Britain is sending a huge nuclear waste consignment to America – why?

A very unusual exchange is about to take place over the Atlantic. The UK is sending some 700kg of highly enriched uranium to be disposed of in the US, the largest amount that has ever been moved out of the country. In return, the US is sending other kinds of enriched uranium to Europe to help diagnose people with cancer.

The vast majority of the UK’s waste comes from its fleet of nuclear power stations. Most of it is stored at the Sellafield site in north-west England. But the material being sent to the US is a particularly high (weapons usable) grade of enriched uranium that you wouldn’t want to move to Sellafield from its current location at Dounreay in the north of Scotland without building a new storage facility – presumably more expensive than the cost of transportation.

The decision to move this radioactive waste out of the UK has been presented as making it harder for nuclear materials to get into the hands of terrorists, but this is implausible. The UK is capable of managing homegrown highly enriched uranium itself. The plan also contradicts the principle that countries are responsible for managing their own nuclear legacy.

The announcement draws new attention to an old issue: how to find a long-term solution to nuclear waste. Countries with atomic weapons or civilian nuclear power have been wrestling with this for several decades. This is partly because the problem was neglected for years, but more fundamentally because governments have failed to develop a strategy acceptable to the communities affected.

This reflects the uniqueness of the problem, of course – we are talking about substances which could harm human health for tens of thousands of years into the future. It raises profound ethical issues of equity between generations.

Deep burial

The scientific community does in fact agree on how to dispose of these materials safely: deep underground in appropriate geology such as clay or granite, with well engineered radiation barriers as an extra defence. Yet only Sweden and Finland, with political systems built on more trust and consensus than most countries, have a clear repository plan – and it will be several years before they become operational.

Most of the storage facilities at Sellafield are designed to last mere decades. The UK has been sporadically focused on deep disposal since the early 1980s, but for a long time approached it top-down and secretively. This became known as the “DAD” method – decide, announce, defend. But it has always led to “abandon” when local communities, having had no part in the siting decision, have rebelled successfully.

It was not until 2008 that the government introduced a system of rules under which local communities would conditionally volunteer a site and then negotiate a deal with the authorities. So far it has produced no result: attempts by district councils around Sellafield to volunteer it were overruled in 2013 by Cumbria county council, the local-authority tier above them, and no other communities have come forward. The government has reserved the right to override the voluntary process but shows no sign of doing so yet.

In such circumstances it becomes tempting to look for short cuts. One occasionally raised is to put all the world’s problematic waste somewhere very remote like the west Australian desert. This is a non-starter. The Czech and Slovak experience illustrated this. As a single country they planned a single repository, but after their “velvet divorce” each insisted it would not permanently manage the other’s waste. Such an international solution also contradicts the aforementioned issue of being responsible for your own legacy.

The other major hope is that science will find a convincing way either to use waste as fuel for reactors, and/or that “partitioning and transmutation” would drastically reduce the half-lives of the relevant isotopes. Yet these approaches are complex and expensive, involving molten salt reactors or accelerator-driven systems. And critically, there would still be some volume of long-lived waste that needed to be managed – no method can yet promise to drastically reduce the half-lives of all the different waste types. The only credible way forward is deep burial.

Sellafield

In the absence of a deep-disposal plan, the UK has a more immediately pressing issue – what to do with Sellafield’s contaminated materials and waste from the UK’s near-70 years in the nuclear power and weapons business, much of which is housed in dilapidated facilities that are not fit for purpose. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)
expects it will cost some £68 billion to clean up Sellafield by stabilising and safely packaging the waste and building new stores. This will only be completed by around 2120.

This problem is at least now getting serious attention and resource – despite the climate of public austerity. Currently the country is spending over £1.5 billion a year on the site, which is one of the most hazardous in Europe.

