop participants that the intermediaries’ stance should be made explicit to others.

Why are our insights relevant? When making recommendations as to how we can achieve more sustainable energy systems, it is important to acknowledge the role of different intermediary actors and their associations. We also need to differentiate between those kinds of intermediary activities that are fundamental for low-energy transitions from those that are beneficial or even detrimental. In addition, we need to know if policies or community experiments are dependent on particular intermediaries to make them successful.

Paula Kivimaa is Senior Research Fellow at SPRU working for the Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED). She is also Senior Researcher at the Finnish Environment Institute SYKE and Docent at Aalto University School of Business. Paula leads the CIED project on Low Energy Housing Innovations and the Role of Intermediaries. She is also member of the TRIPOD project consortium. Her current research interests include policy analysis from low-carbon innovation and transition perspectives, as well as policy complementing approaches to support low-carbon innovation, such as intermediation.

Sussex Energy Group members Dr. Mari Martiskainen, Professor Adrian Smith and Dr. Jake Barnes also contributed to the workshop.

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What would Brexit mean for UK energy efficiency policy?

Only 10 weeks and UK voters will make the most profound decision of this decade – will Britain stay or leave the European Union? There have been numerous analyses of what the implications of a so-called Brexit might be. Those include the economic impacts, security, and sovereignty.

In this blog I will discuss one specific area that would be significantly affected by Brexit but where an analysis is missing so far: energy efficiency. Historically, the EU had little influence on national energy efficiency but this has changed particularly in the last years. A number of important directives set EU-wide standards and targets for energy efficiency.

One of those directives is the Ecodesign Directive that requires manufacturers of electrical appliances to increase the energy efficiency of their products over time with increasing standards. This has had large benefits for households and businesses across Europe and also in the UK, even though outrage about bans of the least efficient vacuum cleaners have been making headlines in British tabloids for some time now. In case of products, Brexit is unlikely to substantially alter the status quo as product manufacturers importing their appliances to the UK market are likely to use EU requirements as a benchmark rather than producing a dedicated (low-efficiency) tranche of products for the UK market. Equally, UK manufacturers are likely to design their products according to EU norms so that they can export easily.

However, Brexit would have more profound implications in another area – buildings. New buildings need to meet energy efficiency standards set by the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In order not to lock in investments into inefficient buildings that require upgrading in the future it is crucial that all new buildings are built to a high efficiency performance level. Recent policy changes such as scrapping the zero carbon homes target show that buildings energy efficiency is not quite on top of the political agenda right now. Without a strong EU driver the future energy performance of new buildings is likely to be jeopardised.

Most significantly though Brexit would mean that the UK no longer needed to comply with the Energy Efficiency Directive which requires all Member States to set firm energy saving targets covering all sectors to reach the EU’s 20% energy efficiency target by 2020 (and subsequent targets thereafter). In particular, Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive is a key provision that obliges Member States to calculate their own savings targets, and demonstrate how it will deliver the target between 2014 and 2020. If Britain exited the EU it would not longer be required to achieve those targets.

One could argue that the UK would simply replace EU legislation with national policies. However, recent policy changes in the UK do not instil a lot of confidence that there would be a strong national energy efficiency drive. As a result, progress would stall with little energy efficiency improvements in a country that still has one of the oldest and leakiest housing stocks in Europe. Whilst EU energy efficiency policy is by no means perfect, it plays an important role for achieving a long-term transition towards a more sustainable, modern and fairer energy system. The prospect of a Brexit in June this year is all but encouraging for the future of energy efficiency in Britain.

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Britain is sending a huge nuclear waste consignment to America – why?

A very unusual exchange is about to take place over the Atlantic. The UK is sending some 700kg of highly enriched uranium to be disposed of in the US, the largest amount that has ever been moved out of the country. In return, the US is sending other kinds of enriched uranium to Europe to help diagnose people with cancer.

The vast majority of the UK’s waste comes from its fleet of nuclear power stations. Most of it is stored at the Sellafield site in north-west England. But the material being sent to the US is a particularly high (weapons usable) grade of enriched uranium that you wouldn’t want to move to Sellafield from its current location at Dounreay in the north of Scotland without building a new storage facility – presumably more expensive than the cost of transportation.