Sellafield stores a further 140 tonnes of waste plutonium that also stems from British and some overseas nuclear power. If used in bombs this amount could obliterate humanity several times over. The NDA is now focusing on what to do about this too, after years of political inattention. Yet the decision-making is laboured and the currently favoured solution of using the plutonium as fuel for conventional reactors lacks credibility – no operator wants to use plutonium-based fuel because it is more difficult and expensive to manage than conventional fuel; and moving it around the country is a security risk.

So nuclear waste remains the Achilles heel of the nuclear industry, in the UK and elsewhere. While the financial problems behind the proposed new nuclear station Hinkley Point C attract most of the headlines, the waste problem hangs over the industry behind the scenes. Until we find a way forward that is scientifically and politically acceptable, it will continue to do so.Gordon smiling

Gordon MacKerron, Professor of Science and Technology Policy, SPRU.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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How do EU Member States implement Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive?

The European Parliament commissioned Dr Tina Fawcett from Oxford University and I in my capacity as Senior Research Fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit to write a report on how EU Member States have implemented Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive.

Article 7 is a key provision of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) which established a set of binding measures to help the EU reach its 20% energy efficiency target by 2020. Each member state (MS) has to calculate its own savings target, and demonstrate how it will deliver the target between 2014 and 2020.

Flags of EU member states at the entrance of the European Parliament in Brussels.

Flags of EU member states at the entrance of the European Parliament in Brussels. Credit: European Parliament / Pietro Naj-Oleari. (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The findings in this report are based on publicly available data, including formal notifications by member states, additional information in National Energy Efficiency Action Plans and Article 7 annual reports from 2015. Article 7 is deliberately flexible; it allows MS to choose how to deliver their savings commitments. Each MS has chosen a different mix of policies to deliver savings. Further, even policies which might seem similar, such as Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (EEOS), can be very different in intent, design and delivery. This heterogeneity of policy responses necessarily makes any form of independent policy evaluation across MS very challenging – and the analysis can only be as good as the data provided by MS.

National savings targets for 2014-2020 must be based on a savings rate of 1.5% per year compared to the average energy consumption in the period 2010-2012. However, the final energy savings target may be lower than this headline rate for two reasons. Firstly, MS can exclude the energy consumption of particular sectors, most significantly the transport sector. Secondly, Member States can use exemptions, reducing the original target by up to 25%. The combined effect of these factors is that the notified saving targets are only about half of what they would be without those adjustments i.e. the annual saving rate of 1.5% is reduced to about 0.75%.

In total, Member States implemented or plan to implement 479 policy measures. Five Member States have notified a single policy measure for the implementation of Article 7: Denmark, Poland and Bulgaria, and Luxembourg notified only EEOS whereas Sweden exclusively uses an energy/CO2 tax. In contrast, others such as Germany or Slovakia adopted 112 and 66 policy instruments respectively.

The largest share of the overall savings is expected to be generated by Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (34%), financing schemes or grants (19%), and from taxes (14%) – all financial measures. The remaining savings come from regulation / voluntary agreements (11%), standards and norms (9%) with smaller contributions from training, national energy efficiency funds, energy labels and any other policy measures. In terms of sectors, most savings are expected from multi-sector ‘cross cutting’ policies (44%), followed by buildings (42%), industry (8%) and transport (6%). Analysis shows that there are considerable uncertainties around the reliability of the energy savings estimates provided by Member States.

EEOS are a key policy tool being used to deliver Article 7 savings. There are sixteen member states with existing or planned EEOS, which include five longer-established EEOS. EEOS can be a very successful policy, delivering substantial savings at low cost. However, there is a risk that new EEOS will not have sufficient time to allow for the gradual introduction, increasing of savings targets, learning by stakeholders, and re-design where necessary which were key features of the successful schemes in Denmark, France, Italy and the UK. On this basis, the following countries are risk of under-delivery: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain. Given the problems with Phase 1 of its EEOS, that of Poland must also be at some risk. For countries where EEOSs are expected to deliver a considerable proportion of their savings, this matters.