The decision to move this radioactive waste out of the UK has been presented as making it harder for nuclear materials to get into the hands of terrorists, but this is implausible. The UK is capable of managing homegrown highly enriched uranium itself. The plan also contradicts the principle that countries are responsible for managing their own nuclear legacy.

The announcement draws new attention to an old issue: how to find a long-term solution to nuclear waste. Countries with atomic weapons or civilian nuclear power have been wrestling with this for several decades. This is partly because the problem was neglected for years, but more fundamentally because governments have failed to develop a strategy acceptable to the communities affected.

This reflects the uniqueness of the problem, of course – we are talking about substances which could harm human health for tens of thousands of years into the future. It raises profound ethical issues of equity between generations.

Deep burial

The scientific community does in fact agree on how to dispose of these materials safely: deep underground in appropriate geology such as clay or granite, with well engineered radiation barriers as an extra defence. Yet only Sweden and Finland, with political systems built on more trust and consensus than most countries, have a clear repository plan – and it will be several years before they become operational.

Most of the storage facilities at Sellafield are designed to last mere decades. The UK has been sporadically focused on deep disposal since the early 1980s, but for a long time approached it top-down and secretively. This became known as the “DAD” method – decide, announce, defend. But it has always led to “abandon” when local communities, having had no part in the siting decision, have rebelled successfully.

It was not until 2008 that the government introduced a system of rules under which local communities would conditionally volunteer a site and then negotiate a deal with the authorities. So far it has produced no result: attempts by district councils around Sellafield to volunteer it were overruled in 2013 by Cumbria county council, the local-authority tier above them, and no other communities have come forward. The government has reserved the right to override the voluntary process but shows no sign of doing so yet.

In such circumstances it becomes tempting to look for short cuts. One occasionally raised is to put all the world’s problematic waste somewhere very remote like the west Australian desert. This is a non-starter. The Czech and Slovak experience illustrated this. As a single country they planned a single repository, but after their “velvet divorce” each insisted it would not permanently manage the other’s waste. Such an international solution also contradicts the aforementioned issue of being responsible for your own legacy.

The other major hope is that science will find a convincing way either to use waste as fuel for reactors, and/or that “partitioning and transmutation” would drastically reduce the half-lives of the relevant isotopes. Yet these approaches are complex and expensive, involving molten salt reactors or accelerator-driven systems. And critically, there would still be some volume of long-lived waste that needed to be managed – no method can yet promise to drastically reduce the half-lives of all the different waste types. The only credible way forward is deep burial.

Sellafield

In the absence of a deep-disposal plan, the UK has a more immediately pressing issue – what to do with Sellafield’s contaminated materials and waste from the UK’s near-70 years in the nuclear power and weapons business, much of which is housed in dilapidated facilities that are not fit for purpose. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)
expects it will cost some £68 billion to clean up Sellafield by stabilising and safely packaging the waste and building new stores. This will only be completed by around 2120.

This problem is at least now getting serious attention and resource – despite the climate of public austerity. Currently the country is spending over £1.5 billion a year on the site, which is one of the most hazardous in Europe.

Sellafield stores a further 140 tonnes of waste plutonium that also stems from British and some overseas nuclear power. If used in bombs this amount could obliterate humanity several times over. The NDA is now focusing on what to do about this too, after years of political inattention. Yet the decision-making is laboured and the currently favoured solution of using the plutonium as fuel for conventional reactors lacks credibility – no operator wants to use plutonium-based fuel because it is more difficult and expensive to manage than conventional fuel; and moving it around the country is a security risk.

So nuclear waste remains the Achilles heel of the nuclear industry, in the UK and elsewhere. While the financial problems behind the proposed new nuclear station Hinkley Point C attract most of the headlines, the waste problem hangs over the industry behind the scenes. Until we find a way forward that is scientifically and politically acceptable, it will continue to do so.Gordon smiling

Gordon MacKerron, Professor of Science and Technology Policy, SPRU.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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How do EU Member States implement Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive?

The European Parliament commissioned Dr Tina Fawcett from Oxford University and I in my capacity as Senior Research Fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit to write a report on how EU Member States have implemented Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive.

Article 7 is a key provision of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) which established a set of binding measures to help the EU reach its 20% energy efficiency target by 2020. Each member state (MS) has to calculate its own savings target, and demonstrate how it will deliver the target between 2014 and 2020.

Flags of EU member states at the entrance of the European Parliament in Brussels.

Flags of EU member states at the entrance of the European Parliament in Brussels. Credit: European Parliament / Pietro Naj-Oleari. (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The findings in this report are based on publicly available data, including formal notifications by member states, additional information in National Energy Efficiency Action Plans and Article 7 annual reports from 2015. Article 7 is deliberately flexible; it allows MS to choose how to deliver their savings commitments. Each MS has chosen a different mix of policies to deliver savings. Further, even policies which might seem similar, such as Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (EEOS), can be very different in intent, design and delivery. This heterogeneity of policy responses necessarily makes any form of independent policy evaluation across MS very challenging – and the analysis can only be as good as the data provided by MS.

National savings targets for 2014-2020 must be based on a savings rate of 1.5% per year compared to the average energy consumption in the period 2010-2012. However, the final energy savings target may be lower than this headline rate for two reasons. Firstly, MS can exclude the energy consumption of particular sectors, most significantly the transport sector. Secondly, Member States can use exemptions, reducing the original target by up to 25%. The combined effect of these factors is that the notified saving targets are only about half of what they would be without those adjustments i.e. the annual saving rate of 1.5% is reduced to about 0.75%.

In total, Member States implemented or plan to implement 479 policy measures. Five Member States have notified a single policy measure for the implementation of Article 7: Denmark, Poland and Bulgaria, and Luxembourg notified only EEOS whereas Sweden exclusively uses an energy/CO2 tax. In contrast, others such as Germany or Slovakia adopted 112 and 66 policy instruments respectively.

The largest share of the overall savings is expected to be generated by Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (34%), financing schemes or grants (19%), and from taxes (14%) – all financial measures. The remaining savings come from regulation / voluntary agreements (11%), standards and norms (9%) with smaller contributions from training, national energy efficiency funds, energy labels and any other policy measures. In terms of sectors, most savings are expected from multi-sector ‘cross cutting’ policies (44%), followed by buildings (42%), industry (8%) and transport (6%). Analysis shows that there are considerable uncertainties around the reliability of the energy savings estimates provided by Member States.

EEOS are a key policy tool being used to deliver Article 7 savings. There are sixteen member states with existing or planned EEOS, which include five longer-established EEOS. EEOS can be a very successful policy, delivering substantial savings at low cost. However, there is a risk that new EEOS will not have sufficient time to allow for the gradual introduction, increasing of savings targets, learning by stakeholders, and re-design where necessary which were key features of the successful schemes in Denmark, France, Italy and the UK. On this basis, the following countries are risk of under-delivery: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain. Given the problems with Phase 1 of its EEOS, that of Poland must also be at some risk. For countries where EEOSs are expected to deliver a considerable proportion of their savings, this matters.

Case studies of good and poor practice in meeting the requirements of Article 7 can help illustrate how MS can improve their reporting, compliance and policy design and implementation. A number of good practice and poor practice case studies are reported including examples relevant to additionality, double counting, monitoring and verification, and penalties.

An overarching energy efficiency target is an important part of EU policy, but ultimately the efficacy of Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive will depend on the policies implemented by MS to deliver those targets. There is uncertainty about the reliability of savings expected, with the main areas concern being: the risk of non-additionality; weak or even absent monitoring and verification regimes; and methodological issues related to the calculation of energy savings. A significant share of the expected savings is at risk of not being delivered in practice. This puts into question whether the EED will achieve its aims.

A number of suggestions for policy reform were developed that would strengthen the Directive and increase the reliability of the anticipated energy savings. Overall, the lack of clarity of the requirements with regards to what is required and how it needs to be reported can be addressed by more detailed provisions, extensive guidance, and reporting templates that ensure Member States follow a more consistent approach in calculating the savings and reporting them as well as outlining their monitoring and verification regimes.

Read the full report.

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