Case studies of good and poor practice in meeting the requirements of Article 7 can help illustrate how MS can improve their reporting, compliance and policy design and implementation. A number of good practice and poor practice case studies are reported including examples relevant to additionality, double counting, monitoring and verification, and penalties.

An overarching energy efficiency target is an important part of EU policy, but ultimately the efficacy of Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive will depend on the policies implemented by MS to deliver those targets. There is uncertainty about the reliability of savings expected, with the main areas concern being: the risk of non-additionality; weak or even absent monitoring and verification regimes; and methodological issues related to the calculation of energy savings. A significant share of the expected savings is at risk of not being delivered in practice. This puts into question whether the EED will achieve its aims.

A number of suggestions for policy reform were developed that would strengthen the Directive and increase the reliability of the anticipated energy savings. Overall, the lack of clarity of the requirements with regards to what is required and how it needs to be reported can be addressed by more detailed provisions, extensive guidance, and reporting templates that ensure Member States follow a more consistent approach in calculating the savings and reporting them as well as outlining their monitoring and verification regimes.

Read the full report.

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Budget 2016: Stakeholders await crucial policy clarity

“What do we want? Clarity over the Levy Control Framework! When do we want it? In the Budget would have been nice…”

On Wednesday, the Chancellor unveiled his 2016 Budget. Reports have unsurprisingly focused on the sugar tax (which some would argue has provided a distraction from some of the more contentious points of the Budget), the controversial decision to convert all schools to academies, and the significant downturn in economic growth forecasts. Energy announcements were generally fairly low-key: the headline announcements included the scrapping of the Carbon Reduction Commitment (to be replaced by increases in the Climate Change Levy), a big tax cut for oil and gas producers who are struggling with low fossil fuel prices, £730m for new Contracts for Difference (mainly for offshore wind), and some funding for demand response, storage and Small Modular Nuclear Reactors. Read more ›

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Should Fracking Decisions be made locally?

Shale gas exploration in the UK has been in the headlines, but little activity has taken place so far. Whether unconventional gas should be part of the UK energy mix is not only the question of economic viability but also of public support. Jim Watson, Professor of Energy Policy at SPRU and Director of UKERC, argues in his latest blog for The Conversation Read more ›

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Why South Africa is finding it difficult to wean itself off coal

Dr Lucy Baker

Lucy Baker, University of Sussex and Jesse Burton, University of Cape Town

South Africa has made domestic and international commitments to climate change mitigation. But the country continues to depend on coal-fired power plants, which provide 92% of its electricity. A key challenge for the country in dealing with electricity shortages is that the bulk of power comes from coal, which is harmful for the environment and local communities.

The electricity sector is responsible for almost half of South Africa’s carbon emissions. As discussed in our recent report, it will be difficult to overcome the important contribution that coal makes to the electricity sector and the economy.

Decarbonisation in the electricity sector cannot be achieved without reducing the absolute contribution of coal-fired power. This can be achieved by introducing a range of low-carbon energy options. These include wind, solar photovoltaics and concentrated solar power, in addition to rapidly developing technologies for energy storage. Demand-side measurement and energy efficiency could also play a key role. All these measures and interventions offer significant potential.

But moving away from coal is proving difficult.

Political tensions

The reasons for South Africa’s electricity crisis are long-term and complex. They include a severe backlog in maintenance of its plants and delays in the construction of new power plants. This poses several opportunities and challenges.

The opportunities it presents include increasing the contribution of renewable energy to the national power supply. But can renewable energy compete with existing coal-fired power and a potential nuclear fleet? And can renewable energy be implemented in a way that prioritises socio-economic well-being and transparent and democratic policy processes? In other words, will the country’s moves towards a lower-carbon economy incorporate a “just transition”?

Among the challenges is the fact that South Africa’s electricity crisis is compounded by a lack of transparency in decision-making and political power struggles. For example, there are long-standing tensions within the ruling party and the tripartite alliance made up of the African National Congress, the trade union congress and the South African Communist Party. These tensions can be found in the ideologically driven disagreement between those who want a liberalised electricity market and those who want the government to hold onto the crisis-ridden, state-owned utility, Eskom.

In addition, recent steps toward transparent and democratic energy planning and policies have been undermined. For example, the latest revision of the Integrated Resource Plan for electricity has been put on ice.

The electricity master plan was launched in 2011 following a prolonged and intense stakeholder engagement process. It covers the country’s total demand requirements from 2010 to 2030.

According to the plan, an electricity project must align with the technological allocations set by the country’s electricity plan to be granted a license. The plan includes:

  • a cap on CO2 emissions,
  • plans to include 17GW of renewable energy that will deliver 9% of supply by 2030,
  • 9.6GW from a nuclear fleet.

Coal, nevertheless, dominates the electricity generation mix.

The nuclear complication

South African President Jacob Zuma and Russian President Vladimir Putin have discussed the option of nuclear energy for South Africa.
Reuters

In 2013 a revised Integrated Resource Plan was put out for public comment. This was in keeping with the expectation that the original would be updated on a biennial basis. It proposed lower electricity demand because of a decline in economic growth, higher prices and increased energy efficiency. The revised plan also stated that commitments to long-range, large-scale investment decisions should be avoided. Notably the revised demand projections suggested that:

no new nuclear baseload capacity would be required until after 2025 and, for lower demand, not until at earliest 2035.

The revised plan is unlikely to be approved because it seriously challenges the case for the proposed 9.6GW nuclear power programme.

The cost of the programme has yet to be determined and it is still unclear if it will be affordable. This programme, which is being pushed by the Presidency, is tied up in broader political wrangling. Serious questions over affordability have been linked to the firing of the finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015 who opposed the programme on the grounds of cost.

If the nuclear programme is approved, it will shape the country’s electricity mix, infrastructure and related tariffs for years to come. While it may reduce carbon emissions in the long term, this will come at a greater cost than other options.

The role of renewables

South Africa has made a significant move toward decarbonisation through a renewable energy procurement programme. Launched in 2011, the programme followed the inclusion of a carbon constraint in the country’s Integrated Resource Plan for electricity. Since then there has been significant growth in the renewable sector backed by South Africa’s banks and private investors.

The country’s renewable energy programme is internationally celebrated as a success for the procurement of renewable energy from independent power producers. In addition the costs of these renewable energy technologies have decreased dramatically in the past four years. Utility-scale wind and solar photovoltaics are now cost competitive with Eskom’s new-build coal.

Grid-tied, roof-top solar photovoltaics are also rapidly emerging, despite the continued absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. These are being installed by wealthy households and businesses who are trying to buy independence from an increasingly unreliable grid and rising electricity tariffs.

Some large industrial players are also trying to connect their own generation plants to the grid through wheeling agreements. These involve independent power producers selling electricity to a third party via Eskom’s grid.

These agreements suddenly seem more attractive in light of the supply-side crisis and the uncertainty of Eskom’s ability to meet the electricity demand.
But they have been stymied because rules around their cost have not been established.

The final piece of the puzzle is to ensure that all decarbonisation efforts and energy supply reach low income consumers. If the country’s tariffs continue to increase it will become even more difficult for the lower income bracket to have access to modern energy services.

The Conversation

Lucy Baker, Research Fellow, International Relations, The Sussex Energy Group, Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex and Jesse Burton, PhD Candidate in energy and industrial policy, economic history, domestic and international coal markets, the mining and minerals sectors, and state-business relations in South Africa, University of Cape Town

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

You can read more about Lucy Bakers new research, and her fellowship awarded by the 2015 SAIS-CARI Fellowship Program into the drivers and obstacles to the expansion of Chinese renewable energy activities in South Africa; in the Sussex Energy Group blog post ‘Understanding China’s involvement in South Africa’s Renewable Energy Sector

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The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the individual authors and do not represent Sussex Energy Group.

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